By Daniel J. Ursu, Roundtable Historian
The Cleveland Civil War Roundtable
Copyright © 2024-2025, All Rights Reserved
Editor’s note: This article was the history brief for the December 2024 meeting of the Cleveland Civil War Roundtable.
In late 1862, President Abraham Lincoln appointed General Ambrose Burnside as commander of the Union Army of the Potomac in the wake of Burnside’s conquest of the famous bridge on the Union left flank at the Battle of Antietam. General Burnside formulated a plan for a rare winter offensive to build on the momentum of the Union strategic victory at Antietam. Relatively simple, Burnside would march his 140,000 troops, organized into three “Grand Divisions” of two corps each, south across the Rappahannock River and overwhelm what he had hoped to be a modest defense near Fredericksburg, Virgina. The march southward went surprisingly well, but the all-important pontoon bridges needed to cross the Rappahannock were tragically delayed. Consequently, the skeletal defenses on the Confederate side, which was south of the river and near the town, were adroitly reinforced by General Robert E. Lee in command of the 80,000-man Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. That said, Burnside’s army was nearly twice the size of Lee’s. On the very day of the December 2024 Roundtable meeting, that is, December 11, Union batteries on the commanding high ground on the north side of the river began a bombardment of the town.
General Lee by this time had arranged a stout defense on Marye’s Heights, part of which involved a stone wall bordering the east side of a sunken road with a line of firing positions and rifle pits extending from the wall. In front of the stone wall, the ground dipped toward the town in a slight depression. Behind the wall and in enfilading positions on either side were massed Confederate artillery. Whatever good qualities Burnside had as a general, he and his commanders did not see or realize the danger posed by Lee’s defenses, which were hidden from view until Burnside’s troops were only about 500 feet away. Nor did Burnside realize that his superior numbers were not enough to defeat defenders in this strong position aided by enfilading fire, concentrated volley fire, fortified positions, and ready reinforcements. This made an assault here foolish from the start and madness as it progressed unimaginatively – unfortunately reenacting the same disastrous scenario again and again.
On December 13th the main attack began. General Sumner’s Right Grand Division’s first assault started at about noon, the second at 1:00 p.m., then again at 2:00 p.m., 3:00 p.m., and lastly at 5:00 p.m., all brutally and bloodily repulsed by the strongly fortified Confederate positions. Historian Emeritus of the U.S. National Park Service Edwin C. Bearss, in his book Fields of Honor, states his opinion of the best Union effort at Marye’s Heights: “When (General) Humphreys sent his last brigade forward, the troops were ordered not to cap their muskets. They were to try and go over the Confederate’s stone wall in a rush without stopping to fire. They didn’t get over, but they got nearer than any other unit.”
But should the Army of the Potomac have been beaten so decisively that day? Not necessarily, when one focuses on what took place under the command of one of my favorite Union generals of the Civil War: General George Gordon Meade, who was to come to fame in July of 1863 at the Gettysburg crossroads in Pennsylvania. In December of 1862, Meade, the old goggle-eyed snapping turtle, was in command of a division at the far end of the Union left flank near Prospect Hill and what was known as Hamilton’s Crossing. His 3rd division was part of the Left Grand Division under General William Franklin, which was facing General Stonewall Jackson’s Confederate corps strung out to the southeast in relatively open terrain. Specifically, Meade’s 3rd division had about 5,000 soldiers.
Stephen W. Sears, in his book Lincoln’s Lieutenants, recalls that only the First Corps from Franklin’s Left Grand Division was committed by Franklin with “Meade’s division in the lead, Gibbons’ division in support on the right (and) Doubleday’s division guarding the left. Meade’s division was small and well worn, but (First Corps Commander) General Reynolds wanted his most experienced general leading the charge…Meade expressed concern they were repeating the Antietam mistake of attacking piecemeal. When he took his objective, where would come the strength to hold it? Franklin said those were Burnside’s orders.” After about an hour’s worth of artillery dueling, including the famous flanking fire from the two guns of Confederate Major John Pelham, Meade set out at about 1:00 p.m. to assault a rebel wooded position. He hit the Confederate brigades commanded by Generals James Lane, Maxcy Gregg, and James Archer. Again from Sears book, “As it happened, (Meade) had struck and exploited a gap in Stonewall Jackson’s line…threatening a breakthrough into Lee’s rear”…but that…”Doubleday’s division was well back and idle, holding the left flank, and Reynolds failed to call on it for Meade’s support.”
Lane’s right flank crumbled under Meade’s fierce assault. Next, Meade’s troops forged ahead, flanking and shattering Archer’s and Gregg’s brigades. Meade gained the wooded area, held off against several uncoordinated rebel counterattacks, but had moved ahead of the rest of the Union divisions by about a mile. Sears again states, “Meade’s foothold was counterattacked, and both his…brigade commanders went down…Meade barely escaped death from a bullet that ripped through his hat. An aide he sent back to find support came upon General David Birney’s Third Corps division…he refused Meade’s first call…Meade sent back that he assumed full responsibility for ordering him forward. Again, Birney refused. The third time brought Meade himself, in high temper, and he lit into Birney in full voice (that) a bystander said, ‘almost… (made) the stones creep’…Birney finally sent forward two regiments, too late.”
Upon learning that Franklin was holding back troops, Burnside ordered him to attack with his whole force. In his after-action report Burnside was blunt: it was not carried out. Franklin instead assumed the defensive, ordering troops of the Ninth Corps to guard the pontoon bridges, this, according to Stephen Sears, at a time when Franklin had under his command 27 of the army’s 51 total brigades. Lastly, Meade sent a message to Franklin for help, but Franklin sent none. With his men tired, with ammunition almost depleted, and realizing that no other supporting divisions were coming up, Meade finally ordered and conducted an orderly retreat.
And so it was that the Union army was once again vanquished. This time, besides the humiliation and the loss of confidence among the troops, Burnside foolishly began to reposition the army for a new offensive in the rain, driving sleet, and snow – in what became known horribly as the awful “Mud March,” that is, until President Lincoln resolutely intervened upon hearing howling complaints from Burnside’s subordinates. In a telegram Lincoln stated, “I have good reason for saying you must not make a general movement of the army without letting me know.” This persuaded Burnside to turn the army north and end his winter campaign. Shortly thereafter, Burnside’s tenure as commander of the Army of the Potomac came to an end.
Click on the book links on this page to purchase from Amazon. Part of the proceeds from any book purchased from Amazon through the CCWRT website is returned to the CCWRT to support its education and preservation programs.