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THE STRATEGY OF THE CIVIL WAR

by

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LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

1. It is not necessary for me to tell you how much I appreciate the honor and privilege of being your guest tonight and allowed to initiate what I hope will be a discussion of a subject, heretofore only treated vaguely by our historians and as elusive for the researcher as your Jo Shelby was for the Union commanders in this Trans-Mississippi Department. Indeed, I am doubtless overbold in attacking this subject, the Strategy of the Civil War. Let me assure you that I do so only as one of the skirmishers who used to be sent out to explore the ground and clear the way for the attacking columns, leaving to you the mission of the latter and to your professional historians the bringing up of their heavy artillery.

2. The manifest lack of any overall strategic plan, adopted and adhered to by either side, has unjustly been blamed by some upon short comings in the course of instruction at the Military Academy. In the first place, the mission of West Point was to turn out competent company officers with a background of general education that would permit them to develop into capable commanders with experience and study; in the second place, Prof. Dennis H. Mahan did give a course of lectures on the Art of War, a synopsis of which was contained in a little 300 page manual with the engaging, if ponderous, title: Advanced-Guard Outpost and Detachment Service of Troops, with Essential Principles of Strategy and Grand Tactics for the Use of Officers of Militia and Volunteers.

3. Looking back over Mahan's writings we can only be astounded at his keen military perception and almost prophetic teachings. Speaking of the book Outpost, too soon forgotten and now disparaged, Col. Ernest Dupuy says: "The most striking thing about it, when analyzed today, is its illustration of Mahan's genius . . . Comparing the art of war with the fixed sciences, Mahan remarks, 'How different is almost every military problem, except in the bare mechanism of tactics. In almost every case the data on which a solution depends are lacking. . . Too often the general has only conjectures to go on, and these based on false premises . . . what is true now, at the next moment may have no existence, or exist in a contrary sense . . . These considerations explain why history produces so few great generals.'" And then again dimly foreseeing the late German Blitzkrieg, he goes on, "Speed is one of the characteristics of Strategic Marches . . . in this one quality lie all the advantages that a fortunate initiative may have procured . . . by rapidity of movement we can, like the Romans, make war feed war. No great success can be hoped for in war in which rapid movements do not enter as an element. Even the very elements of nature seem to array themselves against a slow and ever prudent general . . . "

4. Finally it is noteworthy that Jomini, the accepted military authority of the day, had written: "War once decided upon, it will be necessary to make if not a complete plan of operations, which is always impossible, at least a system of operations in which an objective is proposed and a base secured." It was not until the invention of the telegraph made the overall control of armies in different and widely separated theaters of operation possible, and the railroad made the shifting of considerable bodies of troops from one theater to another practicable, that is, until the experience of the Civil War itself showed that such a general strategic plan, as Jomini had thought impossible, was not only possible but necessary, that the present recognition of the need for such a plan became a tenet of the Art of War. Indeed, this was one of the major lessons that came out of the Civil War. We can hardly blame the commanders in general for not having anticipated this lesson, and must give credit to the one who did appreciate it and by its successful application finally brought the War to a close.

5. Moreover, military strategy must necessarily, especially in a republic, follow the political objectives and policies. It can hardly anticipate them, and for the first year, at least, these political objectives were gradually changing and developing. As the threat of war grew, the political objectives of the slave states was to obtain possession of the Federal arsenals and war equipment and arms, and of the coast forts. Appreciating this, General Scott as early as 29 October, 1860 recommended a reinforcement of the coast garrisons, even insisted upon a personal interview with the President (Buchanan); but in vain.

6. It is pertinent that General Scott greeted the new President on March 4, 1861, with a letter discussing the situation, and stating the alternative political strategic courses open to him. He estimated that to reconquer the seceded States would require a force of at least 300,000 men, maintained at that strength, for two or three years, would involve the loss of a third of that number, and would cost $250,000,000. In view of this, he rather favored letting the "wayward sisters" go. - It must be admitted that the old Commander of the Army made a pretty good strategic estimate in spite of his physical afflictions.

7. While Fort Sumter was being bombarded and before Virginia had seceded President Lincoln summarized his political strategy to a Virginia delegation: "In every event I shall, to the extent of my ability, repel force by force. In case it proves true that Fort Sumter has been assaulted . . . I shall perhaps cause the U. S. Mails to be withdrawn from all the States which claim to have seceded, believing that the commencement of actual war against the Government justifies and possibly demands this. I scarcely need to say that I consider the military posts and property situated within the States which claim to have seceded as yet belonging to the Government of the United States as much as they did before the supposed secession. Whatever else I may do for this purpose, I shall not atempt to collect the duties and imposts by any armed invasion of any part of the country; not meaning by this, however, that I may not land a force deemed necessary to relieve a fort upon a border country. I shall feel myself at liberty to repossess, if I can, like places which had been seized before the Government devolved upon me." It is noteworthy that there was no threat of invasion or violation of the territory of the seceded States, beyond the recovery of Federal property.

8. But as you well know, all efforts at reconciliation failed, and the opening gun of a shooting war was fired April 12th at Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor by order of General Beauregard. It is worth recording that the Confederate Secretary of State, Robert Toombs, at the cabinet meeting to consider the Charleston situation had warned: "The firing upon that fort will inaugurate a civil war greater

than any the world has yet seen . . . You will wantonly strike a hornet's nest which extends from mountains to ocean, and legions now quiet will swarm out and sting us to death. It is unnecessary; it puts us in the wrong; it is fatal."

9. One can but sympathize with President Lincoln at this time. He had to determine what he should do and what he legally could do to save the Union, while distracted by the time consuming and agonizing job of organizing his new administration under the spoils system and providing immediately for the protection of a Capital located in the enemy's country, after the riots in Baltimore cut communications with the North and Virginia seceded. He described the situation without exaggeration when he said he felt like a man letting lodgings in the front of his house when the back was on fire. Moreover, the Treasury was empty and the country broke. The Buchanan Administration's last effort to raise a loan had failed miserably. The offers received were economically inacceptable. We can understand Lincoln's plaint, "Why don't they come? Why don't they come?" when the troops ordered to the Capital were trying to reach there in spite of cut rail and telegraph communications. But he proved equal to the emergency.

10. April 15, 1861, he issued a proclamation, under authority of the 1795 Act, calling on the States for 75,000 militia for three months and convoking Congress for the following July 4th. The response was almost embarrassingly enthusiastic. As Emerson wrote: "At the darkest moment in the history of the republic, when it looked as if the nation would be dismembered, pulverized into its original elements, the attack on Fort Sumter crystallized the North into a unit and the hope of mankind was saved." The President took advantage of the enthusiasm and on May 3rd issued a proclamation calling into service 64,478 three-year volunteers for the Army and 18,000 for the Navy, bringing the aggregate force proposed, including an increase in the Regular Army, to 181,461 men of whom 75,000 were only to serve three months.

11. April 19th the President declared a blockade of the entire coast of the Seceded States. I think the strategic importance of this action has not been emphasized enough. Of course, the pitifully small navy could not do an effective job at all in the beginning, but the Navy grew with great rapidity and learned to make its blockade more and more effective; although never nearly perfect, it did accomplish much in persuading the people of the South of the hopelessness of the struggle. You will be surprised, as I was, that according to the Cambridge Modern History between October 26, 1864, and January, 1865, it was still possible for 8,632,000 lbs. of meat; 1,507,000 lbs. of lead; 1,933,000 lbs. of saltpeter; 546,000 pairs of shoes, 316,000 pairs of blankets; half a million pounds of coffee; 69,000 rifles and 43 cannon "to run the blockade into the Port of Wilmington alone," while cotton sufficient to pay for these purchases was exported. It is easy to justify the labor and time put in by the Union Army and Navy, and consequent losses suffered, to capture Wilmington.

12. In the matter of calling out troops, the Confederate Government had been ahead of the Union, April 8 and 16, the Confederate Secretary of War had called on the then seceded States for 21,000 volunteers then 32,000 more. April 17 President Davis by proclamation called for applications for letters of marque and reprisal. The Confederate Congress that convened April 29 recognized the state of war and was asked by Jefferson Davis for authority to call for 100,000 men in addition to the 82,000 already called.

13. The war was on, and circumstances had shifted the strategic objectives of each combatant. Evidently, the Confederacy's political and military objec-

tives were to win over the still doubtful States and to defend its own territory; while the Federal Government was faced with trying to keep the doubtful States from joining the Confederacy and to reconquer the Seceded States, a Herculean undertaking. It is interesting that such British military authors as General J. F. C. Fuller and Colonel G. F. R. Henderson considered that the Federal Government, in spite of the North's greater population and industrial development, took on an almost impossible task in the reconquest of the Confederacy, and that nothing but complete conquest would bring the "erring sisters" back into the Union. But the people of the North did not appreciate this fact. They hoped and believed that a battle won would do the job. In the newly created crisis, neither side had or could very well make any over-all coordinated plan to accomplish its objectives.

14. Things were happening fast, and consideration for my audience limits me to enumerating but a few events of strategic importance:

(1) April 17: Virginia seceded.

(2) April 18: Confederate volunteers occupied Harper's Ferry. Five companies of Pennsylvania volunteers from Harrisburg reached Washington.

(3) April 20: Col. Robert E. Lee was given, and accepted, command of Virginia's troops. On January 23, 1861, he had written his son: "Secession is nothing but revolution. The framers of our Constitution never exhausted so much labour, wisdom, and forbearance in its formation, and surrounded it with so many guards and securities, if it was intended to be broken by every member of the Confederacy at will. It was intended for 'Perpetual Union,' so expressed in the preamble, and for the establishment of a government, not a compact, which can only be resolved by revolution or the consent of all the people in convention assembled."

(4) April 21: Confederate volunteers occupied the Norfolk Navy Yard.

(5) April 22: At the request of the War Department, Illinois militia was hurried to, and garrisoned, Cairo.

(6) April 24: Gen. Lee writes to Gen. Ruggles on the Rappahannock: "You will act on the defensive"; and on the 26th to Cocke on the Alexandria line: "It is important that conflict be not provoked until we are ready."

(7) April 25: 7th New York reached Washington.

(8) April 26: 21,000 stands of arms; 110,000 musket cartridges; and 2 field pieces shipped from the St. Louis Arsenal to Alton, Ill.

(9) April 27: McClellan, not yet back in Federal service, proposed to Scott a double invasion in the Western Theater of Operations with 80,000 men from Gallipolis via the valley of the Great Kenewah on Richmond, with a right flank guard left at Ironton and a prompt movement on Louisville or the heights opposite Cincinnati. As an alternative, he proposed crossing "the Ohio at Cincinnati or Louisville with 80,000 men, march straight on Nashville, and

thence act according to circumstances."

(10) April 30: Lincoln authorized Col. Lyon to muster in 10,000 men for the protection of citizens and U.S. property in St. Louis, and to proclaim martial law.

(11) May 3: The Department of Ohio (Illinois, Indiana and Ohio) was established with McClellan in command.

(12) May 3 and 21: Scott in two letters to McClellan proposed his Anaconda plan, establishing a cordon of posts along the Ohio and a moving column of 60,000 regular and especially instructed volunteers to start down the Mississippi, partly marching and partly by boat, to extend the cordon there and so blockade the principal seceding states by land. To this he added, "the greatest obstacle in the way of this plan - the great danger now pressing upon us - is the impatience of our patriotic and loyal Union friends. They will urge instant and vigorous action, regardless, I fear, of consequences . . . "

(13) The enthusiasm in response to Lincoln's action and the assurance that the administration was bent upon re-establishing the Union solved the economic problem for the time being, and Secretary Chase was able by May 8 to have a loan of $10,000,000 financed and then an additional $23,000,000.

(14) May 10: Gen. Lee given command of all Confederate troops in Virginia, and Col. Lyon captures the Confederate militia in Camp Jackson, St. Louis.

(15) May 13: Queen Victoria's declaration of neutrality.

(16) May 14: Eads sent to McClellan with design for river gun boats.

(17) May 16: Commander John Rodgers sent to Cincinnati "to establish naval armament on Mississippi and Ohio Rivers."

(18) May 24: Arlington Heights and Alexandria occupied by Union troops.

II. THE STRATEGIC SITUATION

15. Thus the stage was set for the first modern war. Jomini had written that "strategy is the art of making war on a map, the art of including the entire theater of war; tactics is the art of combat on the ground itself . . . " Commanders on both sides complained of the lack of good maps. We know of Lew Wallace's costly mistake of roads on the first day of Shiloh. Richard Taylor attributed the lack of Confederate success in the Seven Days Battles to lack of reliable maps. Certainly there was a serious lack of good local maps, which gave an advantage to the Confederates, as they could most easily obtain reliable and loyal guides. But as will be seen from the maps in the Library of Congress, the over-all maps of the country were good enough for general strategic planning, if not for grand tactics planning in the individual theaters of operation.

16. The limitations of the separate theaters of operation, imposed by the natural topographic features of the terrain, are known to you. As no military opera-

tions of strategic importance took place in the Pacific Theater, and only one campaign of no ultimate significance in the Mountain Theater, we may disregard them. During the period when the fight was primarily on the Confederate side to secure possession of the border States and add them to the Confederacy, while the Union objective was to prevent this and protect the Union sympathizers in these States, some very hard fought battles (Carthage, Mo., 5 July 1861; Wilson's Creek, 10 August '61; Pea Ridge, Ark., 6-8 March 1862) took place in the Trans-Mississippi Theater, ending with Banks's nearly disastrous campaign against Shreveport, an objective it never reached, in the spring of 1864; but on the whole the operations in this theater affected the outcome of the war and over-all strategy only insofar as the troops in it co-operated with the forces east of the Mississippi, which they rarely did. The campaigns of strategic effect, therefore, took place essentially in the theater between the Mississippi and the Appalachian Mountains, and in the theater east of the latter.

17. In these two, which for convenience we may designate as the Western and Eastern Theaters, respectively, of great strategic importance were the rivers and railroads, the latter a new and vital element in the logistics and the former, because of the introduction of armored river gun boats and the river steam boats of considerable capacity, put to a new important tactical use. Here again were innovations impinging on the previous practice and theory of warfare.

18. And now, returning to the high command and over-all plan, Scott's Anaconda was largely inspired by his belief that any overt invasion of Southern territory would arouse the anti-Union spirit in the doubtful states, and that aggressive action should be delayed until at least a part of the new levies had been duly trained. As to the former view, on the contrary the Union sympathizers were begging for a show of force to support them. McClellan's campaign in western Virginia (July 6 - 25) resulted in the separation of the western counties from the Old Dominion; Lyon's prompt action saved Missouri from secession; the Union effort to secure eastern Tennessee, where there was almost universal loyalty to the Federal Government, was carried on with alternating success and failure throughout the duration of the war and was one of President Lincoln's constantly urged strategic objectives; Kentucky's effort to observe neutrality failed before the invasion of Confederate forces, and strategic Paducah was seized without resistance by the new Union Commander at Cairo on September 6th. In the meantime the Confederate forces were fortifying many points they considered it was important to hold, disregarding the alleged sovereignty of the States. It was a peculiarity of this war that there was no over-all continuous front. The general line of each side was marked by the scattered and discontinuous outposts of different territorial departments. A beaten army could often retire until the pursuit stopped from exhaustion and lack of supplies, and reform and recover while the victorious force was reforming for a new start.

19. The first pitched battle, Manassas or Bull Run, (21 July 1861) was a good example of this. It is interesting that, when it became evident that the Administration would succumb to the pressure for action to the demand "on to Richmond", old Colonel Sylvanus Thayer, for so many years Superintendent at West Point and in 1860 living in retirement at Braintree, Mass., told his nephew Jonathan B. Moulton: "Whoever makes the first aggressive move will be beaten. The greater the numbers, the more certain their defeat. Let one division be driven to rout and the whole pack will run like children from an apple orchard when set upon by dogs . . . To make good soldiers out of good materials, they must be drilled by competent men; to make a good army out of the best men will take three years. We should act on the defensive as much as possible until our army is better drilled.

I pray the South makes the first move." But McDowell and the Army of the Potomac were condemned by political strategy to suffer the ordeal.

III. TWO YEARS OF ISOLATED CAMPAIGNS WITH LIMITED OBJECTIVES

20. Manifestly, the safest and quickest line of invasion of the South in the Western Theater of Operations was by the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, supported by the newly developed gun boats; and so we see Fort Henry approached by an amphibious force and constrained to surrender by a Naval Bombardment alone, then a quick midwinter march across the neck of land to Fort Donelson and its capture after some hard fighting, February 6 - 15. This broke the center of the Confederate line, and was so serious a blow that the Confederates abandoned their fortified position at Columbus, a railhead on the Mississippi, and withdrew from Bowling Green also a railroad junction. Prof. Fiebeger in his Campaigns of the American Civil War wrote: "The capture of Fort Donelson by raw troops in mid-winter was one of the most remarkable events of the war and reflected great credit on Grant to whose energy it was due. His promptness in closing the gap made by Pillow's attack sealed the fate of the Confederate garrison."

21. Albert Sidney Johnston, commanding the Confederate forces in the Western theater now conceived and started to carry out the most strategic plan they ever attempted: He concentrated his forces at Corinth, a very important railroad center, and proposed with his superior force to fall on the Union Army assembling at Pittsburgh Landing (the Army of the Tennessee), and then turn on Buell's force (the Army of the Cumberland) which would doubtless attempt to join the former. While the attack at Shiloh on April 6 had considerable initial success, it was finally repulsed, in spite of Lew Wallace's getting on the wrong road and Buell's leading division having dragged its feet and not got to the field of battle until the repulse was definite and Johnston had been killed in rallying his troops for another charge. The next day the repulse was turned into definite defeat, so decisive that a month later the Confederate army abandoned Corinth and its fortifications to Halleck's united force without resistance, - a major strategic mistake. Never again did the Confederates attempt a coordinated attack of their combined forces in the Western Theater of Operations.

22. In the Eastern Theater both sides were concentrated on what General Schofield called "territorial Strategy" - "the worst form of operations in such a war is 'territorial strategy', or that which aims at the capture and occupation of territory as a primary object. The best is that which aims at the destruction or capture of the opposing armies as the first and only important object. Grant at Donelson, Vicksburg and in Virginia best illustrated this kind of strategy." To be sure the capture of the enemy's capital will always have a serious effect on the loser but the government can move elsewhere and continue to function in spite of the disruption of administrative functions and the blow to its prestige. It is only when the capital is also the heart of the country and of greatest strategic importance itself, that the blow need be fatal.

23. This is perhaps the place for another comment: In the Civil War both sides adopted the territorial assignment to command which had been prevalent in the old army. Commanders were usually assigned to command a department, not a mobile army, and were not supposed to go outside their own territorial assignments except into unassigned territory occupied by the enemy. This burdened them with a lot of administrative duties unrelated to the operations of their armies and necessarily limited their thinking and their point of view. You will remember

Halleck's indignation at Gen. Grant's trip to confer with Buell and arrange for cooperation after Donelson! His reprimand of Curtis for sending Steele from Helena to cooperate with Sherman's Vicksburg expedition! It was not until the last year of the war that army commands were assigned independently of departmental administration, and not all of them then.

24. Buell's slowness in reaching Savannah before the battle of Shiloh, his failure to report on arrival in Savannah on April 5th, and Nelson's delay in obeying Grant's order the morning of the 6th to march to opposite Pittsburgh Landing, until transmitted to him by Buell at about 1:30 P.M., are also outstanding examples - Buell did not consider himself under Grant's command. Another example is Bragg's and Kirby Smith's invasion of Kentucky in the summer of 1862. They cooperated, but there was lack of unity of command. This was a strategically well conceived effort "to liberate" Kentucky, but the people of the State did not rise up as hoped, and his campaign ended with the drawn battle of Perryville, and Buell's removal for not defeating Bragg though he had the superior force and did not suffer equally from the difficulties of supply. Bragg had attempted his invasion of Kentucky without rail connections with an adequate base.

25. That same summer, Jackson having cleared up the Shenandoah Valley against the superior forces of three separate Union commanders, in time to join against McClellan's Peninsula campaign and contribute to its failure; he was then the chief agent of Gen. Lee in defeating Pope at the second battle of Bull Run. Lee then attempted in September 1862 his first invasion of northern territory, again with a political objective, the "liberation of Maryland." But Maryland also did not rise to be delivered, and Lee was successfully stopped at Antietam. However, as General Richard Taylor wrote, "when McClellan with storge of battle, might have led on his reserves and swept the field", he lacked the umption. would it have been for the Confederates, with the river in the rear, but this seemed beyond McClellan or outside his nature." However, the two Confederate attempts, sound strategically, to win two supposedly sympathetic states for their cause and inflict a decisive victory on the North, had failed.

26. In 1863 the Union armies again took the offensive; but Hooker was strangely beaten at Chancellorsville, although only one wing of the Army of the Potomac had been seriously affected, and Gen. Lee again attempted an offensive into enemy territory. This time to secure shoes and other supplies, and in the hope of winning a decisive victory which would bring recognition of the Confederacy by England and France, and discourage the people of the North from further efforts to conquer the South. But he allowed his army to be scattered for the gathering of the loot he needed and sent his cavalry under Stewart on a wild goose chase, so that he lost touch with the Army of the Potomac. The piecemeal battle of Gettysburg followed, for him a costly repulse, for the Union a success that failed of the decisive result it might have had.

27. On the other hand, in the Western Theater a brilliant and decisive campaign shut General Pemberton and his army up in Vicksburg, and after a siege of 47 days the garrison of 31,600 men with 172 cannon and 60,000 muskets surrendered. Strategically this was the greatest blow to the Confederates that they had yet suffered: they not only lost an army but also the last railroad connection with the resources of the south-west. Pemberton had been restricted in taking the offensive by Jefferson Davis's orders for the defense of the city as his primary objective, and Johnston with an army that was increased to 50,000 men, probably only about 31,000 of whom were available for the purpose, failed to take any decisive action to relieve the siege.

28. Rosecrans having been bottled up in Chattanooga, after his defeat by Bragg at Chickamauga, and his army being besieged and starved was relieved of his command in October 1863. Thomas was assigned to command the Army of the Cumberland, Grant now in over-all command in the West, hastened Sherman with the Army of the Tennessee to Chattanooga, took charge in person, reopened the line of supply, and November 23-25 decisively defeated Bragg. As a result of these victories he was called to Washington and given his commission in the newly created rank of Lieutenant General and put in command of all the armies of the United States. Unity of command had been achieved at last and a commander selected who was a field commander and would definitely exercise command over all theaters of operation, in accordance with a definite over-all strategic plan.

IV. A COORDINATED STRATEGIC PLAN AND UNITY OF COMMAND WIN THE WAR

29. It is unnecessary to tell this audience of this coordinated strategic plan prepared in the early months of 1864, which contemplated advance of the Union armies in all theaters of operation at as nearly the same time as possible, and sustaining the pressure on the Confederate forces without relaxation until forced to surrender or be destroyed. As the new Commander-in-Chief had confidence in General Sherman's ability and drive to carry out the campaign in the Western Theater; he himself accompanied the main force in the Eastern Theater, but was careful to leave General Meade in command of the Army of the Potomac and was meticulous in passing orders for its operations through Gen. Meade, the victor at Gettysburg. Indeed, to the very end he persisted in his desire to have the Army of the Potomac the one to defeat General Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, against which it had been bravely fighting with such lack of decisive success for nearly four years; and he was careful not to bring commanders from the West, so that the veterans of the Western armies could not in later years claim that they had won the war. Sheridan to take command of a new kind of force, a fast moving tactical striking force, the Cavalry Corps, precursor of the Armored Corps of later years; Ord for his energy and reliability, and "Baldy" Smith to strengthen Ben Butler's command; are the only Westerners of high rank transferred to the East that come to mind. On the other hand O. O. Howard was sent to Sherman.

30. General Grant in after years described his plan as follows: "My general plan now was to concentrate all the force available against the Confederate armies in the field. There were but two such, as we have seen, east of the Mississippi and facing north. The Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee commanding, was on the south bank of the Rapidan, confronting the Army of the Potomac; the second, under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed to Sherman, who was still at Chattanooga. Besides these main armies the Confederates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse to feed their armies from, and their line of communications from Richmond to Tennessee. Forrest a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the West with a large force, making a larger command necessary to hold what we had gained in middle and west Tennessee. We could not abandon any territory north of the line held by the enemy, because it would lay the Northern States open to invasion. But as the Army of the Potomac was the principal garrison for the protection of Washington even while it was moving on Lee, so all the forces to the west, and the Army of the James, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well as when remaining at them. Better, indeed, for they forced the enemy to guard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, and with a greater force . . . Accordingly I ar-

ranged for a simultaneous movement all along the line. Sherman was to move from Chattanooga, Johnston's army and Atlanta being his objective points. Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was to move from the mouth of the Gauley River with a cavalry force and some artillery, the Virginia and Tennessee railroad to be his objective . . . Sigel was in command in the Valley of Virginia. He was to advance up the valley, covering the North from an invasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remaining at Harper's Ferry. Every mile he advanced also gave us possession of stores on which Lee relied. Butler was to advance by the James River, having Richmond and Petersburg as his objective . . . " Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered to assemble all the troops he had at New Orleans in time to join in the general move.

31. You all know how Sigel failed miserably in his mission; how Butler allowed himself to be bottled up in Bermuda Hundred without capturing Petersburg in General Lee's absence, and so not giving the decisive assistance expected; how Smith quarrelled with Butler and was not of any great help to him; and how Banks failed in Louisiana. But in spite of these individual failures on their parts, the plan was successful as a whole with modifications as circumstances required, and ended at Appomattox and at Goldsboro and Durham Station.

32. There were so many new features in the Art of War developed by the American genius on both sides, that it would take all night to even summarize them and their impact on strategy as previously understood. So I refrain, leaving them for some one better qualified to discuss at some later meeting; but I cannot close without reference to two that played an important part all through the war, the first of which was the new role assumed by cavalry. There were but few old fashioned cavalry charges, and they did not play as decisive a part as later in the Franco-Prussian War; but great cavalry leaders, Sheridan, Wilson, Grierson, J. E. B. Stewart, Forrest, Jo Shelby, Wheeler, and many others, proved the effective use of independent cavalry as a fast-moving, hitting force capable of decisive tactical action while fighting on foot. Although the dramatic cavalry raids on both sides effectively preyed on the enemy's communications and gathered needed supplies or destroyed depots and railroads with unbelievable rapidity, there were only two that achieved important strategic objectives; Van Dorn's raid that captured Holly Springs and Grierson's raid that blinded Pemberton by taking away all the available Confederate cavalry, his feelers and means of keeping in touch with his enemy, both in the Vicksburg campaign.

33. The second was the success of joint Army and Navy action both on the rivers and in the recapture of coastal harbors. Close cooperation proved possible and often decisive with understanding commanders in each service.

V. CONCLUSION

34. The strategic objective of President Lincoln and his Federal Administration was the re-establishment of the "more perfect union" under the Constitution. While the armed might of the Confederacy had been definitely defeated, it may be doubted that the Union would really have been re-established on a permanent basis had not the terms of surrender granted the Confederate armies been so wise and so magnanimous as to have proven conciliatory and prevented vengeance. There were no Nuremberg trials. At least as far as the armies were concerned the war was over, and friendly relations could be resumed. I have always felt that General Lee was never greater than when he accepted those terms and set the example of returning to

his role of good citizen without malice or evidence of resentment, thus preventing years of guerrilla warfare and continued hatred and enmity. To be sure, the vengeful spirit was there among the politicians and civilians in many cases, and President Johnson's quarrel with Congress put the radicals in control of that body so that the Reconstruction legislation was probably unnecessarily harsh and imposed undue burdens on a population already in great distress because of sufferings brought on by the war they had started. And yet, the South is more prosperous generally and more populous than it ever was, and in spite of unavoidable sectional feeling and conflicting interests, we are again a united nation, and the sons of both sides in that conflict have since fought side by side loyally in three foreign wars.

35. I like to think that we Americans, after two years of experimenting with the training of citizen soldiers, showed the world how to fight a war and, better still, how to end a war.