War of Maneuver – Rocky Face Ridge to the Outskirts of Resaca
By Daniel J. Ursu, Roundtable Historian
The Cleveland Civil War Roundtable
Copyright © 2025-2026, All Rights Reserved
Editor’s note: This article was the history brief for the November 2025 meeting of the Cleveland Civil War Roundtable.
The Roundtable’s 2025 field trip covered the Vicksburg Campaign, and the field trip in 2021 covered the Battles of Chickamauga and Chattanooga. The Union’s ultimate success in these military actions in Confederate territory depended on many Northern generals, but most prominently and importantly on the leadership of General Ulyssess S. Grant. As a result of his successes, Grant was summoned by President Abraham Lincoln to come east, and Grant was put in command over all the Union armies.
Grant soon placed the Union forces near Chattanooga under the command of Grant’s fellow Ohioan and friend, General William Tecumseh Sherman. Sherman’s command was designated the “Military Division of the Mississippi.” Under Sherman were the Army of the Cumberland with about 65,000 men and commanded by General George H. Thomas, the Army of the Tennessee with about 24,000 men commanded by General James B. McPherson, and the Army of the Ohio with about 10,000 men commanded by General John Schofield. In his Memoirs Sherman states, “in Generals Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, I had three generals of education and experience, admirably qualified for the work before us. Each has made a history of his own and I need not here to dwell on their respective merits…except that each possessed special qualities of mind and of character which fitted them in the highest degree for the work then in contemplation.”
Grant and Sherman had been through the crucible of war during many previous engagements in the Western Theater and were bonded by both great success as well as regrettable setbacks. Now Grant wanted Sherman to run a destructive campaign against the Confederate army in Georgia. In Sherman’s Memoirs, he recalls Grant’s letter of April 4, 1864. This letter directed Sherman regarding the rebel Army of Tennessee, which was then in Georgia, “to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy’s country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources.” To Sherman, that meant a drive on Atlanta, which was the important remaining nexus of Confederate railroad, supply, and manufacturing in the Western Theater.
The Confederate Army of Tennessee, which had been pushed into Georgia after the Union victories around Chattanooga, was commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, fresh from his controversies surrounding the South’s defeat the previous summer at Vicksburg. When General Braxton Bragg submitted his resignation as commander of that army, President Jefferson Davis appointed the very competent General William Hardee, but Hardee eventually declined the promotion due to his perception of the army’s chaotic status. Accordingly, Davis nominated General Robert E. Lee to go west, but Davis was talked out of it by General Lee, himself, who advocated instead for Johnston even while knowing that Davis disliked Johnston. Furthermore, the Confederate Congress, General Hardee, and General Leonidas Polk along with Secretary of War James Seddon applied pressure for the appointment of Johnston. Indeed, despite all his shortcomings, Johnston was known as an excellent defensive strategist. Davis gave in to the pressure and in mid-December of 1863 appointed Johnston commander of the Army of Tennessee. Johnston had under him about 60,000 men organized into three corps under Generals Hardee, Polk, and John Bell Hood.
Although immediately ordered by President Davis to attack Sherman, Johnston’s good instincts, especially since he was outnumbered by nearly two to one, dictated a more militarily sound defensive strategy. In Shelby Foote’s masterpiece The Civil War, A Narrative, Volume III, Foote states that “the 100-mile distance from Chattanooga to Atlanta was the same as that from Washington to Richmond and so were the respective size of the armies which…gave the Union…roughly a two to one numerical advantage.” In his book Battle Cry of Freedom, James M. McPherson further points out, “The topography of northern Georgia favored the defense…Steep, rugged mountains interlaced by swift rivers dominated the landscape between Chattanooga and Atlanta…Johnston’s army…took position on Rocky Face Ridge flanking the railroad twenty-five miles south of Chattanooga and dared the Yankees to come on.”
But at this time Sherman was in a thoughtful mood. He took his time gathering supplies via the excellent railroad network into Chattanooga and eventually amassed enough to last for about two months. From there, Sherman had an excellent supply line in the Western & Atlantic Railroad running southward into Georgia, but he was aware that it could be vulnerable to attack from rebel cavalry, especially troopers led by General Joseph Wheeler.
In early May, Sherman instructed his three armies of maneuver to begin operations with Schofield’s Army of the Ohio on the Union left along the railroad through Red Clay, Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland out of Ringgold in the center, and McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee out of Lee and Gordon’s Mills on the old Chickamauga battlefield on the right. Sherman endeavored to use his numerical advantage to outflank Confederate defenses on Rocky Face Ridge, which would be pinned by Thomas and Schofield. McPherson would head through Snake Creek Gap and cut the rebel supply line at Resaca. Sherman states in his Memoirs, “The position was very strong, and I knew that…my antagonist, General Johnston…had fortified it to the maximum. Therefore, I had no intention to attack the position seriously in front but depended on McPherson to capture and hold the railroad to its rear (at Resaca).”
Johnston had entrenched two of his three corps in strong positions on top of Rocky Face Ridge. After proceeding through Tunnel Hill, which inexplicably was lightly defended, Thomas hit the rebels at Mill Creek Gap and toward Dug Gap as planned. However, probing attacks all along that front caused unit commanders to report back that heavy casualties were likely if an all-out attack was made. Meanwhile, by May 9 McPherson’s troops made it to Resaca. Finding Confederates entrenched there and overestimating their strength, which at the time was only about 4,000, McPherson withdrew back to Snake Creek Gap. Hearing this, Sherman felt let down but was not angry. Shelby Foote notes in his The Civil War, A Narrative, Volume III that Sherman stated, “Such an opportunity does not occur twice in a life…(but that McPherson was) perfectly justified,” since Sherman had given discretionary orders, and “I regret that you did not break the railroad (supply line)…but I suppose it was impossible.” The following day, Sherman ordered Thomas and Schofield to pull away from Rocky Face Ridge and join McPherson, who was maneuvering once again through Snake Creek Gap.
Realizing he was being outflanked by the superior numbers of the combined Union armies, Johnston withdrew Hardee and Hood off of Rocky Face Ridge and abandoned otherwise good positions near Dalton. The Confederates linked up at Resaca with the rebels who were already defending that town. Sherman sent a message to General Henry Halleck in Washington about Johnston’s retreat to prepared positions at Resaca: “We will press him all that is possible…Weather is fine and troops in fine order. All is working well…let us keep the ball rolling.”
In the next part, the saga of the Atlanta Campaign will be rejoined with General Sherman’s plan to take Resaca from the Confederates, and in the vernacular of General Grant’s order regarding the Confederate army, “to break it up…get into the interior…and inflict all of the damage that you can.”
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Related link:
Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign, Part 2