The Civil War Person I Would Most Like to Converse with – Daniel Sickles

Which individual from the Civil War would be the most interesting to sit down and speak with over dinner or a tasty beverage? Daniel Sickles

By John Syroney
The Cleveland Civil War Roundtable
Copyright © 2025, All Rights Reserved

Editor’s note: The subject of the annual Dick Crews Memorial Debate at the January 2025 Roundtable meeting was: “Which individual from the Civil War would be the most interesting to sit down and speak with over dinner or a tasty beverage?” Five members made presentations on the topic; the article below was one of those five presentations.


General Sickles: Why did you advance your 3rd Corps forward on July 2, 1863?

Before I interpret General Daniel Sickles’ decision to advance, one must remember that when General Sickles was asked why he does not have a monument at Gettysburg, he stated, “The whole damn battlefield is my monument.”

Daniel Sickles

My decision to advance forward from the original position of Geary’s 12th Corps, where I was initially assigned, was a judicious and carefully chosen position. First, the original position was in a low, marshy area that was unsuitable for a proper defense. Second, General Hancock had 11,347 troops under his command to occupy a distance of 1,300 yards. I had 10,675 soldiers that clearly would not have covered a front of 1,500 yards, the distance necessary to hold the crest of Little Round Top in force. I made a tactical decision to move forward three-quarters of a mile to occupy the Peach Orchard salient that rose 40 feet higher than my assigned position. If I was left to defend the marshy location of the assigned area, my forces would have provided minimal protection and would have been pushed back without causing much destruction to General Longstreet’s attack on July 2nd. My decision to move forward was a tactical defeat but a strategic victory for the Union army.

John Syroney

I can confidently say that my forward position slowed down the Confederate attack, since they never anticipated that my corps was occupying the Emmitsburg Road, a position the Confederate army scouted earlier in the morning as vacant, this being designated the exact attack location of General Lee’s plans for July 2nd. My decision to move forward made the defense of the Cemetery Ridge line possible by slowing down the Confederate attack and forcing them to meet the Federal army in the Peach Orchard, Devil’s Den, and the Wheatfield.

I provide you with the words of General Meade. When confronted with the decision that I made to move forward, this is what General Meade said: “He examined my position and remarked that my line was too extended and expressed his doubts as to my being able to hold so extended a line. I replied I could not with one corps hold so extended a line against the rebel army, but that if supported, the line could be held. He would send up the 5th Corps to support me on my left and that I could look to General Hancock for support on my right flank. He also authorized me to send to General Hunt for as much artillery as I wanted. I then assured him of my entire confidence in my ability to hold the position, which I did.”

General Hunt was allowed to observe my artillery positions as I led him toward the Emmitsburg Road and the Peach Orchard. He said this position was advantageous, if the Union army used it to attack to the left. But while he said it showed vulnerabilities, namely being attacked simultaneously from both flanks, he nevertheless saw its potential. Recall what happened to the Union army at the Battle of Chancellorsville only two months prior to Gettysburg. I occupied an advantageous position at Hazel Grove only to be ordered back to Fairview, where the Union army was driven out because the Confederate forces were able to concentrate their artillery on high ground that was advantageous for offensive operations.

I told the Committee on the Conduct of the War that I took up that line because it enabled me to hold commanding ground. Did General Meade reconnoiter my advanced position and see the advantages of my position? No, he was too concerned with developments on his right flank and center. He harbored strong animosity toward me for my relationship with Generals Hooker and Butterfield. General Meade never rode to the Round Tops to see the area, but only sent out General Warren to see the position a mere 15 minutes prior to being attacked by the Confederate forces of General Longstreet.

I submit to this debate, that if General Meade would have scouted the Round Tops, Devil’s Den, and the Peach Orchard more thoroughly, he would have recognized the distinct advantages these positions would have held for the Union army and would not have been so obstinate in my holding the original location of General Geary’s position from the evening of July 1st. I conclude by stating that my 3rd Corps, with help from the 2nd and 5th Corps, absorbed the Confederate attack causing it to run out of momentum prior to reaching Cemetery Ridge, thus making it possible for the eventual defeat of the Confederate army at Gettysburg. Although my movement created a tactical defeat of my 3rd Corps, it did lead to a strategic victory over the Confederate forces at Gettysburg.

Lastly, while I may not have a statue, I was awarded the Medal of Honor in 1897, and the citation on that medal states that I “displayed most conspicuous gallantry on the field vigorously contesting the advance of the enemy and continuing to encourage his troops after being himself severely wounded.”

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