



THE CIVIL WAR ROUND-TABLE

P. O. BOX 5028, CLEVELAND, OHIO 44101

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132nd Meeting

DATE: TUESDAY, January 9, 1973

SPEAKER: MOVIE NIGHT

SUBJECT: "MOSEBY'S MARAUDERS"

PLACE: THE HERMIT CLUB, DODGE COURT

IT'S AN OLD FASHION SALOON LUNCH FOR DINNER

JOHN SINGLETON MOSBY

According to Boatner's CIVIL WAR DICTIONARY: John Singleton Mosby was a Confederate Partisan Ranger. Born in 1833 and died in 1916, in Virginia. While at the University of Va., he shot another student in a provoked incident and was finally released. Meanwhile, he had read law with his defense counsel in jail. He practiced law at Bristol and was commissioned into the state forces in early 1861. When Va. seceded, he became a private in "Grumble" Jones's 1st Va. Cavalry and fought at 1st Bull Run. He was commissioned 1st Lt. in Feb. '62 and began scouting for J.E.B. Stuart shortly afterward, guiding him on the famous ride around McClellan in June. After having been a prisoner for a few weeks in July, he was given permission in January '63 to organize his Partisan Rangers and engage in guerrilla warfare around the Loudoun Valley of northern Va. In Mar. '63 he captured B.G. Edwin H. Stoughton from his bed, uncovering the sleeping general and slapping him on the behind. During the Wilderness campaign a great deal of Union energy was spent trying to track Mosby down. V.C. Jones, in his excellent RANGER MOSBY, advances the theory that Mosby prolonged the life of the Confederacy by diverting much of Grant's strength to combat the Partisan Rangers. During the last winter of the war the Rangers were supreme in eastern Va., and that area was called "Mosby's Confederacy." Promoted Maj. in April '63 and Lt. Col. 11 Feb. '64, he was named Col. 7 Dec. of that year. The command, numbering 100 at first and around 200 by the end of the war, was mustered into the Confederate Army as the 43rd Battalion of Va. Cavalry on June 10, 1863. In Dec '64 the troops were split into two battalions. Rather than surrender, Mosby disbanded his Rangers on April 20, 1865 and returned to his law practice. He later became involved in Reconstruction politics and was tremendously unpopular in the South for supporting Grant for president. After serving as Consul in Hong Kong and practicing law in Calif., he returned to Va., where he spent the rest of his long life. His WAR REMINISCENCES was published in 1887. Jones describes him as of medium height with sandy blond hair and a clean-shaven face. He wore a gray cape lined with scarlet that was thrown back over his shoulder, and a curling ostrich plume decorated his hat, the second most famous feather in the Confederacy. Weighing only 125 pounds, he was agile and fearless--his pictures show a man whose determination bordered on ruthlessness but never overlapped into cruelty. Grant said in his memoirs: "Since the close of the war I have come to know Col. Mosby personally and somewhat intimately. He is a different man entirely from what I had supposed. He is able and thoroughly honest and his

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ERRATUM AND APOLOGIES

Do you remember the first time you were caught doing something you shouldn't? Then you have some idea about how I feel about an article in last month's newsletter, after I received a letter from Stephen Z. Starr, past president of the Cincinnati CWRT and a recognized authority on George St. Leger Grenfell. I'll let Stephen's letter speak for itself.

Dear Guy;

I got quite excited when I noticed in your December Newsletter the reprint of an article about George St. Leger Grenfell. . . .

Then I read the article. I won't comment on the style, other than to remark that it is such a good example of the kind of gee-whiz, lurid writing that has given Civil War literature a bad name, that it could be used as a parody. But I will comment on his facts. I began to check off his mistakes: Grenfell always wrote his name with two l's; he was born in 1808, not 1800 (I have a copy of his baptismal certificate); he never enlisted in the Chasseurs d'Afrique; having been born in 1808, it is not very likely that he could have "gained a field commission" in 1819 - at the age of 11, or that, in 1822, at the age of 14, he took a mistress; when the French bombarded (not attacked) Tangier, Grenfell did not join them; he never enlisted in the Turkish army as a private - he was commissioned a captain in what was called the Anglo-Turkish Contingent; he was not within several hundred miles of the Charge of the Light Brigade. And so on, and so on, and so on. After checking off anywhere from one to four blatant errors per paragraph on the first couple of pages, I gave it up as a waste of time.

As the editor. . . , you owe it to your fellow-members to suggest that they forget the article as soon as possible. If any of them are interested in Grenfell - and he was a truly fascinating individual who does not need the treatment the article gave him - let them read my biography of him (Colonel Grenfell's Wars (Baton Rouge, 1971)), or my article, "Colonel George St. Leger Grenfell: His Pre-Civil War Career," in Journal of Southern History, XXX (1964), 278-98.

You see what I mean? So here and now I wish to publically apologize to all of you for not checking closer before using the article in the newsletter. I do not want to be guilty of perpetuating bad Civil War history.

BELATED POSTSCRIPT TO THE VICKSBURG FIELD TRIP

by Fred Gill

The advance guard, comprising of Neville Bayless, Stu Cramer and Fred Gill, spent the day before the main contingent's arrival with Park Historian Albert Scheller being shown the corollary battlefields not covered by Ed Bearss- Chickasaw Bluffs, Raymond, Champion Hill and Big Black Bridge. Most noteworthy: Champion Hill, now only an unmarked and disused gravel pit, described by Mr. Scheller as "One of the decisive battles of our history." If Grant had lost, an army would have been lost, the western campaign lost and the Confederacy perhaps given the lift needed for its life. As Pemberton lost, Vicksburg was lost and the life of the Confederacy doomed. A belated thanks to Park Historian Albert Scheller who gave up his day off to do a day's work.

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THE CIVIL WAR ROUNDTABLE OF CLEVELAND, OHIO

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THE CONFEDERATE STATES NAVAL ACADEMY

By G. Melvin Herndon

In the years preceding the Civil War the "Yorktown, a side-wheel passenger steamer of beautiful model, was one of the steamers of the New York and Old Dominion Line running between Richmond and New York. She was of thirteen hundred tons burthen and brigantine rigged, (i.e. having foremast with square sails and a mainmast with fore and aft sails) and considered a fast boat. This was the period when steam had begun to revolutionize sea travel; yet so uncertain were shipbuilders and shipmasters regarding the ultimate development of steam as an exclusive motive power, they still insisted that their ships should be at least partially rigged for sail.

When the Commonwealth of Virginia seceded from the Union the "Yorktown" was in the James River and was seized by the state along with other vessels. Though not fitted for fighting, it had to be utilized if possible. She was taken to Rocketts, the harbor of Richmond, and later sold to the Confederate States Navy along with the steamer "Jamestown" for a total of \$280,000. The ship was then sent to the Norfolk Navy Yard and placed in drydock; here her name, appearance and occupation were changed.

Under the supervision of naval constructor, Joseph Pearce, mechanics commenced the necessary alterations, and in a short time the passenger steamer, "Yorktown" was converted into a very creditable man-of-war. Her decks were rearranged and straightened and much of the superstructure removed, one-inch iron plates were placed abreast her boilers extending two feet below the water line and running a little forward and abaft her engines and boilers, and iron shields in the form of an inverted V were placed on her spar decks fore and aft. When fighting head on or stern on, they provided cover from raking shot as well as some protection for her walking beam. Metal plate was also placed around her wheel houses, for a shell placed in these vulnerable points would have put her completely at the mercy of the enemy.

A number of guns bristled on her decks. The transformation was now complete. The old "Yorktown" was now the "C.S.S. Patrick Henry", a man-of-war of thirteen hundred tons, twelve guns, and a crew of one hundred eighty officers and men. Command of this new fighting ship was conferred upon Captain John Randolph Tucker, of Alexandria, Virginia, late an officer of the United States Navy who had resigned his commission to offer his services to his native state.

The "C.S.S. Patrick Henry" was immediately assigned to the James River Squadron and took position off Mulberry Island, on which point rested the right of the Army of the Peninsula under General John B. Magruder, prepared to repel an attack which might have been made at any moment. Soon the monotony became so irksome that on September 13, 1861, Captain Tucker took the "C.S.S. Patrick Henry" down the James to the Newport News point and fired a few shots on the "Savannah", the "Louisiana", and the "Congress" with two of his heavy guns, with the hope of inducing a single gunboat to ascent the river and engage vessel to vessel. It was later reported by Union sources that the fire of the "Patrick Henry" did considerable damage to the frigate "Congress".

On the night of December 1, 1861, the "Patrick Henry" again went down the river hoping to intercept Federal picket boats rumored to be ascending the James. Daylight found the "Patrick Henry" near the Federal squadron. As she could not have returned unseen Captain Tucker opened fire, and after a skirmish of an hour or so the "Patrick Henry" returned to her usual anchorage off Mulberry Island. One officer and several men of her crew were wounded during the skirmish.

In the latter part of February 1862 the ladies of Charles City County, on the north side of the James River, planned to present the "Patrick Henry" with a flag which they had made for her as a token of their confidence in the vessel and crew and to denote their appreciation of the services she had done them by keeping marauding expeditions from coming up the river to pillage, plunder, and perhaps destroy many of the homes along that side of the river. But the flag was destined never to be presented as the few hours necessary for the ceremonies could not be spared. The battle that changed naval warfare for all time was in the immediate offing -- the contest between the "Monitor" and the "Merrimac" or "Virginia" -- and the "Patrick Henry" was to prepare for its role in the Battle of Hampton Roads.

In this historic battle the "C.S.S. Patrick Henry" did her part. On March 7, 1862, Captain Tucker moved down to Day's Neck as ordered, and anchored at a point from which any vessel coming out from Norfolk could be seen. March 8, 1862, was a bright, beautiful day, and all eyes on board the "Patrick Henry" were watching for the "Merrimac". They were not disappointed; about one o'clock the Confederate iron-clad came steaming out from behind Craney Island. The "Patrick Henry" hauled anchor and under a full head of steam sped on her way to join her powerful friend.

The "Patrick Henry" passed the Federal batteries with less damage than anticipated--one shot passed through the crew of No. 3 gun wounding two and killing one--and was soon in the thick of the fight. During the conflict a rifle shot from one of the field batteries penetrated her steam chest, five or six men were scalded to death and her engines stopped running, but her guns continued to blaze away. One boiler was soon repaired and after the battle was over, she limped back up the James to Drewry's Bluff.

On May 15, 1862, the "Patrick Henry" fought her last engagement as a man-of-war at the Battle of Drewry's Bluff. Drewry's Bluff was the best defense position between the Federal squadron and Richmond. The Confederate steamer "Jamestown" was sunk to complete the obstructions of the river--her guns having been previously placed in battery on the Bluff. One solid-shot eight-inch gun and two rifled thirty-two-pounders were also taken from the "Patrick Henry", mounted in pits dug in the brow of the Bluff, and manned by officers and crew of the vessel. These additions gave the Confederate fortifications sufficient firepower to repel an enemy attack. On March 15, 1862, a Federal squadron consisting of the "Galena", "Monitor", "Naugatuck", "Port Royal", and "Arroostook" attacked. After a hot battle of about four hours duration, the Federal squadron withdrew--an attack on Richmond had been prevented.

Following the Battle of Drewry's Bluff the "Patrick Henry" was withdrawn from active duty with the James River Squadron and elevated to a new status. On May 15, 1862, the "C.S.S. Patrick Henry" was designated to become a military college--The Confederate States Naval Academy. In August her commander, Captain J.R. Tucker, was transferred to Charleston, S.C., to take command of the "C.S.S. Palmetto State". In the months that followed, activity aboard the "Patrick Henry" consisted largely of alterations, most of them internal, to prepare her for the new role she was to play. Some of her guns had been removed earlier and mounted on nearby Drewry's Bluff, others remained in position on her decks for training purposes and to assist in the defense of the James when and if necessary.

The idea of a naval academy for the Confederacy seems to have originated in the mind of Stephen R. Mallory, the Florida-born son of Charles Mallory, a "Connecticut Yankee". Young Mallory was very capable, energetic, and a man of varied experiences. He grew up by the sea on the island city of Key West, Florida, fought Seminole Indians, practiced law, served as Collector of Customs in Key West, and in 1851 became a member of the United States Senate. While a member of the Senate, his intense and vigorous interest and activity in naval reforms led to his appointment as Chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs. In this capacity he applied himself earnestly and acquired a great deal of additional knowledge about the Navy, which was invaluable to the Confederacy. In 1858 he was sent as minister to Spain and on February 21, 1861, Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederacy, very wisely selected Stephen R. Mallory as Secretary of the Confederate States Navy.

Confederate Navy and immediately began attacking the problem with tireless energy. Plans were soon made for the construction, purchase, and capture of ships. Such was the paucity of shipyards and skilled mechanics in the South that the capture of a Federal vessel of any kind was an event of great rejoicing in the Confederate Navy. To train efficient officers to help man these ships, Mallory conceived the idea of establishing a naval academy.

The first move to establish the naval school was made in December 1861, when the Confederate Congress passed a bill providing "that some form of education be established for midshipmen." In the spring of 1862, more concrete action was taken as Congress enacted legislation providing that a naval academy be established and that 106 acting midshipmen be appointed to the academy by members of Congress from their respective districts and by the President of the Confederacy at large. In May 1862 the "C.S.S. Patrick Henry" was designated as the Confederate Naval Academy, to be located at Drewry's Bluff; alterations to prepare the ship for her new role were soon begun. Cabins were ordered erected on Drewry's Bluff for quarters to supplement those being prepared aboard the ship. Lieutenant William H. Parker was selected as superintendent of the nascent naval academy and instructed to formulate regulations for its government, and Commander John M. Brooke was given the task of organizing the school.

Lieutenant Parker, a native of New York, graduated first in his class at the United States Naval Academy in 1848. He held an instructorship at the Naval Academy 1853-1857 and again 1860-1861, resigning to offer his services to the Confederacy. Prior to his appointment to the superintendency of the Confederate Naval Academy, he served as Lieutenant Commander of the "C.S.S. Patrick Henry" under Captain John R. Brooke.

Commander John Mercer Brooke, a native Virginian, was also a graduate of the United States Naval Academy. He resigned from the U.S. Navy April 20, 1861, to join the Virginia State Navy, and was later placed in charge of the Office of Ordnance and Hydrography of the Confederate States Navy. He invented the "Brooke Rifle", the most powerful gun produced by the Confederacy and aided in the designing and construction of the ironclad war vessels, including the famous "Merrimac".

Parker and Brooke were not able to submit their detailed proposals concerning the academy to Secretary Mallory for final approval until July 1863, and classes did not begin until October of that same year. However, part of the training program was operational by the end of April 1862. Time was of the essence. The Confederate Navy was in dire need of trained officers as evidenced by the fact that Acting Midshipman William Andrews was commanding officer of the 520 ton "C.S.S. Sumter" anchored in the Bay of Gibraltar in August 1862 awaiting repairs. It was soon obvious that the facilities aboard the Academy would be inadequate to accommodate more than one-half of the 106 appointments authorized by Congress. Although a few cabins were built on Drewry's Bluff as additional quarters for midshipmen, a bill sponsored by Secretary Mallory requesting funds to be used to increase the number of cabin-quarters and instructors failed to pass Congress. In order that the entire 106 acting midshipmen might receive some instruction at the school ship and to inaugurate a part of the training program while the establishment of the academy was being completed, a plan of rotation of the midshipmen was conceived. Those at the academy would be alternated from time to time with those at sea and at shore installations. Thus many appointments and assignments were made soon after Congressional authorization in April of 1862.

Each appointee was required to meet certain age, mental, and physical requirements. He had to be at least fourteen and not over eighteen years of age; there were exceptions, however, as Raphael Semmes, Jr., the son of the Admiral, began his training as an acting midshipman at the age of twelve. Written examinations were given on such elementary studies as reading, writing, spelling, and arithmetic. As to physical requirements, any one of the following conditions would bar a young man from the academy:

"Muscular tenuity; glandular sweatings; chronic cutaneous affections; severe injuries of the bones of the head; convulsions; fistula lachrymalis, deafness; copious discharge from the ears; impaired or inadequate efficiency of one or both of the superior extremities, contractions of a joint, extenuation, or a deformity; an unnatural excurvature of incurvature of the spine; impaired or inadequate efficiency

of one or both of the inferior extremities on account of varicose veins, fractures, flatness, lameness, contraction, or unequal length, bunyons, overlying or supernumerary toes."

Many of the 59 acting midshipmen who resigned from the United States Naval Academy as a consequence of secession completed their courses of naval studies at the Confederate States Naval Academy. These, along with the original appointees in 1862, were assigned to vessels in service or to shore installations. They were expected to study certain books and manuals during off-duty hours in addition to the routine practices and duties. St. George Tucker Brooke, of Richmond, was one of the first to receive an appointment as acting midshipman. This young midshipman was ordered to report for duty aboard a frigate anchored in the Elizabeth River. The ship, unfit for combat duty, had been fitted up as a Receiving Ship and "was commanded by one lieutenant with six or eight midshipmen and perhaps ... 25 or 30 men and an armament of 10 or 12 old fashioned 32 pounder guns." Young Brooke stated that "On board the 'States' I was given a book of instructions in heavy ship-gun drill and was required to learn the manual. When I had learned it out of the book and from observation I was assigned with the other midshipmen, the duty of drilling the men at the heavy guns and sometimes at the Navy Yard." Thus many of the midshipmen had received considerable training before they could be received aboard the "Patrick Henry".

Lieutenant Parker and Commander Brooke submitted their final plans to Secretary Mallory in July 1863 and classes began at the "floating academy" in October 1863. As far as possible the organization, discipline, and studies of the school were modeled upon the curriculum of the United States Naval Academy and "conforms to that of most approved naval schools."

A very able and proficient academic group was selected to staff the school and the staff remained almost intact until the school died with the Confederacy. Lieutenant O.F. Johnson relieved Lieutenant W. B. Hall as Commandant in the summer of 1864, in order that the latter might devote more attention to the instruction of classes, and in November 1864 a Lieutenant B. P. Loyal relieved Lieutenant Johnson. Five of the six professors were drawn from the army. The naval officers serving as instructors at the academy were paid according to rank--Lieutenants received \$1,500 annually. The professors were classified as civilians and received \$1,000 plus one ration each day. While at the academy the midshipmen received \$500, uniforms, room, and board, those on sea duty \$550, and those on leave or awaiting orders \$450. Upon graduation those assigned to vessels in service received \$900 and those on leave or other duty \$800.

The academic program was practical, yet rather rigid for such young lads. There were four annual courses of study and each midshipman was placed in one of the four classes.

In October 1863 fifty-two midshipmen reported to the academy as ordered, the remaining fifty-four of the 106 appointed by this time remained at their present posts (at sea, at shore installations, or abroad) and awaited their turn for instruction at the academy. On board the "Patrick Henry" were quarters, recitation rooms, a messroom, and facilities for drill and practical works. The midshipmen slept in hammocks slung together as close as sardines in a can and in cabins on Drewry's Bluff. Two recitation rooms were located on the hurricane deck between the paddle boxes. Facilities for drill and practical works included a foremast fully rigged with sails, steam engines, guns with smooth and rifled bore, and a launch or small boat fitted with a twelve-pound howitzer to teach the midshipmen boat and howitzer exercises. Infantry tactics and drill were usually held on Drewry's Bluff. In the latter part of 1864 a Prussian officer, on convalescent leave from General Fitzhugh Lee's staff, was assigned to the academy to provide instruction in the use of the broadsword.

The morning gun was fired at 7 a.m., breakfast was served at eight, and studies and recitation ended at 2 p.m. Following lunch, the remainder of the day was devoted to various drill exercises and practical works. The day ended with tattoo at 9:30 p.m. and taps at ten. Such was the daily routine if not broken by orders for active military details.

A more realistic war college had perhaps never existed. There were few of the midshipmen, if any, who did not receive their baptism of fire a number of times while assigned to the academy. Thus most of these young students were combat veterans

before leaving the academy. Active military details became so frequent that they might well be included as a part of the curriculum. There were usually more volunteers for these active details than were needed or requested, but the instructors solved this problem by making such assignments a reward for scholarship. In a report to Secretary Mallory, Commander John M. Brooke wrote: "Though but from 14 to 18 years of age, they eagerly seek every opportunity presented for engaging in hazardous enterprises; and those who are sent upon them uniformly exhibit good discipline, conduct, and courage."

Three large guns had been removed from the decks of the "Patrick Henry" and mounted for action on Drewry's Bluff, and nearby were the naval land batteries of Wood, Brooke, Semmes, and Howlett. Classes were frequently interrupted when midshipmen were summoned to man these batteries. After a duel ended, the boys would return to the "Patrick Henry" and resume their studies. Midshipmen also assisted in laying mines, in anchoring torpedoes, in excursions down the James to board and capture or destroy Federal gunboats, and sometimes participated in more distant expeditions.

On a cold wintry day in 1863, ten midshipmen were ordered to join a force led by Colonel J. Taylor Wood to assist General George E. Pickett in his attack on New Bern, North Carolina. The expedition went down the James and up the Appomattox to Petersburg in ten small boats. At Petersburg the men and boats were put aboard a train and taken to Kinston, North Carolina. Here the boats were placed in the Neuse River and the group finally reached New Bern after rowing miles upstream. Failing to make contact with General Pickett, the expedition proceeded up the Trent River where they suddenly came upon the "U.S. Underwriter," a Federal steamer of four guns. Quietly the men began to board the gun boat only to be met on deck by its crew of 85 officers and men, but the vessel was captured. Heavy enfilading fire from Federal land batteries damaged its machinery so badly that it could not be moved. Finding 'the prize' useless, Colonel Wood ordered it destroyed. In his report to President Davis, Secretary Mallory wrote: "Our loss was five, including two gallant and promising young officers, Midshipman P. Saunders and First Assistant Engineer E.J. Gill, who fell in a hand-to-hand conflict on the enemy's decks."

When General Benjamin F. Butler landed at Bermuda Hundred in May of 1864, there were but 3,000 Confederates between the Appomattox River and Richmond. The academy was thus called upon to help man the land batteries around Richmond and boats of the James River Squadron. Some of them helped work the guns on Drewry's Bluff, others were sent to man a battery on Mechanicsville Pike three miles above Richmond. Lieutenant Parker took a detachment with him aboard the "Fredericksburg," another group was ordered aboard the "Virginia" with Lieutenant Hall, and fifteen were sent to the gunboat "Roanoke." Others were used to strengthen a raiding party sent to Wilmington, North Carolina, and still another group joined an expedition to Halifax, North Carolina, in an attempt to prevent the capture of a small ironclad being built in the Roanoke River. A lull in the heavier fighting along the river in September permitted the resumption of a full-time academic program aboard the school ship.

No special privileges were granted to the midshipmen who participated in the various activities just noted or even to those detached with more permanent assignments. All midshipmen were expected to be prepared to take the written assignment given semiannually. Those aboard the "Patrick Henry" were usually given in June and December of each year by an Academic Board. A board of visitors decided upon the qualifications for class promotion, and it was possible for a midshipman to be advanced more than one class following an examination. As soon as the midshipmen were deemed proficient, they were ordered to ships, batteries, or other duty. Replacements at the academy were filled by those midshipmen who had not had formal instruction there. All midshipmen not at the academy were to be examined semi-annually by "roving examining boards."

Commanders of vessels in Confederate waters were ordered to strictly enforce the sunset regulation in granting liberty to midshipmen under their command and to insist upon the pursuance of studies as prescribed by the regulations of the academy. Each midshipman was required to keep journals of all his duties, studies, and other activities. These were to be produced at examination time, together with letters from his commanding officer certifying his good conduct and studious habits.

Midshipmen serving aboard the Confederate cruisers on the high seas, and even those in foreign countries, were not out of reach of the long arms of the academy. They were also subject to the regulations prescribed by the academy, including the written examinations.

A number of high ranking members of the Confederate States Navy deemed the naval academy a most worthy and competent war college and were highly complimentary. In a report to Secretary Mallory, Commander John M. Brooke wrote: "The Naval School, under the superintendence of Lieutenant Parker, is conducted in the most satisfactory manner and its importance can not be overestimated." In a later report Brooke stated: "The system of instruction and discipline adopted in the naval school. . .has proved of great benefit to the service. As the efficiency and tone of the Confederate Navy will hereafter depend chiefly upon the early training of its officers, it is most important that this establishment should be carefully fostered." Secretary Mallory voiced his opinion in these statements to President Davis: "The satisfactory progress already made by the several classes gives assurance that the Navy may look to this school for well-instructed and skillful officers. The beneficial results of the school are already visible in the progress, tone, and bearing of our shipmen." Lieutenant Parker reported that "the behavior of the young men has been all that he could have expected; those just appointed are generally much further advanced and of a better class than those received at the United States Naval Academy during his stay there (1853 to 1857 and 1860 to 1861)."

Secretary Mallory was thoroughly convinced of the need and value of the school and deeply disturbed because all of the midshipmen could not be placed under instruction at the academy simultaneously. Corresponding with President Davis he wrote:

"The instruction of midshipmen is a subject of the greatest importance to the Navy. The naval powers of the earth are bestowing peculiar care upon the education of their officers, now more than ever demanded by changes introduced in all the elements of naval warfare. Appointed from civil life and possessing generally but little knowledge of the duties of an officer and rarely even the vocabulary of their profession. . .many of them have heretofore been sent to vessels or batteries where it is impossible for them to obtain knowledge of its most important branches, which can be best, if not only, acquired by methodical study."

In December 1864, upon recommendation and urgent request by Secretary Mallory, bills were introduced in Congress providing that the number of midshipmen be increased to 150, that \$6,000 be appropriated for the erection of more cabins at Drewry's Bluff for the midshipmen, and the addition of six instructors to the staff of the academy. The first bill was vetoed by President Davis and the other two seem to have died in Congress.

The failure of President Davis to act favorably towards these measures was probably due to the more serious military problem created by the capture of Fort Harrison, Virginia, in September 1864 by Union troops. This event caused considerable alarm in and around Richmond. In October 1864 the seventy well drilled and disciplined officers and midshipmen aboard the "Patrick Henry" were armed with rifles and ordered up the James to help protect the bridge above Wilton. In March 1865 the "Patrick Henry" moved up to Richmond and lay at Rocketts.

The fall of Richmond seemed eminent. Determined to preserve the naval academy Secretary Mallory recommended that the school be moved into the interior of the Confederacy. Congress authorized its removal to some other point and a detail led by Lieutenant C.J. Graves, one of the instructors at the academy, was sent dashing through North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia in search of a suitable location, but movements of the enemy prevented the selection of a site to which the institution could be safely moved.

Near the end of March, Lieutenant Parker received orders to prepare to scuttle the "Patrick Henry" in the obstructions of the river. A tobacco warehouse was rented at the corner of Franklin and 24th Streets in Richmond to house the midshipmen, supplies, and equipment. On April 2 Parker received orders to have the corps of midshipmen at the railroad depot at 6 p.m.--the midshipmen has been selected to guard the train transporting the archives and half a million dollars in gold and silver bullion belonging to the Confederate government. Richmond was to be evacuated! Perhaps no higher compliment has been paid these gallant midshipmen than this final duty entrusted to them. Lieutenant J.W. Bilups, Assistant Instructor in Seamanship and ten midshipmen remained behind to scuttle the "Patrick Henry."

Outfitted as infantry soldiers, the treasure escort left Richmond aboard the train on the evening of April 2, 1865. While passing through Manchester the midshipmen displayed such courage and discipline that a raid on the treasure by a destitute mob was prevented. The train reached Danville, Virginia, on April 3, and halted

there for six days. The treasure and archives remained aboard the train at the station guarded by the midshipmen. Leaving Danville on April 9, the train moved through Greensboro and on to Charlotte, North Carolina, where the treasure escort was joined by a Captain Tabb and a company of soldiers. Upon reaching Chester, South Carolina, on April 13, the treasure was transferred to wagons and the military escort followed on foot as the wagon train slowly ground its way to Abbeville, South Carolina, and from there to Augusta via Washington, Georgia. On the long march from Washington to Augusta the news of Lee's surrender reached the wagon train and all along the way the wagons were lightened by discarding books, stationery, and even Confederate money. The wagon train reached Augusta on April 20 and here the money was placed in the vaults of a bank. Finding no competent Treasury official in Augusta, on April 26, the escort transported the money back to Washington, Georgia. Not a single package of the sizable fortune in gold and silver entrusted to the corps of midshipmen was broken while in their charge.

From this point there are to be several conflicting accounts as to exactly what happened. One story has it that on April 26, while still in Washington, the members of the midshipmen escort were offered furloughs, and that all of them accepted except five Virginians. These five midshipmen and Captain Tabb's army unit remained with the wagon train until it returned to Abbeville, where the treasure was deposited with General Basil Duke, commander of the cavalry unit escorting President Davis.

The account related by Lieutenant W.H. Parker makes no mention of any of the midshipmen having left the escort at Washington, Georgia. He simply stated that every Midshipman under his command was disbanded May 2, at Abbeville, South Carolina, by order of Secretary Mallory. . . and \$1,500 worth of gold distributed among them.

The ten midshipmen left in Richmond to scuttle the "Patrick Henry" did the job well and probably performed their last duty for the Confederacy at Sailor's Creek. The Richmond "Dispatch" listed the nine midshipmen captured in the final retreat from Richmond.

As far as can be ascertained, two classes graduated from the Confederate States Naval Academy during its rather brief but noble existence. The first group consisted of twenty-six midshipmen who went aboard the "Patrick Henry" for their formal instruction in January 1864 exchanging places with an equal number already there. This group seems to have consisted largely of acting midshipmen who had but entered the U.S. Naval Academy when the war began. They had since passed two annual written examinations, elevating their class standing, before being ordered to the academy--the first in Richmond in June 1862, and the second at Charleston, South Carolina, in 1863. They were examined a third time upon arrival at the academy in January 1864. They attended classes at the academy until August, at which time they were given thirty days to prepare for their final examinations. Only one of the twenty-six failed to pass the final; he was given another opportunity and passed.

There were others who should have graduated with this group, but they were on cruisers, foreign service, or some other duty and were unable to report to the academy. It was permissible to take the first two or three examinations while on active duty elsewhere, but each acting midshipman was required to have some formal instruction and take the final examination at the academy to be eligible to graduate from the institution. Upon graduation they became Passed Midshipmen or Masters and were sent back to active duty.

In December 1864 a second, and perhaps the last class, graduated from the Confederate States Naval Academy. Only fragmentary evidence concerning this class was located, but these bits show conclusively that a second class did graduate from the academy on that date. In a report to Secretary Mallory on November 4, 1864, Commander John M. Brooke commented on the coming examination in December, the promotion of all four classes of midshipmen at the academy, and of bringing in a new fourth class. Brooke's report indicates that the second graduating class consisted of about twenty-two midshipmen, although a James M. Morgan, was the only graduate of this class definitely located by this writer. He was one of eighteen midshipmen serving aboard as of January 1, 1864. Another source noted that ten members of this class failed to pass their final examinations and were sent home where they probably joined other military units.

In a report issued by Secretary Mallory in December of 1864, he proudly stated: "Many acting midshipmen, who had but entered the U.S. Naval Academy of Annapolis when the war began, have here completed their courses of naval studies, and in addition of

these, 29 youths, appointed originally to this school and representing nearly every portion of the Confederacy, have graduated as passed midshipmen or masters, and they will compare favorably with those of like grades in any naval service."

The Confederate States Naval Academy can not be fully evaluated by its mere size, rather brief existence, or the number of its graduates, for no other group, large or small, performed their varied duties more gallantly than the officers, instructors, and midshipmen of this institution. From various commentaries by Commander John M. Brooke, Lieutenant William H. Parker, and Secretary Stephen R. Mallory perhaps an adequate appraisal might be drawn. The school was conducted ". . . in the most satisfactory manner. . . ." and ". . . conform(e)d to that of most approved naval schools," the behavior of the young men has been (was) all that he could have expected. . . ., and the graduates ". . . compare(d) favorably with those of like grades in any naval service." A final analysis must include the fact that these young men returned home after the war to become earnest, thoughtful, law-abiding citizens--many of them very prominent citizens. This in itself is a glowing tribute to the academic training received at the Confederate States Naval Academy.

EDITOR'S NOTE: G. Melvin Herndon is Associate Professor of History at Lynchburg College. This article appeared in the February, 1962 in TRADITION MAGAZINE

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SHORT ROUNDS

Dr. Otto Eisenschiml in his book "The Hidden Face of the Civil War" rated several of the generals in the Civil War based on their abilities and performances. The following is his rating of the Union Generals listed with a star system that Dr. Eisenschiml devised for simplicity.

**	George H. Thomas	Competent and dependable
**	Fitz John Porter	Competent and dependable
*	George B. McClellan	Erratic, but with high average
*(?)	U. S. Grant	Undetermined
-*	Henry W. Halleck	Bad
-*	Ambrose E. Burnside	Bad

Dr. Eisenschiml appears to have agreed with Robert E. Lee's opinion of Grant which was that "Grant's talent and strategy consisted in accumulating numbers."

Charles A. Dana, the official observer for the War Department said of George H. Thomas, "He had more the character of George Washington than any man I ever knew."

Porter was the only Union General to hand the formidable Lee-Jackson combination their only defeat in the battle of Malvern Hill. At Gaines Mill, with 35,000 men, Porter stood off Lee, Jackson, Longstreet and the two Hills together with 55,000 Confederates before retiring from the field with honor.

Dr. Eisenschiml was considerably more impressed with the Confederate Generals.

****	Nathan B. Forrest	Military ability near genius
***	Stonewall Jackson	Extraordinary ability
**	Joseph E. Johnston	Competent and dependable
**	James Longstreet	Competent and dependable
*	Pierre G. T. Beauregard	Erratic but with a high average
*	Robert E. Lee	Erratic but with a high average
-*	Braxton Bragg	Bad

Had Forrest been under President Lincoln, who spent the war looking for a fighting general, the War might have turned out differently. Instead, his military ability was not appreciated by Davis who placed emphasis on diplomas and family background.

Stonewall Jackson recognized the importance of a fluid infantry in stopping a larger and better equipped enemy. His famous foot cavalry proved that speed and agility were a match for the McClellan bulldozer-type war machine.

(thanks to the Cincinnati CWRT newsletter CANISTER)

GRANT'S STRATEGY IN VIRGINIA

by BRUCE CATTON

A speech delivered at the Washington Civil War
Round Table Gold Medal Award Dinner, April 13, 1967

Any man who tries to make a speech about the accomplishments of General Ulysses S. Grant runs at once into three problems. Let me list them, as follows:

First, most of his listeners would rather have him talk about Robert E. Lee. They have nothing at all against Grant--except, perhaps, here and there, for the fact that he finally won the war; they just think Lee is a more glamorous character, and because he is more glamorous he is somehow more interesting.

Second, if the speaker is not very careful he will have to spend most of his time explaining that this famous soldier was not really an habitual drunkard, and that on quite a number of occasions he showed up for duty cold sober.

Third, the speaker cannot go very far without running head-on into the common belief that Grant was simply an unimaginative slugger who never in the world would have got to Appomattox if he had not commanded so many men that his great rival was simply beaten by force of numbers. If that is the case, of course, there is no point in talking about Grant's generalship, because no generalship was needed. All the man had to do was sit at the steering wheel and let the car run itself. Sheer weight and momentum would finally carry it to its goal.

I am going to dodge the first two of these hurdles. I will freely admit that Robert E. Lee is one of the most appealing characters in American history and that he did as well as any man could possibly have done with a task that in the last analysis proved impossible of accomplishment. I am not going to get into the second at all, because it seems self-evident that the soldier who came to represent--in the judgment of Abraham Lincoln, the keenest appraiser of men who ever sat in the White House--complete dependability and integrity, was no part of an alcoholic. It is to the third prong of this problem that I would like to address myself this evening.

What did Grant do, in the final, climactic campaign of the Civil War--the campaign that began on May 4, 1864, when the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan, and ended eleven months later when the Army of Northern Virginia surrendered at Appomattox Courthouse?

I suggest to you that there was a good deal more to this campaign than simple slugging and attrition. The war did not win itself. The heavy weight of numbers, of course, was on the Federal side--it had been so, ever since Fort Sumter--but that weight in itself was not enough to bring victory. Grant's predecessors had had that weight on their side, and none of them could make real use of it. The chief difference in 1864 was that there was a different man in charge: U.S. Grant. He used the power that was available to him as McClellan, Burnside, Pope, Hooker and Meade had been unable to do. How did he do it?

Let's begin by trying to understand just what Grant's principal objective was when the 1864 campaign in Virginia opened.

Obviously, he wanted to defeat General Lee and capture Richmond. That goes without saying. But he was responsible for something more than that. It was up to him to destroy the Southern Confederacy as an independent nation. The Confederacy, of course, would remain independent as long as it possessed its capital city and that city's magnificent defender, the Army of Northern Virginia. To destroy the army and occupy the city were naturally objectives of the highest importance. But to say that is not at all the same thing as saying that Grant's underlying idea, from the start, was simply to bring Lee to battle head-on and fight him until he could fight no more. If he could do that, to be sure, it would be fine, and unquestionably one of the things Grant hoped for, in every battle he fought between the Rapidan and the James, was the kind of all-out victory every general wants. But his strategic plan was a good deal more subtle and complicated than we generally realize.

When he opened the 1864 campaign Grant had to keep two points in mind.

The first was the fact that Lee was notoriously averse to remaining on the defensive. He was a master of maneuver, an extremely daring strategist who took long chances--and usually made them work--simply because he was in a position where to play it safe was to lose. Precisely because time and the weight of numbers were on

the side of the North, Lee had to turn the tables before the handicap they imposed became too much for him, and thus far in the war he had done it with dazzling success. Lee would seize the initiative if he were given the smallest bit of leeway. If a McClellan got down to the Chickahominy and then paused to get everything ready--if a Pope got to Bull Run and waited for reinforcements to come up--if Hooker moved around the flank at Chancellorsville and then halted in order to let his own nerves regain their coolness--in all such cases, Lee could be relied on to strike back and reduce a "Forward to Richmond" drive to failure.

Whatever happened, therefore, it was necessary for Grant to keep the pressure on so constantly that Lee had no chance to go over to the offensive. The instructions Grant gave General Meade just before the campaign began are eloquent. Lee's army, Grant said, was Meade's big objective point: "Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also." The Army of the Potomac in other words not only had to go on the offensive; it had to retain the offensive every minute of the way, so that whatever the two opposing armies did they would march where the Federal commander chose rather than where Lee chose.

But if this required Meade to keep in close contact with the Army of Northern Virginia every foot of the way--which of course would mean a great deal of hard fighting--it was not supposed that this by itself would be enough to bring victory. And this is where the second point in Grant's basic plan comes in.

From the moment the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan, Grant was actually looking toward the country south of the James River. The reason for this is clear, and Grant stated it repeatedly: what he wanted was to cut the supply lines by which the Confederacy sent food, munitions, replacements and equipment to Lee's army. If this could be done, Lee would be forced to do one of two things: either to retreat into the deep south, which in itself would lead to final Confederate defeat, or to turn and attack the much larger army that faced him under conditions which would doom such an attack to failure. Now it is of course true that Grant's plan did not work perfectly. Far from it, as the terrible engagements in the Wilderness, at Spotsylvania and around Cold Harbor testified. But everything Grant did that spring and summer was directed toward that end, and it is instructive to see how it was planned.

In his attempt to put his plan into operation Grant had three principal instruments. First, of course, there was the Army of the Potomac. Second, and of almost equal importance, there was Benjamin Butler's Army of the James. Third, there was the army that operated in the Shenandoah Valley, commanded successively by Franz Sigel, by David Hunter and by Phil Sheridan. All three armies moved together. Meade crossed the Rapidan, Butler went up the James to Bermuda Hundred, and Sigel began to move up the Shenandoah Valley.

Meade's operation naturally gets most of the attention. His first task was to keep Lee so busy that the great Confederate would never have the opportunity to start a significant counter-offensive of his own. Grant hoped that Meade could eventually slide past Lee's flank and take a position between Lee and Richmond which would compel Lee to attack him. Since Meade's army was about twice as large as Lee's army, and since the combination of field entrenchments and the rifled musket gave the defense all of the advantages, such a fight could hardly end in anything but Lee's defeat.

Meade did half of the job perfectly. That is, he kept crowding Lee so energetically that after the first sharp clash in the Wilderness Lee remained on the defensive until the two armies had crossed the James River. Meade was never able to do the other half--to interpose between Lee and Richmond--partly because the command system of the Army of the Potomac was just a little muscle-bound but much more because Lee was too able a strategist to get caught in such a trap. But the half that Meade did accomplish would have been enough if the other two armies had been able to do their part.

Butler and Sigel were supposed to go after those lines of supply. Landing below the James, Butler was supposed to cut the railroad lines that connected Richmond with the deep South; moving up the Shenandoah, Sigel was supposed to cut off that rich source of supplies; and it seems fairly certain that if Grant had been able to put really competent generals in the places held by those two incredibly inept political appointees the whole scheme would have worked in fairly quick time. Unfortunately for Grant, neither man was able to do the job, and the Army of the Potomac finally

had to carry the whole load. The load was extremely heavy, and the war went on until the spring of 1865. It might well have ended much sooner.

In any case, Meade and Grant together moved down from the Rapidan to Cold Harbor. The terrible battles and the costly flanking maneuvers that filled those six weeks constitute one of the most grimly fascinating stories of the entire war, but unfortunately we do not have time tonight to examine them--we would be here until midnight, and we would know no more when we got through than we know now. The only point I would like to make here is that the battle of Cold Harbor was actually a final attempt to move around Lee's right flank and take a position between Lee's army and the Confederate capital. It failed, and Grant ordered the Army of the Potomac to cross the James River.

I want to emphasize that this had been his primary objective from the start. Beat Lee's army in the field if possible, slip past him and occupy Richmond if possible but at all events get south of the James, put Meade's army in line beside Butler's, and then go after those lines of supply in earnest--that was the basic point in the whole strategic plan.

General Andrew A. Humphreys, Meade's chief of staff, a capable soldier who was thoroughly familiar with the plan, and a man by the way who was not at any time an apologist for General Grant, wrote about this move after the war. He said that it was designed "to carry out the plan with which the Army of the Potomac began the campaign, that is, to destroy the lines of supply to the Confederate depot, Richmond, on the south side of the James as close to that city as practicable, after those on north side of the river had been rendered useless." Two days after Cold Harbor, Grant himself wrote to Halleck, in Washington: "My idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army, if possible, north of Richmond, then after destroying his lines of communication north of the James River to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat."

Before we go any farther with this, it is necessary to take a brief look at the railroad lines that were Grant's principal objective.

Four railroad lines came up from the south to Petersburg. Two of these were unimportant--a stub line east to City Point, and a longer one running down to Norfolk. The federals occupied both of these as soon as they came up in front of Petersburg and the Confederacy never felt the loss. The other two, however, were vital.

These were what is called the Weldon road, that ran south from Petersburg all the way to the great blockade-runners' port of Wilmington, North Carolina, and the South Side railroad that ran off westward to Lynchburg, where it met the Virginia and Tennessee railroad. Fifty or sixty miles west of Petersburg it intersected another line of vast importance, the Richmond and Danville road. The roads that came into Petersburg, of course, had a direct railroad connection with Richmond itself.

These were the supply lines that Lee and Richmond simply had to retain. If they could be broken even briefly, the army of Northern Virginia and the capital it defended would have to retreat and the capital would have to be given up. Butler might have broken them by seizing Petersburg during the first week of May. Being Butler, he did not even come close. Now the job had to be done.

In addition, both Humphreys and Grant had spoken about breaking the supply lines north of the river. Here they were thinking principally about the Shenandoah Valley and about Lynchburg. The Virginia Central railroad went north and west from Richmond to strike the Orange and Alexandria road at Gordonsville. It went on to Staunton, in the Valley; and there was also a branch running down from Gordonsville through Charlottesville to Lynchburg. Lynchburg, incidentally, was a supply depot of extreme importance to the Confederate cause. If, while the lines south of the James were broken, Lynchburg could be seized, and if the Virginia Central and its connections in the Gordonsville-Charlottesville area could be occupied, Lee's isolation would be complete. At the time the Army of the Potomac crossed the James, Grant had reason to hope that this was about to take place.

General Hunter, having replaced Sigel, was moving up the valley with Lynchburg as his goal. Grant sent Sheridan and two divisions of cavalry off to Gordonsville, with orders to destroy that railroad connection, join hands with Hunter, go on and take Lynchburg, and then come back to join the Army of the Potomac.

As you know, this plan failed to work. Sheridan got to Trevilian Station, a dozen miles east of Gordonsville, destroyed a segment of the Virginia Central, and then learned that Hunter was moving up the valley on the far side of the Blue Ridge, by

way of Lexington. Sheridan fought the Confederate cavalry, and although he claimed a victory the fact remained that he felt unable to go on and join Hunter, who was moving away from him rather than toward him. He came back to the Army of the Potomac, the destruction he inflicted on the railroad was quickly repaired--one interesting fact about the Civil War is that cavalry raids, by themselves, almost invariably failed to inflict lasting damage--and Hunter, who was a little better than Sigel but not very much better, failed to take Lynchburg and was driven off in retreat into the mountains of West Virginia, leaving the Shenandoah Valley open for the operations of General Jubal Early.

In other words, what Grant hoped to gain immediately was not gained. He did not break the communications north of the river. His swift thrust to the south did not result in the fall of Petersburg, which would have broken the southern supply network permanently. He did get Meade's and Butler's armies together south of the James, as he had hoped to do, but although he got them there in the middle of June, 1864, it was not until April of 1865 that Lee was forced to go off in a doomed retreat. It is easy to assume, as a result, that the fearfully costly campaign from the Rapidan south had not won anything in particular, that Grant had been foiled and that he finally won out only because of the North's immense superiority in manpower and supplies.

It is precisely at this moment, however, that I think we need to take a fresh look at Grant's strategy.

The first witness has to be Lee himself. When Lee took the Army of Northern Virginia below the river to counter Grant's thrust at Petersburg he unquestionably went where he did not want to go. Earlier in the campaign he had said to Jubal Early, "We must destroy this army of Grant's before he gets to the James River. If he gets there it will become a siege, and then it will be a mere question of time." At about the same period he told A.P. Hill that unless Grant could be stopped, "we shall at last be obliged to take refuge behind the works of Richmond and stand a siege, which would be but a work of time." By the end of June, 1864, Grant was on the James, and if Lee was not quite in the "works of Richmond" he was in the trenches of Petersburg, which were very nearly the same thing.

Grant had the same idea. The day after the last attack at Cold Harbor he told Adam Badeau, his military secretary, that he believed success now "was only a question of time." He and Lee, in other words, saw it the same way. Grant's strategy was beginning to work. Six weeks after crossing the Rapidan--not a long time, as military campaigns go--he had put his army in a position from which it could not be dislodged--in a position where it could constrict the life out of the Confederate army and capital in Virginia. It would take many more months, many lives, and unflinching determination: but the rival generals saw it alike--now it was only a question of time.

Why?

There was nothing magical about having a strong Federal army on the south side of the James--except that now, at last, this army was within reaching distance of those railroad lines that it had been going for from the beginning. An advance of only a few miles would break the Weldon railroad once and for all, and to go only a little farther would break the South Side line. The goal was not Petersburg, and it was not really Richmond: it was the supply lines. Grant understood the meaning of railroads. This was the Vicksburg campaign all over again. He had been able to do nothing against Vicksburg until he finally crossed the river and cut the railroad that linked General John C. Pemberton with the rest of the Confederacy. Once he did that, Pemberton's number was up. Once he crossed the James, he threatened Lee with Pemberton's fate.

Lee understood this very clearly. He sent Jubal Early and an army corps off to the Shenandoah on June 12, the very day Grant disappeared from his front--a time when Lee needed every soldier he had--to protect the valley and the valley's railroad network; to stave off the disaster that he saw taking shape. Just after he told Early to go as far north as he could, Lee wrote to President Davis:

"I am less uneasy about holding our position than about our ability to procure supplies for the army. I fear the latter difficulty may oblige me to attack General Grant in his entrenchments, which I should not hesitate to do but for the loss it will inevitably entail. A want of success would in my opinion be almost fatal, and this causes me to hesitate in the hope that some relief may be procured without running such great hazard."

Grant of course had to send troops north to drive Early away from Washington. He shaved it pretty thin, but he succeeded; and once the Sixth Corps got to Washington Grant never had any doubt that Early would eventually be defeated and made harmless. And it is interesting to note that over and over again, from July of 1864 to the winter of 1865, in his dispatches to Halleck, to Hunter and at last to Sheridan, Grant emphasized one point. Assuming that Early would be driven back, he called time and again for a new Federal advance up the Valley that would seal that source of supplies off from Lee once and forever. He wanted the Gordonsville-Charlottesville-Lynchburg railroad network broken, just as he wanted the railroads south of Petersburg broken.

He finally got what he wanted, in the spring of 1865. It is instructive to note that in the spring of 1865, after the Weldon road had finally been broken, when Sheridan at last occupied Staunton and came eastward, ripping up the Virginia Central, to join Grant, Lee felt compelled to do what he had told Mr. Davis he did not want to do: that is, he moved out to attack Grant's fortified lines, striking at Fort Stedman and suffering an expensive defeat. Grant followed by cutting the South Side road, after the battle of Five Forks--which logically followed the battle at Fort Stedman--and then there was nothing left for Lee but the hard road to Appomattox, the sunset shadows and a tragic, haunting place in the American memory.

Grant's strategy, in short, worked the way he hoped it would work when he took Meade across the Rapidan. It was not, to be sure, automatic, and it assuredly was not easy. And it required one element that is not always taken into account--unflagging persistence, not only by the army in the field but also by the government in Washington. What Grant did cannot be considered apart from what Abraham Lincoln did. The dominant fact in the final year of the war indeed was the unbreakable partnership between President Lincoln and General Grant. Grant was admitted to that partnership--as none of his predecessors had been--simply because he had earned it. Lincoln trusted him implicitly and gave him all-out support.

This cannot have been easy for Lincoln. He had a Presidential election campaign to win in that summer of 1864; he doubted very much that he would be able to win it, and after the terrible casualty lists produced by the campaign from the Rapidan to the James a great wave of disillusionment and war-weariness swept the north. But Lincoln left no one in any doubt about where he stood. On June 16, just after Grant had crossed the James, Lincoln made a little speech at a Sanitary Commission Fair in Philadelphia, using words which any American President might feel called on to use at a moment when the electorate seems to have grown tired of supporting a war that seems to have no visible end. Here is what Lincoln said:

"We accepted this war for an object, a worthy object, and the war will end when that object is attained. Under God, I hope it never will until that time. Speaking of the present campaign, General Grant is reported to have said: 'I am going through on this line if it takes all summer.'...I say we are going through on this line if it takes three years more."

With that kind of support from Washington, Grant brought his 1864 campaign to a triumphant conclusion.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Appeared in the newsletter of the U.S. Grant Association.

CIVIL WAR HUMOR

A soldier was lying down with the rest of his regiment, but he soon found the field being plowed up with shot and shell all around him. The fire soon became so hot that his nerves gave way and he began to advance to the rear.

"What are you doing there?" cried an officer. "Well," said the man, "I'm looking for the rear of this army, but it don't seem to have any."

"Halt there, turn around, and get back to the front, you _____," "Lookee here Gin'ral," said the man, cocking his gun and taking aim at the officer's head, "when a man calls me a name sich es that, it's his last departin' word."

"Oh, put up your gun," said the general, "i din't mean anything. I forgot your other name."

THEATER: 'LINCOLN MASK' AT PLYMOUTH
BY CLIVE BARNES THE NEW YORK TIMES, NOVEMBER 1, 1972

There have been many plays about Abraham Lincoln, and it seems that this season we are to have one or two more. The first contender in these stakes arrived at the Plymouth Theater Monday night. It is a play by V.J. Longhi, it is called "The Lincoln Mask" and it is most worthily inconsequential.

Mr. Lincoln must have been a more interesting man than playwrights have so far demonstrated. Mr. Longhi takes Lincoln at the moment of death and recaps a few mildly inaccurate historical vignettes about his life.

The play's title -- "The Lincoln Mask" -- is a little obscure. It possibly refers to a moment in the drama when Lincoln glances in a mirror and claims to see two faces, a white face behind his own. His wife interprets this vision as clear evidence that he will die tragically during his second Presidential term. As a matter of fact he did, and the rest is history.

The playwright who plays with history faces certain difficulties. The face is well-known, the legends well-thumbed, the attitudes well-explored. What insight is Mr. Longhi going to provide to the mystery of greatness? The story of Lincoln, from first ax to final bullet, is part of common experience. How can it be translated into uncommon drama?

Mr. Longhi makes a try. He starts his play that tragic night at Ford's Theater with its performance of "Our American Cousin". We even see a little of the play--yes, it was every bit as bad as you suspected--and then, after the assassination (tactfully suggested by lighting effects), the play proper moves into the story of Lincoln and Mary Todd Lincoln, his Southern bride.

Playwrights make politics both very noble and very ordinary. Stage statemen are always depicted as gods with lovable feet of clay and the most monstrous fears both of success and failure. Mr. Longhi's Lincoln is no exception. As a character he has almost all the virtues except credibility. Well, just possibly that is the stuff Presidents are made of.

Lincoln's fair-mindedness and nobility are never left in any doubt. To be sure he has his own fears and despairs, yet they are never revealing. Even his mental disturbance--those long shafts of melancholia that struck across his days--is hinted at as some kind of amiable eccentricity.

Here and there hints can be seen of a play in this Lincoln saga. But Mr. Longhi has too much material and too little dramatic method with it. Anecdotes float to the top of the drama like likable goldfish in a plain fishbowl--some of them we recognize, and even those that are new seem familiar. And nothing of Lincoln is illuminated, nor is a play made real. There is room--unhappily--for drama in politics, but surprisingly little room for politics in drama.

The work was moderately well staged. Kert F. Lundell's setting, a mirrored arena in which scenic elements could be dropped, had an imaginative sense of claustrophobia to it, and Gene Frankel's staging moved with speed and authority. The play also offered two very decent performances in the leading roles.

It was Raymond Massey who practically made a career of playing Abe Lincoln, and since then many a craggy actor has tried his luck with this most spectacular of Presidents. Fred Gwynne, tall and gangling, his face the picture of homespun philosophy combined with a certain political savvy, does well in giving us a Lincoln hounded by destiny but making corn-cob jokes on the way to immortality.

I liked Mr. Gwynne, and I also liked the tight-lipped ambition of Eva Marie Saint: Southern and cracked belle of a Mrs. Lincoln. She had an air of artificial and dusty tragedy to her that cuts through the conventionalities of the play. Of the rest, Tom Rosqui and W. B. Brydon were admirably prominent in the background.

As the old joke has it: "But apart from that, what did you think of the play, Mrs. Lincoln?" I don't know about Mrs. Lincoln, but for my money, not all that much. And that goes for "Our American Cousin" as well.