



THE CIVIL WAR ROUND-TABLE

P. O. BOX 5028, CLEVELAND, OHIO 44101

OCTOBER 1972

Vol. 16 No. 2

_____ 129th Meeting _____

DATE: TUESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1972

SPEAKER: MR. ELDEN "JOSH" BILLINGS

SUBJECT: LINCOLN AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF

PLACE: THE HERMIT CLUB, DODGE COURT

PRELIMINARIES: 6 PM DINNER 7 PM

ELDEN "JOSH" BILLINGS

When Elden Billings lived in Tacoma, Washington he was called Elden, the name given him by his parents. His father sometimes called him "Cy". No one knew why.

But in Washington, D.C., where he has lived for 37 years, Elden Billings is Josh Billings, nicknamed after the famous humorist who wasn't Josh Billings at all but really Henry Wheeler Shaw. Applied by friends who couldn't resist the combination of names, the Josh has stuck and has become so much apart of Billings' life that many persons in the capital know him by no other name.

A 1935 graduate of the University of Puget Sound, where he majored in business administration, Billings won a scholarship to American University in Washington, D.C. When he completed his studies there he remained in the capital to become an analyst in international finance with the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. This means that he digs into all manner of world finance to write reports and papers for congressmen. In line with this work he studied for a time at the London School of Economics where he specialized in problems of British economics.

While his study of business administration at UPS led to his post at the Library of Congress, where he has worked for nearly 36 years, his college minor, history, led him to the hobby that occupies most of his spare time--study of the Civil War and Abraham Lincoln. Billings is nationally recognized as an authority on the Civil War and frequently is invited to lecture on the subject.

The Library of Congress, of course, is an invaluable source of material for his studies on the war between the states, but Billings has one of the finest libraries anywhere on the great conflict. Among his more than 1500 volumes are some war books not available in the Library of Congress.

Josh is a member of the Civil War Roundtable of Washington and a past president as well as past president of the Washington Lincoln Group. He was a member of the Civil War Centennial Commission of the District of Columbia, and he is the curator of the Columbia Historical Society. He holds a membership in Phi Alpha Theta an honorary historical fraternity.

We of the Cleveland Roundtable eagerly look forward to Josh's talk on Lincoln as Commander in Chief. Welcome to Cleveland --Josh!

CLEVELAND CWRT BULLETIN BOARD

FREDERICK, MARYLAND

CITY TRIES TO COLLECT CIVIL WAR RANSOM & INTEREST

Officials from Frederick, Md., have asked Congress to reimburse the city for a 108-year-old Civil War ransom they say has cost almost \$4 million in interest.

City fathers say the debt was incurred in 1864 when Confederate General Jubal Early marched his troops through their county seat about 40 miles from Washington, and demanded \$200,000 from the populace. The city borrowed the money from local banks and paid the ransom to keep the general from seizing almost \$1 million worth of Union supplies stockpiled in Frederick.

The city spent the next 87 years paying off the banks from tax revenues, and ended up with a total expenditure of \$4.1 million, including interest, when the task was completed in 1951.

For the past 10 years the city has been trying to collect the sum from the Federal Government, claiming the money was used to help the Union win the war. The long-pending measure has been revived by Senator Charles Mathias (R-Md.), a Frederick native.

* * * * *

VICKSBURG FIELDTRIP

Led by our intrepid leader, Dr. William Chamberlin, the following troops made the longest fieldtrip (in terms of miles from Cleveland) since we first started our group: Dr. William Schlesinger, Bernie Drews, Art Jordan, Al Narwold, Hedi Heidlebaugh, Bob Bayless and guest Charles Spiegle all did it the hard way--We drove the 1000+ miles to Vicksburg. The smart ones like Stu Cramer, Fred Gill and Neville Bayless flew. However they missed a most unusual trip to Fort Donelson, but I'm getting ahead of myself.

Starting at the ungodly hour of 7 am the doughty little groups pushed off into the night (the weather man only promised "scattered daylight" at that time) with their ultimate objective a small town in Tennessee known by the quaint name of DOVER. The two machines converging on the town at approximately 6 pm that same evening. A trip of 590 miles. Our machine wandered down through Ohio and into Kentucky with a side trip to Fairview, Kentucky to see the monument to the birthplace of Jefferson Davis. If your in the area it is well worth the time.

At Fort Donelson that night they were waiting at the park to put on a rifle and cannon firing demonstration. They were well done "living history". A young park technician by the name of Bob Nelson endeared himself to the group with his eagerness to show and inform us of the Fort Donelson campaign. To say he knows his subject and enthusiastic about it would be the understatement of the year. He was delightful to hear and watch. We all should have such dedication. Go to Donelson and ask for Bob.

The next morning starting at 7:30 am Bob took us around a compact and well cared for and marked battlefield area. It was the surprise and delight that the men expressed as we took our leave to drive the 450+ miles to Vicksburg. Generally the highways in the area were good, but at times a bit trying...It's not all interstate.

We reached Vicksburg again late in the evening--our final objective reached. Ed Bearss was waiting for us and after the usual meeting of "the group" for cocktails and "old home week" we adjourned for dinner and an excellent talk by Ed as to the details of the campaign and the participants. Also the ground we would be covering the next day...such as Grand Gulf, Bruinsburg Landing, Port Gibson and the Vicksburg Park.

After sleeping-in we were underway by 8 am towards Grand Gulf. All I can say is that I'm mighty glad we had Ed Bearss with us. Usually a shy man he virtually came alive as he recreated the events of 110 years ago. The Grand Gulf area is marked with "histerical markers," but when Ed took us to Bruinsburg Landing-a cow (its now a cattl ranch and private property)of a different color-believe me. From there to the ruins of a once beautiful plantation called Winsor that had burned in the 1890's.

Then Ed wanted to show us the Federal advance up the Rodney Road and the fight around Magnolia Church and the Schaeffer House. It had rained hard and the roads are composed mainly of Mississippi Mud. One of our machines became entangled in the mud

(Continued on the last page)

THE COURIER
OF
THE CIVIL WAR ROUNDTABLE OF CLEVELAND, OHIO

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THE BREVET RANK
Taken from THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES
By Fayette Robinson 1848

An Account of the organization of the United States
with biographies of Distinguished Officers of all grades.

Brevet rank--Its origin--Effect in the English service--Dispute about it. BREVET RANK is an imitation of a species of military rank which exists in the British army, and there owes its existence to the exertion of the sovereign authority. When the source of all honor, the king, pleases to promote any officer, though there be no vacancy or opportunity to make one, into which the object of favor can be advanced, the monarch has but to issue his fiat, and the officer is promoted. Consequently, there may exist in that service a regiment with ten companies, but with eleven or more officers of any one grade. Any officer thus promoted is said to be breveted, a phrase derived through the French from the Latin word brevis, signifying short.

In the British service the breveted officer has all the privileges of those who have been promoted in the regular way, commanding and taking precedence according to his brevet on all occasions. It is, however, held that a brevet officer cannot sell out this royal favor, but if anxious to leave the service, must content himself with disposing of the commission he held in the line of his regiment, according to its proper organization. The reason of this is obvious. Brevets are rarely conferred in England, and only on occasion of great events and national rejoicings, when the oldest and most faithful officers are thus honored. To reward them the government violates the rules it has laid down to define the organization of its military forces, but does not permit the temporary evil to be perpetuated, as it would were the brevets transferable. There is no limit to the number of brevets thus conferred, which are in fact commissions.

In the army of the United States the case is different. The president here is the mere executive, and not the fountain of honor, which exists only in the will of the people as declared by positive law. The president cannot issue a commission to any officer, except to fill a vacancy in a regiment or company already organized. For instance, if there were fifty regiments or corps of the line in service, there would be fifty colonels, and though a man should be found with the valor of Ney and the military skill of Turenne, he could not be promoted without a gross and great assumption of power by the president.

Were the government disposed to reward him, it could only do so by the means of a brevet. For this there is in the law of the country no authority except that clause of the rules and articles of war which says, that a brevet shall not hereafter be conferred without the advice and consent of the senate. The first brevet conferred in the army of the United States was on the present Major-General Taylor during the war of 1812 for his gallant defence of Fort Harrison. He, then a captain, received the brevet of major, and from this well-earned rank was drawn a precedent which has been productive of more trouble than any other one event which has occurred in the army.

Before the way was over, many brevets had been conferred,--in every instance, it is believed, on gallant and meritorious men. The army was then a young one; there was but little knowledge of the theory of military rank, and its members were satisfied when they learned that a brevet commission conferred the right to command in Europe, that it should do so here. They did not analyze the origin of that power of which they were the representatives; nor did they appreciate the difference between an officer who held his commission by virtue of an exercise of royal will and themselves, who existed in consequence and by authority of law.

When, however, matured by service, they had begun to understand their position, captains doubted the right of their juniors in the line to command them by virtue of a brevet. The old colonel, who had served long, naturally hesitated in yielding obedience to his lieutenant-colonel, who had by the chances of war become a brigadier-general by brevet.

The dispute was long and angry, and finally the rules and articles of war were revised, without, however, wettling anything except that on boards, courts of inquiry, and courts martial, brevet rank took effect; in which the whole army at once acquiesced. A clause which said something about brevet rank taking effect when troops of two crops met, was not so easily understood, and, as the case might be, was sometimes interpreted in one manner, sometimes in another.

An anecdote which tells the story of a dispute which occurred at a post on one of the northern lakes, will illustrate the difficulties which originated in consequence of this abnormal rank.

At the post referred to, was a battalion of infantry, composed of four companies, commanded of course by the highest officer in commission, on duty, who chanced to be a captain. One of the junior captains, however, happened to have received for gallantry and good conduct on many occasions, during the war, the brevet of major. The captain in command was also an officer of reputation, second in merit to none in the army. His subsequent career has fully sustained the promise of his youth and almost boyhood. It is remarkable, also, that the two officers referred to are essentially the Bayards of the service, and occupy in the roll of the army now, almost the same relative position they then held to each other. A court-martial was ordered to convene at the post. As has been before stated, it had been settled already, that on duty of this kind, brevet rank took effect. It may be asked what reason is there that it should be observed on one species of duty, if not on all? The brevet major, however, presided at the court, with his commanding officer below him, as the next member. The question was a novel one, and the major, in the course of familiar conversation, probably at the garrison mess, expressed some doubts as to whether, during the session of the court, he should obey the orders of his commanding officer. In every garrison, as in every other coterie, there is always some ill-natured person, anxious to make mischief; and this familiar chit-chat was at once repeated to the person whom it most concerned. The commanding officer was a soldier essentially, who would not listen to any coquetting about rank or its privileges, and at once dispatched an order to his junior, which it was necessary at once for him to obey, or assume an attitude which, if he were not sustained in it, placed him in the position of disobey. It need not be said that he did not hesitate, but obeyed the order. A subsequent reference to the matter, led to personal conflict and long subsequent apparent hostility. This mask is now thrown aside; they are said to be firm friends, and all who know them, must be aware that two such brave and gallant gentlemen must love each other.

According to the interpretation of this brevet rank, a captain might march at the head of his company, with his subalterns in their places. If one of these officers chanced to have a brevet of captain older than his superior's commission, and the command were joined, or in the words of the regulations, "chanced to meet" a detachment of another regiment, the captain would be commanded by a member of his own company. So with a regiment or any other body of troops. It once occurred in Florida, previous to the war, that the gallant Gen. D. L. Clinch, while colonel of the regiment in garrison there, found that his lieutenant-colonel, Brooke, held a brevet of brigadier-general, which, if the iniquitous system were carried out, would, in case one company of militia had been mustered into service, have placed him in command of the territory. Two admirable officers and accomplished men were thus arrayed in an antagonism which must have led to difficulty, had not their strong good sense and mutual respect prevented it.

A more recent conflict will be remembered by all, which caused the gallant Worth to resign his commission, and thereby lose all participation in the battles of Palo Alto and La Resaca. The president of the United States then decided that brevet rank was invalid against a positive commission, which settled the matter during the present administration and war. It is, however, sure, that with a new president, the old res vexata will be again revived, and, in consequence of the many brevets made in the course of the Mexican War, will be discussed with as much acrimony as ever.

TRADITION

In my library I have several copies of a magazine called "Tradition - The Monthly Magazine of America's Picturesque Past." Unfortunately to my knowledge this wonderful little magazine is now defunct. There have been some very fine articles on the Civil War that should be brought to the attention of all Civil War Buffs, and I intend to do so. Not all the articles are objectively written but how many histories are? I hope you will enjoy them and find them informative.

The first of the articles was published in the January 1962 edition that I wish to use is entitled, "War On The Plains" by Reginald S. Craig. At the time of the article Mr. Craig was the District Engineer for the City of Los Angeles. His book "The Fighting Parson" was published in 1959.

WAR ON THE PLAINS

by

Reginald S. Craig

The 7th of April, 1864, was a fine day in Denver; and a comparative calm rested on the headquarters of the Military District of Colorado. Suddenly, a roughly dressed civilian rushed in and loudly announced, "The Indians are on the warpath." At this point, the figure of a giant with a bushy black beard, piercing black eyes and a high forehead appeared in the doorway of the inner office. He was Colonel John M. Chivington, the district commander, who stood six feet four inches in his bare feet and weighed two hundred and sixty pounds. In civilian life the presiding elder of the Rocky Mountain District of the Methodist Church, he volunteered at the start of the war and was offered the chaplaincy of the First Colorado Regiment, which he declined asking for a "fighting commission." Due to this circumstance and his record in the campaign against the Confederates in New Mexico, he was known as "the Fighting Parson."

Somewhat awed by the formidable figure of the district commander, the visitor explained that he was a herdsman for Irwin, Jackman and Company, a firm hauling freight for the government. He stated that a band of Cheyennes and Arapahoes had attacked the freighter's camp in the Bijou Basin forty miles to the southeast and driven off 175 head of cattle. The colonel sent for Lieutenant George Eayre, who was dispatched in pursuit with a detachment of eighty men and instructions to recover the stolen stock, avoiding a fight if possible. Eayre followed the raiders to the headwaters of the Republican, where he seized nineteen of the missing animals.

A more alarming incident took place a few days later. On April 11th, W.D. Ripley, a ranchman from the Bijou, came into Camp Sanborn on the Platte River northeast of Denver, where Captain Sanborn and his men were on duty guarding the Overland Trail, and reported that Indians had stolen his horses. On the 12th, the captain sent Lt. Clark Dunn in pursuit with forty men. After searching the bluffs south of the river most of the day, Dunn came out of the sand hills about four o'clock and encountered a band of 25 Indians on the north bank, driving a herd of horses identified by Ripley as his property. To avoid any appearance of aggression which might bring about an Indian war, the Lieutenant dismounted, walked forward alone and asked for the horses. The chief replied with a scornful laugh; and, when Dunn tried to disarm them, the red men opened fire. In a running fight the raiders escaped with the stolen stock. Four soldiers were wounded, of whom two afterwards died; and the savages lost from eight to ten killed and twelve or more wounded. This was the start of a series of vicious attacks by the federated plains tribes, extending throughout the spring, summer and fall of 1864.

In his efforts to protect the settlements, Colonel Chivington received the full support of Governor John Evans of Colorado Territory. As ex-officio superintendent of Indian affairs, the governor labored diligently for many months in an effort to avoid war with the Indians. Having been instructed by Washington to negotiate new treaties in his area, he sent agents to arrange a meeting with the Cheyennes and Arapshoes. Although these Indians agreed to meet him at the Big Timbers on the Arikaree Fork of the Republican about the middle of September, 1863, none was there when he arrived. All further efforts by the governor and his agents to persuade members of the two tribes to attend the treaty ground proved fruitless. It was obviously not peace the Indians wanted.

To meet the requirements of the Indian war, the district commander had only a portion of his own First Colorado Cavalry and a few miscellaneous units, which were only sufficient to escort the mails, garrison the posts and camps and provide detachments for the periodic pursuit of bands of raiders. On June 18, the serious nature of the war was brought home to the people of Denver. On that day a party of Arapahoes attacked a ranch on Running Creek 25 miles east of the city, murdered Hungate, the ranch foreman, his wife and two children and scalped and horribly mutilated the bodies.

After two months of increasingly savage attacks culminating in the Hungate massacre, it appeared that there would be no peace on the plains until the hostile tribesmen received a decisive punishment for their depredations. As the season wore on, conditions grew critical. The interruption of traffic on the river trails led to a scarcity of food; and prices rose in proportion until flour sold at 25 dollars per hundredweight. Finally, the Indians cut the Overland Trail and held it from the middle of August till late in September. In many of the raids, women and children were carried off as captives to suffer unbelievable torments; and a number of men were burned at the stake or suffered other inhuman torture.

Throughout the summer, Governor Evans forwarded urgent pleas to the government for the assignment of troops to defend the territory. However, none could be spared in view of the needs of the war in the East. Finally, on August 13th, the War Department authorized the governor to raise a regiment of 100-day volunteers for use in protecting the settlements and punishing hostile Indians. Recruiting proceeded rapidly; and, in a few weeks, between eight and nine hundred men had enlisted in the new unit, the Third Colorado Cavalry. Their services were soon needed.

Late in the night of August 20th, the governor received information that, within the next two nights, all of the settlements from the Platte to the Arkansas would be attacked at the same time by separate parties of hostiles formed from a group of nearly one thousand Cheyennes and Arapahoes, who were then encamped at Point of Rocks in preparation for the raid. The 100-day recruits were at once placed under the district commander, and messengers were sent in all directions with warnings of the impending attack. This placed the whole area on guard; and when the raiders appeared on schedule they found the settlers prepared for defense. Only three or four men were killed, although many cattle and horses were stolen.

COLD WEATHER PEACE It was late in the afternoon of September 14th, 1864. A sentry patrolled the parapet along the north wall of Fort Lyon which was located on the north bank of the Arkansas River in southeastern Colorado. It was not an imposing edifice, with its three foot thick walls of stone and adobe and heavy wooden gates covered with iron. At intervals along the parapet, several small howitzers were mounted at embrasures in the walls. Inside, along the walls were the headquarters, barracks and other buildings, also built of stone and adobe, with flat dirt roofs and dirt floors.

As the sentry reached the east wall of the structure, he halted three Indian braves who were riding rapidly towards the fort from the northeast. When an interpreter arrived, it was learned that the visitors were Cheyenne warriors with a message for Major S. G. Colley from Chief Black Kettle and the tribal council. They were admitted under guard and interviewed, through an interpreter, by Major Wynkoop the post commander and Agent Colley. They delivered a letter, written for Black Kettle by the half breed George Bent, which read in part as follows: "Cheyenne Village August 29th, 1864. "Major Colley: We received a letter from Bent wishing us to make peace. We held a council in regard to it. All came to the conclusion to make peace with you, providing you make peace with the Kiowas, Comanches, Arapahoes, Apaches and Sioux. ... We heard you had some (prisoners) in Denver. We have seven prisoners of yours which we are willing to give up providing you give up yours. There are three war parties out yet ... we want true news of you in return. That is a letter.

At this time this letter was written, Black Kettle was encamped with the main body of his tribe near the headwaters of the Smoky Hill River, 140 miles northeast of Fort Lyon. Summer was drawing to a close and the hostile warriors had begun to turn their thoughts to peace, since it was their usual custom to make war in the summer when the grass was green and game was plentiful, and to make peace in the fall.

Oblivious to the inconsistencies in the letter and genuinely concerned with the fate of the prisoners mentioned, Major Wynkoop decided to make a suitable response. Early the next morning, he set out for the Indian camp with 127 mounted men and two artillery pieces. Late in the afternoon of the fifth day he reached his destination, where he was soon surrounded by from six to eight hundred warriors. Placed in an extremely perilous position by his lack of foresight, he managed to withdraw twelve miles to a strong position, after asking for the release of the prisoners. The following day the chiefs came to his camp and surrendered four white prisoners, a Miss Roper and three children, two of whom died in Denver a short time later as a result of ill treatment.

Explaining that he had no authority to conclude a peace, Wynkoop persuaded Black Kettle and the other chiefs to accompany him to Denver for a conference with the governor, with a promise of protection on the journey and a safe return. At the conference, which was held at Camp Weld on September 28th, the whites were represented by Governor Evans, Colonel Chivington, Colonel Shoup of the Third Colorado Cavalry, Major Wynkoop, certain representatives of the Indian Bureau and a number of private citizens. The Indians attending were Head Cheyenne Chief Black Kettle, Cheyenne Chiefs White Antelope and Bull Bear, Chiefs Neva and Bosse of the Arapahoes and several minor chiefs of both tribes. All of the chiefs present admitted that their people had been and still were engaged in open warfare against the whites, and that they had previously spurned the governor's efforts for peace. Governor Evans told the assembled chiefs that the negotiation of peace was in the hands of the military. As the senior army officer present, Colonel Chivington then advised the Indians that peace could only be secured when the hostile tribes surrendered and laid down their arms. The Fighting Parson's requirement for a complete surrender was reinforced by a telegram from Department Commander General Curtis, sent to him on the day of the council, which stated: "I fear the Agent of the Indian Department will be ready to make presents too soon ... No peace must be made without my direction."

Following the close of the council, Major Wynkoop returned to Fort Lyon with the chiefs. Before they left for their villages, he told them to bring in their hands so that they could be under his observation until he could hear from department headquarters on precise terms of peace. In conformity with this suggestion, and apparently in the belief that they were surrendering to the military, Left Hand and his band of Arapahoes came in to Fort Lyon about the middle of October and delivered some of their summer's plunder to the major. However, neither Black Kettle nor any substantial number of his Cheyennes ever made even a token effort to comply with Colonel Chivington's requirement that they must surrender and lay down their arms as a condition of peace.

General Curtis disapproved of Wynkoop's actions in trying to make peace with the hostile Cheyennes and Arapahoes without proper safeguards. He also felt that the major's trip to the Indian camp was foolhardy and that he had allowed Indians to approach the fort contrary to explicit orders. Accordingly, by Special Orders No. 4, dated October 17, 1864, Major Scott J. Anthony of the First Colorado Cavalry was ordered to take command at Fort Lyon and to investigate and report on Wynkoop's actions towards the Indians..

On November 2nd, when Anthony arrived and took command at Fort Lyon, he found a band of 650 Arapahoes including Chiefs Little Raven and Left Hand, who were camped about a mile from the post. Apprehensive concerning the presence of such a large group of possibly hostile Indians, he immediately arranged a council with their leaders. At this meeting the Indians offered to take any action he might propose in an apparent desire to stay near the post, and the post commander agreed to let them remain and be treated as prisoners of war if they would surrender all of their arms and stolen property. The chiefs seemingly accepted these terms and turned over some twenty head of horses and mules and a few worthless arms, following which they persuaded Anthony to feed them as Wynkoop had done.

After ten days, Anthony decided that this arrangement was not compatible with the safety of the post. The idea that these Indians were prisoners of war was fiction,

since they had never surrendered most of their arms and the small garrison at the fort could never have controlled them in an emergency. Therefore, the major called the chiefs together and told them that he could not continue to feed them. He gave them back their worthless arms and told them to go out on the prairie and hunt buffalo. Thereafter, Left Hand and about forty of his people left the main band and joined Black Kettle and his Cheyennes, who were camped on Sand Creek, thirty-five miles north of Fort Lyon.

BATTLE AT SAND CREEK: Throughout the long weeks of late summer and early fall, the men of the Third Colorado Cavalry waited impatiently for action. Finally, with the war still on and no signs of surrender by the warring tribes, Colonel Chivington decided to strike a blow to bring the raiders under control. He ordered Colonel Shoup to proceed to Boone's ranch on the Arkansas with his Third Colorado Cavalry and a provisional battalion of 125 men of the First Colorado Cavalry under Lieutenant Luther Wilson.

On November 13th, seven companies of the Third Regiment, under command of Major Hal Sayr, set out from their concentration point in the Bijou Basin fifty miles southeast of Denver. This column marched ninety miles in the next five days, much of the way through deep snow and over rough terrain, and joined Colonel Shoup with the rest of the command at Boone's ranch. On the evening of November 23rd, Colonel Chivington joined the expedition with members of his staff and assumed command. After a brief inspection, marching orders were issued, and at nine the next morning the command was on the road. Proceeding steadily down the Arkansas at a maximum rate of speed, the expedition reached Fort Lyon before noon on November 28th to the complete surprise of the members of the garrison who had received no word that the troops had left Denver.

After establishing his camp one mile below the post, the expedition commander left for the fort with his staff. Near the post entrance, some of his officers met Major Anthony, commanding the fort, who exclaimed: "Damned glad you have come! I've got a bank of hostiles only about forty miles from here and have only been waiting for assistance in dealing with them." At post headquarters the group was joined by Major S. G. Colley of the Upper Arkansas Indian Agency. Anthony explained that there was a bank of about one thousand hostile Indians on Sand Creek about forty miles to the north, mostly Cheyennes under Black Kettle with a few Arapahoes, and another larger group about seventy miles further north on the Smoky Hill River.

The Fighting Parson turned to the Indian agent and asked, "What is your opinion of these Indians, Major Colley?" "I have done everything in my power to make them behave," Colley replied, "but I have been able to do nothing with them. In my opinion they should be punished for their hostile acts." "I am marching for Sand Creek tonight," said the colonel. Anthony then offered to join the expedition with a force of 125 men.

A number of the junior officers at Fort Lyon, who had served under Major Wynkoop, were sympathetic to his unauthorized efforts to arrange a peace; and some felt that Wynkoop had converted Black Kettle and his band from "hostile" to "friendly". This became apparent when Anthony called in Captain S. S. Soule and Lieutenants Joseph Cramer and James D. Cannon and instructed them to form a fighting unit to accompany the expedition. They protested vigorously, claiming that Black Kettle and his band were friendly and that the men of Wynkoop's command owed their lives to them. Anthony replied that, with few exceptions, the Cheyennes were hostile. "The object of the expedition," he said, "is to recover the stolen stock and exterminate the Indians who have been committing depredations." "On those grounds," said Cramer, "I am perfectly willing to go."

Chivington's preparations proceeded rapidly. His forces now numbered about 750 men and his strength was further augmented by four 12-pound howitzers, which were manned by detachments from the cavalry companies. The wagon train was left at the fort and field rations were issued to the men. All units formed in column of fours, and the expedition set out at eight that night, heading across the trackless prairie with only the north star as a guide. It was a clear starlit night, but there was a bitter chill in the air. All night long the troops alternated pace for maximum speed. Most of the men were so tired, after four days of forced marches, that they could hardly stay awake in the saddle. Nevertheless, the personality of their indomitable commander permeated all ranks and inspired the belief that at last they were being led to decisive action. At early dawn, they reached a ridge with a view up a valley to the northwest. The half-breed guide pointed out an Indian camp in the valley, and was sent at once to the rear.

The Fighting Parson carefully studied the terrain and formed his plan of operations. Off in the distance, perhaps a mile to the northwest, an Indian village of approximately 130 ledges was scattered irregularly for about a mile along the northern bank of a dry creek bed. Immediately to the west, south of the camp on the opposite side of the creek bed, was a large herd of ponies, numbering between five and six hundred. North of the village, barely visible in the early light, was another smaller herd. Chivington ordered one battalion of the Third to advance at once and seize the herd south of the camp, and dispatched Lieutenant Wilson with his unit to capture the smaller herd to the north. Both forces were under strict orders not to open fire unless first fired upon.

It was between daybreak and sunrise, and some of the Indians were beginning to move about. Hearing the sound of hoofs, some ran out of their lodges and discovered the troops advancing towards the horse herds. Soon the camp was in confusion, with men, women and children running about, securing arms for a fight or preparing for flight. The Fighting Parson awaited the outcome of the maneuver for seizure of the Indians' mounts. It was his intention to engage them in parley on terms of surrender after their means of transportation was secured. The larger herd was soon taken and driven off under guard, but the horses to the north took alarm and ran for the camp. In trying to cut them off, Wilson's men were forced to run in close to Black Kettle's lodge where firing broke out, and it was soon apparent that they were heavily engaged after capturing approximately one-half of the four hundred or more animals in the herd. Accordingly, Chivington ordered a general advance in support of Wilson's hard pressed troops. The men surged forward, seething with long pent up fury and bent on dealing retribution for the long reign of terror, replete with murder, torture and rape.

With the absence of men serving as guards for the captured horses and on other special duties, the effective strength of the attacking force had been reduced to about seven hundred. The number of Indians is unknown, but based on the usual estimate of three warriors to a lodge, it appears that the fighting men numbered about four hundred. Including a number of squaws who fought with the men, Chivington was opposed by approximately five hundred well armed, hard fighting Indians, a force not greatly inferior to his own. The capture of the horses was the decisive factor. The plains Indians were excellent horsemen, and, mounted on their own superior ponies, they would have been extremely difficult to defeat. As it was, all odds were against the red men.

As the attack began, a group of approximately one hundred warriors formed a defense line, which covered the escape of the noncombatant women and children. The direction of the attack had left routes on which they could withdraw, either westward up the valley of Sand Creek or north over the hills to the Smoky Hill River. The ponies driven into camp by Wilson's attack were caught, and many of the squaws, with most of the children, took them and fled. As the attacking troops approached, a large number of these refugees could be seen in the distance, hurrying northward.

Anthony's battalion advanced along the left flank, and Lieutenant Wilson was assigned to the right flank. Advancing in the center, the men of the Third Regiment crossed the creek, passed through the camp, and were turned back in their first attack on the defense line. Chivington then brought his artillery into action, and the first salvo made a breach in the line. Leaving a number of their dead on the field, the Indians retreated slowly, fighting as they went.

As the Indians fell back, some took cover in the tall grass and sagebrush, but most found shelter in rifle pits or trenches, which they had previously dug along the creek banks apparently for just such an emergency. Several squaws were shot while fighting beside the men, using spears, bows and arrows and muskets as skillfully as the warriors, and a number of children were hit by stray bullets. The fighting continued fiercely as the day wore on. Finally, in the late afternoon, Chivington became apprehensive of a possible counterattack by savages thought to be approaching from the Smoky Hill encampment, and ordered his scattered forces to reassemble in the Indian camp.

The troops completed their concentration at about four o'clock in the afternoon, and the battle came to an end, after having continued with cessation since sunrise. Chivington formed his command in a hollow square with the animals on the inside. Supper was provided from the field rations carried by the men, and the exhausted soldiers were soon sleeping with their guns in their arms. To eliminate its use as

a base for hostile operations, the Fighting Parson ordered the Indian camp destroyed, and the lodges beyond the area occupied by the troops were set on fire.

An examination of the village before its destruction gave abundant evidence of the hostile character of its occupants. The troops found large quantities of food supplies, wearing apparel and other belongings which obviously formed part of the loot taken in attacks on wagon trains and ranches. Further, many white scalps were seen in the village by Dr. T. P. Bell and Dr. Caleb Birdsall, Surgeon and Assistant Surgeon of the Third Regiment, who gave the opinion that a number were freshly taken and that a few were not over five to ten days old.

Chivington's losses amounted to seven killed, forty-seven wounded, of whom seven afterwards died, and one missing. The casualties of the Indians are not readily determined, due in part to their custom of carrying off their dead for burial with tribal rites. It is known that Black Kettle, with two hundred of his warriors and their families, escaped to the main Cheyenne village on the Smoky Hill. Considering this and other available information, it appears that approximately 250 Indians were killed, including two hundred warriors and a few noncombatant women and children.

After a day of skirmishing and another night on the alert, Chivington left the battlefield on the morning of December 1 and proceeded down the course of Sand Creek to the Arkansas in pursuit of a hostile band of Arapahoes under Little Raven. However, almost all trace of the savages finally disappeared, and the chase was abandoned near the Kansas line. Since the term of service of the Third Regiment had already expired and his stock was exhausted, the Fighting Parson reluctantly ordered a return to Denver on December 7th. The troops were welcomed as heroes by the citizens of Denver; and the Colorado legislature passed a resolution expressing the gratitude of the people of the territory to Colonel Chivington for his conduct of the Sand Creek campaign.

HISTORY PERVERTED - The full benefits of the battle of Sand Creek were never secured, since the War Department was prevented by political pressure from continuing the campaign against the defeated Indians. In spite of the obvious benefits of the expedition, there were a number of enemies of Colonel Chivington who were determined that the facts would be suppressed and that he would be discredited for his part in the battle. Chief among these were Indian Agent S. G. Colley and John Smith his interpreter, who were operating as partners in trade with the Indians. The firm, which also included Colley's son, was making huge profits and reportedly swindling the government by using, for their trade goods, property furnished for Indian annuities.

The controversy on the nature of the campaign seems to have started on December 20th, when Colley sent a letter describing the battle as a massacre to Senator Doolittle of Wisconsin, a member of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. Soon thereafter, the people of Colorado read with amazement and indignation that Congress was to investigate the Sand Creek engagement, based on letters from undisclosed "high officials in Colorado," which stated that Indians, mainly women and children, had been killed after surrendering. Subsequently, the program to discredit the battle was advanced by distorted and exaggerated accounts published in the Eastern press.

As a result of Colley's letter and the lurid publicity, an investigation of the of the campaign was started by the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War. The principal witnesses were S. G. Colley, John Smith, Governor Evans, Major Anthony and Colonel Chivington, whose testimony was in the form of a deposition. Only John Smith gave any substantial, competent evidence adverse to the Fighting Parson and his men. Nevertheless, and in spite of the reasons that Smith had to color his testimony, the committee disregarded the weight of responsible evidence on the other side of the issues and accepted his story as the true version of the incident.

The record of the Joint Special Congressional Committee to Inquire into the Condition of the Indian Tribes, which held hearings on Sand Creek at a later date, contains testimony of some of the witnesses who appeared before the other committee. The tenor of the evidence is very much the same, and any inferences adverse to Colonel Chivington rest largely on the testimony of John Smith.

The military proceedings on this incident began with a preliminary investigation by Major Wynkoop, who was ordered to Fort Lyon to take testimony concerning the battle. On January 15, 1865, Wynkoop submitted his report, which described the engagement as an unjustified, indiscriminate massacre of friendly Indians, with

mutilation of the dead and the slaughter of defenseless women and children. The lurid charges received little support from the general and largely hearsay affidavits attached thereto, which were signed by Colley, Smith, three officers, a soldier and a civilian, only one of whom took part in the engagement.

Based on this report and instructions from the War Department, General Curtis ordered the appointment of a military commission to investigate the Sand Creek campaign. Like the other two proceedings, this one was conducted in a prejudicial manner under the presiding officer, Lieutenant Colonel S. F. Tappan, who was Colonel Chivington's implacable personal enemy. Nineteen witnesses were called by the commission and testified to matters, either extraneous or adverse to the colonel and his men, and Chivington presented sixteen witnesses who gave evidence on his behalf.

Considering the evidence at all three hearings, it clearly appears that the attack was justified by the proven hostile character of the Indians at Sand Creek. There was no evidence that Colonel Chivington issued any orders for indiscriminate slaughter. Further, it appears that, other than scalping, mutilation of Indian bodies was not extensive, and that none of such actions were authorized by the colonel. Finally, the records show that the affair was a hard fought battle lasting ten hours, and not in any sense a "massacre."

For nearly twenty years after the close of the war, Colonel Chivington was the object of vicious attacks in the public press and elsewhere, based on the adverse portions of the records of the hearings. His only reply to this abuse was, "I stand by Sand Creek." Finally, on September 13th, 1883, the Fighting Parson was given a hero's welcome at the Pioneers' Reunion in Denver, when, in a moving address, he told the simple story of the Sand Creek campaign. From that day forward until his death in 1894, it was made abundantly clear that, like the colonel, Colorado too stood by Sand Creek.

EDITOR'S NOTE: The above article is of course of one opinion concerning so controversial an episode in the "War On The Plains."

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THE BATTLE OF McDOWELL

Gen. Jackson's Official Report

(The following report was made by Major General Thomas J. (Stonewall) Jackson, C.S. Army, commanding The Valley District, including operations since the battle of Kernstown and is taken from the "War of Rebellion." Record of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume XII, Part I, Reports.

(Jackson's telegram of the battle follows:)

Valley District, Va., May 9, 1862
Via Staunton, Va., May 10, 1862

General S. Cooper,
Adjutant-General

God blessed our arms with a victory at McDowell yesterday.

T.J. Jackson,
Major-General

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS
ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA

March 7, 1863

GENERAL: I have the honor herewith to submit to you a report of the operations of my command in the battle of McDowell, Highland County, Virginia, on May 8:

After the battle of Kernstown I retreated in the direction of Harrisonburg. My rear guard--comprising Ashby's cavalry, Captain's Chew's battery, and from time to time other forces--was placed under the direction of Col. Turner Ashby, an officer whose judgement, coolness, and courage eminently qualified him for the delicate and important trust. Although pursued by a greatly superior force, under General Banks, we were enabled to halt for more than a fortnight in the vicinity of Mount Jackson.

After reaching Harrisonburg we turned toward Blue Ridge, and on April 19 crossed the South Fork of the Shenandoah, and took position between that river and Swift Run Gap, in Elk Run Valley.

General R.S. Ewell, having been directed to join my command, left the vicinity of Gordonsville, and on the 30th arrived with his division west of the Blue Ridge.

The main body of Bank's pursuing army did not proceed farther south than the vicinity of Harrisonburg; but a considerable force, under the command of General Milroy, was moving toward Staunton, part of it had already crossed to the east of the Shenandoah Mountain, and was encamped not far from the Harrisonburg and Warm Springs turnpike. The position of these two Federal armies were now such that if unmolested they could readily form a junction on the road just named and move with their united forces against Staunton.

At this time Brig. General Edward Johnson, with his troops, was near Buffalo Gap, west of Staunton, so that if the enemy was allowed to effect a junction, it would probably be followed not only by the seizure of a point so important as Staunton, but must compel General Johnson to abandon his position, and he might succeed in getting between us. To avoid these results I determined, if practicable, after strengthening my own division by a union with Johnson's, first to strike Milroy and then to concentrate on the forces of Ewell and Johnson with my own against Banks.

To carry out my design against Milroy, General Ewell was directed to march his division to the position which I then occupied, in the Elk Run Valley, with a view to holding Banks in check, while I pushed on with my division to Staunton. These movements were made.

At Staunton I found, according to previous arrangements, Major-General Smith, of the Virginia Military Institute, with the corps of Cadets, ready to co-operate in the defense of that portion of the Valley.

On the morning of May 7 General Johnson, whose familiarity with that mountain region and whose high qualities as a soldier admirably fitted him the advance, moved with his command in the direction of the enemy, followed by the brigades of General Taliaferro, Colonel Campbell and General Winder, in the order named.

Encountering the enemy's advance near the point where the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike intersects the Harrisonburg and Warm Springs turnpike, General Johnson pressed forward. The Federals rapidly retreated, abandoning their baggage at Rodgers and other points east of the Shenandoah Mountain. After the advance had reached the western base of the Shenandoah the troops bivouacked for the night.

On the following morning the march was resumed, General Johnson's brigade still in front. The head of the column was halted near the top of Bull Pasture Mountain, and General Johnson, accompanied by a party of 30 men and several officers, with a view to a reconnaissance of the enemy's position, ascended Setlington's Hill, an isolated spur of the Bull Pasture Mountain on the left of the turnpike, and commanding a full view of the village of McDowell. From this point the position, and to some extent the strength of the enemy could be seen. In the valley in which McDowell is located was observed a considerable force of infantry. To the right, on the height, were two regiments, but too distant for an effective fire to that point. Almost a mile in front was a battery supported by infantry.

The enemy, observing a reconnoitering party, sent out a small body of skirmishers which was promptly met by the men with General Johnson and driven back.

For the purpose of securing the hill, all of General Johnson's regiments were sent to him. The Fifty-second Virginia Regiment, being the first to reach ground, was posted on the left as skirmishers, and it was not long before they were engaged in a brisk encounter with the enemy's skirmishers, whom they handsomely repulsed. Soon after this three other regiments arrived, and were posted as follows: The Twelfth Georgia on the crest of the hill, and forming the center of our line; the Fifty-eighth Virginia on the left, to support the Fifty-second; and the Forty-fourth Virginia on the right near a ravine.

Milroy having during the day been re-enforced by General Schenck, determined to carry the hill, if possible, by a direct attack. Advancing in force along its western slope, protected in his advance by the character of the ground and the wood interposed in our front and driving the skirmishers before him, he emerged from the woods and poured a galling fire into our right, which was returned, and a brisk and animated contest was kept up for some time, when the two remaining regiments of Johnson's brigade (the Twenty-fifth and Thirty-first) came up they were posted on the right. The fire was now rapid and well sustained on both sides and the conflict fierce and sanguinary.

In ascending to the crest of the hill from the turnpike the troops had to pass to the left through the woods by a narrow and rough route. To prevent the possibility of the enemy's advancing along the turnpike and seizing the point where the troops left the road to ascend the hill, the Thirty-first Virginia Regiment was posted between that point and the town, and when ordered to join its brigade in action its place supplied by the Twenty-first Regiment. The engagement had now only become general along the entire line, but so intense, that I ordered General Taliaferro to the support of General Johnson.

Accordingly, the Twenty-third and the Thirty-seventh Virginia Regiments were advanced to the center of the line, which was then held by the Twelfth Georgia with heroic gallantry, and the Tenth Virginia was ordered to support the Fifty-second Virginia which had already driven the enemy from the left and had now advanced to make a flank movement on him.

At this time the Federals were pressing forward in strong force on our extreme right, with a view of flanking that position. This movement of the enemy was speedily detected and met by General Talliaferro's brigade and the Twelfth Georgia with great promptitude. Further to check it, portions of the Twenty-fifth and the Thirty-first Virginia regiments were sent to occupy an elevated piece of woodland on our right and rear, so situated as to fully command the position of the enemy. The brigade commanded by Colonel Campbell coming up about this time was, together with the Tenth Virginia, ordered down the ridge into the woods to guard against movements against our right flank, which they, in connection with the other forces, effectually prevented.

The battle lasted about four hours--from 4:30 in the afternoon until 8:30. Every attempt by front or flank movement to attain the crest of the hill, where our line was formed, was signally and effectually repulsed. Finally, after dark, their forces ceased firing, and the enemy retired.

The enemy's artillery, posted on a hill in our front, was effective in throwing shot and shell up to the period when the infantry fight commenced, but in consequence of the great angle of elevation at which they fired, and our sheltered position, they inflicted no loss upon our troops. Our own artillery was not brought up, there being no road to the rear by which our guns could be withdrawn in event of disaster and the prospect of successfully using them did not compensate for the risk.

General Johnson, to whom I had intrusted the management of the troops engaged, proved himself eminently worthy of the confidence reposed in him by the skill, gallantry, and presence of mind which he displayed on the occasion. Having received a wound near the close of the engagement which compelled him to leave the field, he turned over the command to General Talliaferro.

During the Federals made a hurried retreat towards Franklin, in Pendleton County leaving their dead upon the field. Before doing so, however, they succeeded in destroying most of their ammunition, camp, equipage, and commissary stores, which they could not remove.

Official reports show a loss in this action of 71 killed and 390 wounded, making a total loss of 461.

Among the killed was Colonel Gibbons of the Tenth Virginia Regiment. Colonel Harman, of the Fifty-second, Colonel George H. Smith and Major John C. Higginbotham, of the Twentieth-fifth, and Major Campbell of the Forty-eighth Virginia, were among the wounded.

To prevent Banks from re-enforcing Milroy, Mr. J. Hotchkiss, who was on topographical duty with the army proceeded with a party to blockade the roads through North River and Dry River Gaps, while a detachment of cavalry obstructed the road through Brock's Gap.

As the Federals continued to fight until night and retreated before morning, but few of their number were captured. Besides master and commissary stores, some arms and other ordnance stores fell into our hands.

Dr. Hunter McGuire, my medical director, managed his department admirably.

Lieut. Hugh H. Lee, chief of ordnance, rendered valuable assistance in seeing my instructions respecting the manner in which the troops should go into action faithfully carried out. I regret to say that during the action he was so seriously wounded as to render it necessary for him to leave the field.

First Lieut. A.S. Pendleton, aide-de-camp; First Lieut. J. K. Boswell, Chief Engineer; and Second Lieut. R. K. Meade, assistant Chief of Ordnance, were actively engaged in transmitting orders.

Previous to the battle the enemy had such complete control of the pass through which our artillery would have to pass, if it continued to advance on the direct road to McDowell, that I determined to postpone the attack until the morning of the 9th. Owing to the action having been brought on by Milroy's advancing to the attack on the 8th, Maj. R.L. Dabney, assistant Adjutant-General, was not with me during the engagement. Major J.A. Harman, Chief Quartermaster, and Maj. W.J. Hawks, Chief Commissary, had their departments in good condition.

Leaving Lieut. Col. J.T.L. Preston, with a detachment of cadets and a small body of cavalry, in charge of the prisoners and public property, the main body of the army, preceded by Capt. George Sheetz, with his cavalry, pursued the retreating Federals to the vicinity of Franklin, but succeeded in capturing only a few prisoners and stores along the line of march.

The Junction between Banks and Milroy having been prevented and becoming satisfied of the practicability of capturing the defeated enemy, owing to the mountainous character of the country being favorable for a retreating army to make its escape, I determined, as the enemy had made another stand at Franklin, with a prospect of being soon re-enforced, that I would not attempt to press farther, but return to the open country of the Shenandoah Valley, hoping, through the blessing of Providence to defeat Banks before he should receive reinforcements.

On Thursday, the 15th, the army, after divine service, for the purpose of rendering thanks to God for the victory with which He had blessed us and to implore His continued favor, began to retrace its course.

Great praise is due the officers and men for their conduct in action and on the march.

Though Colonel Crutchfield, Chief of Artillery, did not have an opportunity of bringing his command into action on the 8th, it was used with effect on several occasions during the expedition.

My special thanks are due Major General F.H. Smith for his conduct and patriotic co-operation during the expedition.

Col. T.H. Williamson, of the Engineers, rendered valuable service.

For further information respecting the engagement and those who displayed themselves I respectfully refer you to the accompanying reports of brigade and other commanders.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T.J. Jackson,
Lieutenant-General

Brig. Gen. R.H. Chilton
Assistant Adjutant and Inspector General
Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia

VICKSBURG FIELDTRIP (cont)

and I won't go into who won. After the wrecker hauled us out we all agreed that good old Grant had a guardian angel as he had no rain when he made the march. Needless to say a Corp wud have never made it. Then Ed wrapped up the tour inside the Vicksburg Military Park proper. The excitement of the talk was further enhanced by a darkening sky and streaks of lightning. Our final dinner was one of good comradeship touched with a note of sadness that we had to make ready to head homeward. A consensus of the group that we wouldn't have missed it no matter how long or far we had to drive, fly or walk. Once again the National Park Personnel proved that they are more than willing to give of their time (and their time off in the case of the group who flew) and knowledge to assure groups such as ours that we have a wonderful hobby.