By Daniel J. Ursu, Roundtable Historian
The Cleveland Civil War Roundtable
Copyright © 2020-2021, All Rights Reserved
Editor’s note: This article was the history brief for the May 2021 meeting of the Cleveland Civil War Roundtable.
We left off in February with Union General Grant’s army defeating Pemberton at Champion Hill and in turn the Confederate rear guard bridgehead on the Big Black River, the latter bolstered mainly by a cunningly opportunistic charge led by the inspiringly huge and unforgettable General Lawler. As a result, on the morning of May 18, 1863, Grant issued orders to McClernand’s and McPherson’s corps to advance the seven remaining miles between the Big Black and the rebel fortifications ringing Vicksburg and sent Sherman’s corps to seize the high ground north of the city.
Sherman was familiar with the terrain there, having attempted several times unsuccessfully to capture it earlier in the campaign at the Yazoo River and Chickasaw Bluffs. Confederate Commanding General Pemberton did not oppose this thrust and thusly, Grant now had clear and swift river supply and communications northward on the mighty Mississippi to Union depots at Memphis, Cairo, and St. Louis. Grant’s army would importantly be going forward well fed and supplied with munitions and weapons of war as needed. Conversely, Pemberton’s Confederates were now surrounded by Union troops north, east, and south of the city and by Admiral Porter’s brown water fleet in the Mississippi River to the west. The makings of a siege were developing rapidly.
However, a siege was not what Grant initially had in mind. Rather a quick attack suited his mood. Sayeth he in his Memoirs of the initial approach, “On the 19th there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while we were getting into better position. The enemy had been much demoralized by his defeats at Champion’s Hill and the Big Black, and I believed he would not make much effort to hold Vicksburg. Accordingly, at two o’clock I ordered an assault.”
Ed Bearss, the renowned former Chief Historian Emeritus of the National Park System and a recognized expert on the Vicksburg Campaign, in his book Fields of Honor puts it this way. “Union morale is high. They have beaten the Confederates in five battles in 17 days. On the 16th they mauled Pemberton’s field army at Champion Hill. They routed the Confederates at Big Black Bridge. In these battles they inflicted more than 7,000 casualties on the foe, captured 65 cannon, and drove the Confederates back into Vicksburg, which seems ripe for plucking. The soldiers want over quick. Grant knows what a hot long summer on the river might do. Yellow jack mosquito borne yellow fever – or something equally atrocious might attack the Union forces. With scant preparation, Grant schedules an attack for the afternoon of May 19.”
The major defensive works constructed by the rebels around Vicksburg from north to south were: 1) Fort Hill, 2) Stockade Redan, 3) 3rd Louisiana Redan, 4) Great Redoubt, 5) 2nd Texas Lunette, 6) Railroad Redoubt, 7) Salient, and 8) South Fort. The assault on the 19th went up against the Stockade Redan. Mr. Bearss in Fields of Honor states, “Stockade Redan is the strong point guarding the northeast approach to Vicksburg. Entering the Vicksburg works topping the ridge…is Stockade Redan…Fronting Stockade Redan is a ditch or dry moat. Why is it called Stockade Redan? Across Graveyard Road is a poplar log stockade through which wagons can egress and ingress…The Confederates here are fresh troops…the Confederates who occupy the earthworks from Fort Hill, commanding the river on Perberton’s left to the Second Texas Lunette north of the Southern Railroad of Mississippi, have not tasted defeat.”
Mr. Bearss further generally describes the defenses thusly. “A redan is a triangular-shaped fortification. If it is enclosed, it has three angles and an equal number of fronts. South of Jackson Road is Great Redoubt. A redoubt is a rectangular or square enclosed fortification.” Finally, “the major works are connected by rifle pits or trenches, battery lunettes, crescent shaped earthworks to protect cannon, are sited at commanding positions along and behind the defense perimeter. Timber has been felled in the ravines and hollows, creating extensive abati. These works had been laid out during the fall of 1862 and early winter of 1863.”
Grant’s assault was made by soldiers of Sherman’s corps, but was not against the vanquished portion of the Confederate army that had retreated from Champion Hill, rather as noted by Mr. Bearss against the relatively well-rested and alert garrison troops. The attack was a dismal failure. In his Memoirs, Sherman commented, “On the supposition that the garrison of Vicksburg was demoralized by the defeats at Champion Hill and at the railroad crossing of the Big Black General Grant ordered an assault…My troops reached the top of the parapet, but could not cross over. The rebel parapets were strongly manned, and the enemy fought hard and well. My loss was pretty heavy.” The Confederate fortifications boasted clear lines of fire for muskets and artillery coupled with terrain height advantages. They were now proven to be well engineered and brutally effective. Union casualties were about 900 and the rebels about 200. Now realizing that more planning would be needed, over the next two days Grant put together a bigger, better, and thoroughly organized assault. Though it might be a hard fight, Grant was ever determined.
On the morning of the 22nd, after a four-hour artillery bombardment from Union massed batteries to the east of the rebel lines and from Porter’s fleet in the Mississippi west of town, at 10 a.m. all three Union corps, totaling about 40,000 available troops, took part in the assault. Corps alignments were McClernand to the south, McPherson in the center, and Sherman to the north. Pemberton had about 30,000 soldiers in four divisions with M. L. Smith in the north, Forney in the center, Stevenson in the south, and Bowen’s division in reserve. When the bombardment cleared, ensconced in their fortifications, the Confederates were confidently awaiting the Union attack.
Sherman’s assaults were made along the Graveyard and Jackson Roads toward the 3rd Louisiana Redan, the Stockade Redan, and the Great Redoubt, but were duly repulsed with little success throughout the morning and afternoon. Union forces were unable to coordinate their efforts, nor bring to bear more than a third or so of their troops.
All day long the Union assaults could get no traction, as the center and south were also stubbornly held against the Union. However, success fortuitously emerged for the Federals against the 2nd Texas Lunette and the Railroad Redoubt.
General McClernand had arrayed four brigades to assault the 2nd Texas Lunette and two against the Railroad Redoubt. Some of his soldiers had worked their way into the ditch in front of the Lunette during desperate fighting. Portions of the Lunette structure were made of cotton bales which caught fire and caused injury and confusion on both sides. Union soldiers tried to crawl from the ditch through the firing embrasures with no success. At one point a Union cannon was rolled up within about 30 feet and fired directly into the Lunette.
On the other side of the railroad, after a hard fight, Iowa troops succeeded in taking the Railroad Redoubt and held it stubbornly for two hours against a variety of counterattacks. They were reinforced by troops from Illinois and the 48th Ohio Regiment. This could be the break in the Confederate line that Grant needed. In Fields of Honor Mr. Bearss described what happened next at 3 p.m., “Now comes up a hero. Col. Thomas Waul had been a Vicksburg lawyer before going to Texas. He had raised Waul’s Texas Legion and solicits for his Texans the honor of recapturing the Redoubt. Two companies of Texans guided by Col. Edmund Pettus counterattack. They overwhelm the Yankees, capturing several flags.” The Texan troops ejected the Northerners from the fort in a wild hand-to-hand melee.
Back at the 2nd Texas Lunette, a stalemate existed until Pemberton adroitly committed troops of Bowen’s division that had been wisely held in reserve. These fresh troops charged, overwhelmed the Union troops, and forced them out of the Lunette ditch where they pursued them well beyond.
By about 4 p.m., with Grant stymied, all Union troops were back where they had started. Federal losses were high: about 500 killed, 2,500 wounded, and up to 500 captured. Confederate losses numbered about 500.
Further during the day, Grant once more had his problems with the generalship of McClernand, who mistook some of his men’s waving of banners to indicate that they had also taken one of the other forts. He asked Grant for more troops, who, despite his misgivings, sent reinforcements. Those troops were ground up by rebel fire. An angry Grant asserted McClernand’s messages to be misleading, and he accused him of causing much of the loss that morning. Grant would eventually take more decisive action against McClernand, but under the circumstances that would have to wait.
Grant now knew that a siege would be necessary but was satisfied that his troops also now knew that Vicksburg would not be any easy conquest. After the heavy casualties which were far and away beyond anything experienced since Grant landed on the east side of the river, there was no longer the notion that his men would suffer a loss of morale at the prospect of a long summer siege in the heat and vermin. Grant recounts in his Memoirs, “I now determined upon a regular siege – to ‘out camp the enemy,’ as it were, and to incur no more losses. The experience of the 22d convinced officers and me that this was best, and they went to work on the defences and approaches with a will. With the navy holding the river, the investment of Vicksburg was complete. As long as we could hold our position the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men and munitions of war to what they had on hand. These could not last always.”
Beginning now, the civilians of Vicksburg would endure severe hardship. Terry Winschel, Historian of Vicksburg National Military Park (ret.), gave a thorough and sobering account of their plight at the May 2021 meeting of the Cleveland Civil War Roundtable, which had been arranged by the 2020-2021 president, Steve Pettyjohn. A video of Mr. Winschel’s May 2021 presentation is available on the Roundtable’s YouTube channel. Also, the images in this history brief are modern-day photos of the Confederate works from Steve’s collection. Incidentally, the May 2021 meeting marked the CCWRT’s return to in-person meetings from the start of COVID-19 pandemic restrictions.
Next time, we’ll see the results of the siege and Grant’s ascension to even more prominent stardom in the North!
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