Editor’s note:This article was the history brief for the October 2021 meeting of the Cleveland Civil War Roundtable.
The Cleveland Civil War Roundtable just returned from our excellent fall field trip planned by President Mark Porter to Chickamauga and Chattanooga. Therefore, I thought that it would be appropriate to focus on some aspect of the field trip for this history brief. During our battlefield visits it became obvious to me that the stand of the 21st Ohio Volunteer Infantry Regiment at Snodgrass Hill would be ideal. Our guide, Robert Carter, termed it every bit as heroic and consequential as the stand of the 20th Maine on Little Round Top at Gettysburg. Indeed, the length of the line defended by the 21st Ohio was far greater than that of the 20th Maine at the end of its line. Also, the stand of the 21st Ohio was longer in duration, as it began in the early afternoon and ended with the fall of darkness.
Editor’s note: This article is the history brief for July 2021. Because the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted the in-person meetings of the Cleveland Civil War Roundtable in the 2020-2021 season, this history brief was submitted during the following summer and not as part of a monthly meeting.
We pick up where we left off last month with the second underground mine explosion by the Union on July 1, which destroyed the Confederate’s Third Louisiana Redan in the fortified line defending besieged Vicksburg. This was the second such detonation at this redan. The first was followed by a failed Union assault. After the second blast no assault was attempted pending General Grant’s desire to do so at such time when numerous underground mines could be detonated simultaneously.
Editor’s note: This article is the history brief for June 2021. Because the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted the in-person meetings of the Cleveland Civil War Roundtable in the 2020-2021 season, this history brief was submitted during the following summer and not as part of a monthly meeting.
We pick up from last month’s history brief where we left off in the wake of Grant’s second major assault on the prepared defenses of the Vicksburg fortress. It was marginally more successful than the hasty first attack of the May 19 and was deliberately planned, complete with an early morning prebombardment. The assault succeeded in taking the Railroad Redoubt for several hours but seriously threatened only one other major defensive work, that being the Second Texas Lunette. Overall, the attack was another disappointing setback. Going forward, Grant would more patiently await the demise of the Vicksburg garrison via siege warfare, which inevitably over time would exhaust its food, stores, and munitions. Ultimately, in Grant’s mind, it should force a C.S.A. surrender by their Commanding General Pemberton.
Editor’s note: This article was the history brief for the May 2021 meeting of the Cleveland Civil War Roundtable.
We left off in February with Union General Grant’s army defeating Pemberton at Champion Hill and in turn the Confederate rear guard bridgehead on the Big Black River, the latter bolstered mainly by a cunningly opportunistic charge led by the inspiringly huge and unforgettable General Lawler. As a result, on the morning of May 18, 1863, Grant issued orders to McClernand’s and McPherson’s corps to advance the seven remaining miles between the Big Black and the rebel fortifications ringing Vicksburg and sent Sherman’s corps to seize the high ground north of the city.
Editor’s note: This article was the history brief for the February 2021 meeting of the Cleveland Civil War Roundtable.
We left off in January with General Grant’s three corps of about 30,000 soldiers advancing westward toward Vicksburg, Mississippi. Grant had just defeated General Johnston, who was in overall command of rebel troops in the west, at the state capital, Jackson. On May 16, 1863, Grant had McPherson’s corps on or near the railroad line with McClernand’s corps south of McPherson’s. Following close behind was Sherman’s corps after carrying out Grant’s orders to destroy the military and manufacturing value of Jackson – he burned the city so badly to the ground that henceforth it became known as “Chimneyville.”
Editor’s note: This article was the history brief for the January 2021 meeting of the Cleveland Civil War Roundtable.
We left off last December with General Grant having advanced from his Mississippi River Bruinsburg landing south of Vicksburg. From there, he went on to win a small but sharp battle in front of Raymond, just west of the Mississippi capital, Jackson. However, before we progress I would like to pause and thank our president, Steve Pettyjohn, for providing modern photos from his extensive collection of some of the places mentioned in these history briefs last month and going forward.
Noted Civil War author Shelby Foote used a picturesque phrase to describe William T. Sherman’s repeated maneuvering around Joseph E. Johnston during Sherman’s drive through Georgia toward Atlanta. Foote called this a “red clay minuet.” It was at the first battle of Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign, the Battle of Rocky Face Ridge, that the Union general devised the dance steps that he employed for his minuet with Johnston. At the Battle of Rocky Face Ridge, Sherman used a coordinated series of maneuvers to compel Johnston into abandoning his strong position and give ground toward Sherman’s ultimate objective: the city of Atlanta. Except for the disaster at Kennesaw Mountain, Sherman sent his forces on similar coordinated maneuvers throughout his thrust toward Atlanta and thereby forced Johnston to fall back all the way to the objective that Sherman was seeking to reach.
William T. Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign was instrumental in ensuring the completion of the Union victory in the Civil War, because its culmination, the capture of the city of Atlanta, enhanced support of the war effort in the North by giving Northerners hope that the war could soon end in defeat of the Confederacy. This likely contributed greatly to Abraham Lincoln’s re-election, which meant that the war would be continued and the Confederacy defeated. Much of Sherman’s progress toward his objective of Atlanta was achieved by maneuvering his adversary, Joseph E. Johnston, out of one strong position after another followed by Johnston falling back closer and closer to Atlanta. Sherman’s tactic of maneuver around Johnston’s strong positions, rather than direct assault on those positions, was devised and first employed at the Battle of Rocky Face Ridge, the opening battle of the Atlanta Campaign. Because of this, and because the Atlanta Campaign, as stated above, was the most significant military action in ensuring the completion of the Union victory, the Battle of Rocky Face Ridge, which is not a well-known battle, is proposed in this four-part article as the decisive battle of the Civil War. As discussed in Part 1, the intent in nominating this battle as the most decisive is to provide an unconventional and hopefully thought-provoking point of view and to show how a seemingly insignificant battle can have important ramifications. Part 1 of this four-part article describes the Battle of Rocky Face Ridge, while Part 2 focuses on how Sherman used the tactics that he employed at Rocky Face Ridge in the early phases of the Atlanta Campaign. Part 3 continues this story and includes the one battle in the campaign in which Sherman deviated from this pattern, with disastrous consequences.
One very effective way to instigate a lively discussion among a group of Civil War enthusiasts is to propose a specific battle as the decisive battle of the Civil War. It is likely that the people in the group will follow up by making their own proposals for the decisive battle, which will probably result in a number of different battles being suggested for this distinction, among them Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Antietam, and Chancellorsville (because of the mortal wounding of Stonewall Jackson), if not others. This four-part article proposes a different (and obscure) battle as the decisive battle of the Civil War: the Battle of Rocky Face Ridge, which was the opening battle of William T. Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign. This battle is nominated as the decisive battle of the war because it set the pattern for the entire Atlanta Campaign, and the Atlanta Campaign, as argued in this four-part article, was the most significant military action in ensuring the completion of the Union victory. Part 1 of this article focuses on the beginning of the Atlanta Campaign at Rocky Face Ridge and how one of Sherman’s subordinates missed an opportunity to possibly eliminate Joseph E. Johnston’s Confederate Army of Tennessee and thereby remove the only significant military force between Sherman and Atlanta. Part 2 continues the story of how the Battle of Rocky Face Ridge set the military pattern that Sherman used throughout his Atlanta Campaign.
One of the much debated topics about the Civil War is which battle was the decisive battle. Much effort and time have been expended in support of one or another Civil War battle for this distinction. A great deal of energy and thought have also been devoted to the point of view that no Civil War battle merits this title. Herein is offered another nomination for this designation as well as the case for this contention. Note that the choice of the word “contention” is intentional, because the battle which is proposed as the most decisive is not one which is likely to be selected and which is instead likely to provoke disagreement. Rather than championing this battle as the most decisive, the intent is to provide a different and hopefully thought-provoking point of view about a little-known Civil War battle, the ramifications of which are greater than the apparent insignificance of the battle. The battle in question is Rocky Face Ridge, the opening battle of William Tecumseh Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign. This battle is nominated as the decisive battle of the war because it set the pattern for the entire Atlanta Campaign, and the Atlanta Campaign, as argued below, was the most significant military action in ensuring the completion of the Union victory.