



THE CIVIL WAR ROUND-TABLE

P. O. BOX 5028, CLEVELAND, OHIO 44101

FEBRUARY, 1969

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99th Meeting

DATE: TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1969

SPEAKER: Frank Gillen

SUBJECT: THE FIRST CIVIL WAR MONUMENT: HOWARD BRIGDON

PLACE: THE HERMIT CLUB, DODGE COURT

PRELIMINARIES: 6 PM DINNER 7 PM

HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CIVIL WAR

by

Brigadier General William H. Harris
Chief, Military History

The American Civil War means many things to many people. To the student of government it is the final crucible that proved the validity of the Federal System. To the sociologist it is the story of the end of a social structure that was destroyed by its own excesses. To the student of literature, the narratives of the sorrows and heartaches of that time represent some of our attempts to reach the best in the written word. To others its stirring scenes were the first to be recorded as they occurred. No longer need man depend upon the memory of an artist to depict the scenes of combat. Each individual American today approaches the Civil War with a feeling that reflects much of his training and his heritage. To the student of military history it signifies the unfolding of new techniques in communications, command control, or reconnaissance; it illustrates the problems created by politically adept but ill-trained officers and by short terms of service; and it affords an evaluation of the professional versus the amateur man-at-arms.

For many years the Regular officers in the armies of our present Allies studied intently the campaigns of this war as a means of developing their own skills. During the Thirties it was often said "If you want to know the strength and weaknesses of the American commanders in the period 1861-65, consult the British officer." These same campaigns were the object of study and analysis by our own service schools.

The interest in this era is not limited to any single stratum of our society. The fact that many people spend hours of labor and personal funds to keep alive the uniform, equipment, tactics, and military customs of this bloody fratricidal war is unparalleled in this country. Traditionally our people try to forget as rapidly as possible the existence and results of each war. Yet not only the historian, but the novelist, scenarist, and playwright have kept the memory of this time fresh in the minds of the American people.

We as a nation have progressed from isolationism to the point where we have allies in every quarter of the globe. These friends usually have (cont last page)

MANASSAS NATIONAL BATTLEFIELD PARK

Francis F. Wilshin, superintendent of Manassas National Battlefield Park, urgently called the attention of the Chicago CWRT and its sister organizations throughout the world to the introduction of two bills in Congress that threaten Manassas National Battlefield Park. They are:

HR 12556 authored by Rep. Robert O. Tiernan (D., R.I.) "to permit burial of qualified veterans in suitable and appropriate portions of the nation's memorial battlefield."

HR 18116 introduced by Rep. William Lloyd Scott (R., Va.) which would open the lands of Manassas National Battlefield Park to expand Arlington National Cemetery.

"Virtually unlimited expansion of Arlington into the Manassas Battlefield Park would be permitted under the Scott bill," Wilshin warned. "And it would set up an untenable dual jurisdiction over the area."

Wilshin recalled that more than 80 Civil War Roundtables came to the rescue of Manassas battlefield park once before when the Virginia highway department wanted a 660-foot right-of-way through the park. Response from CWRT groups was so overwhelming that the project was dropped within a week.

"Now we call upon Civil War Round Tables again to respond by writing their own Congressmen to protest the invasion of battlefield parks by veteran' cemeteries," Wilshin said. "It is best to refer to the resolutions by number so that your representatives know what bills you oppose."

Rep. Scott's plan for an expansion of Arlington Cemetery, Wilshin warned, would keep Henry Hill and the picnic area and allow all else to be used as cemetery land. "Most of the Manassas battlefield area is actually unsuited for burial," he observed.

Wilshin suggested that there are many more suitable places "where we can find places to bury the veterans of today with the heroes of yesterday."

February 3, 1969

Congressman Wm. E. Minshall
Rayburn Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Congressman Minshall:

I am a member of the Civil War Round Table of Cleveland, Ohio, that meets once a month, 75 strong.

I am told that two bills (HR 12556 and HR 18116) were introduced last session which could ultimately destroy Manassas as a battlefield memorial, and could do the same to other battlefield parks.

This is to express my hope that both will be defeated.

Kindest regards.

Sincerely,

GENTLEMEN: PLEASE COPY THE ABOVE LETTER AND SEND ANOTHER COPY TO:

Congressman J. William Stanton
House Office Building
Washington, D.C.

It is with profound grief that we learned of the death of Gilbert G. Twiss, 61, editor of the Chicago Round Table Newsletter. He edited the newsletter for the past fourteen years and was a recognized Civil War historian. A former president of the Illinois State Historical Society, Mr. Twiss was a veteran member of the Chicago Civil War Round Table. We will sorely miss such a fine gentleman.

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FOUNDED FEBRUARY 19, 1957

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THE EXECUTION OF UNION STRATEGY
by
John Miller, Jr.

Strategy of the Civil War has been less clearly understood than, say, that of WWII. Before 1942 the Axis, and after 1942 the Allies, devised complicated plans and then executed them, so that the course of events followed directly from an intellectual process.

It was not always so in the Civil War. The relationship of strategic ideas to events does not become wholly clear until 1864, although in the earlier years there was more correlation between ideas and events than has met the eyes of some writers.

Four major factors explain the divergence between strategy and events. First, the valiant and skillful Confederates frequently frustrated the best-laid plans of Union leaders. Second, the scope of the war was not immediately foreseen by anyone save perhaps the aged but brilliant Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott, so that early strategic concepts tended to stop with the capture of Richmond. Third, in the absence of a modern general staff, no formal administrative machinery for strategic planning existed anywhere in the United States government. Planning was "ad hoc." Fourth, although President Lincoln soon foresaw the massive operations that victory required, execution of strategy depended on raising and training large armies, building or acquiring a large number of warships and manning them, and upon the character, intellect and military prowess of the high commanders. Lincoln's strategy could not be carried out until he had found a general with the ability to command all the armies of the Union successfully.

Basic to Union strategy was Confederate geography. As long as the Confederacy intended to fight a defensive war, Northern geography was largely irrelevant except as it influenced routes of approach and intertheater movements. As strategy unfolded, operations of the United States Army and Navy were directed toward blockade of the coastline, seizure of ports, control of or destruction of railways, control of waterways that led into the Confederacy, and destruction of armies.

The 3,550 - mile - long Confederate coast embraced 189 harbors and navigable river mouths. Sealing off such a long and sharply indented stretch of seacoast posed a tremendous problem to the Navy, and constituted its primary mission throughout the war.

Inland, the Mississippi River and the Appalachian Mountains divided the Confederacy into three major theaters of operation. The Eastern Theater stretched from the mountains to the Chesapeake Bay and the Atlantic Ocean. The Western ran from the mountains to the Mississippi. The Eastern and Western proved to be the decisive theaters. The Trans-Mississippi West was vitally important to both sides, and four years of war saw constant campaigning. But except for drawing off troops which could have been used elsewhere, the fighting west of the Mississippi had no decisive effect on the outcome of the war.

In the Eastern Theater the 100 miles of rolling country that separated the rival capitals of Washington and Richmond tended to complicate the strategic problem. Yet the frequent criticisms of Presidents Lincoln and Davis for showing undue concern for the safety of their capitals are not entirely justified. The prestige value of a capital city is great. Lincoln could hardly persuade foreign powers that the Confederacy was not a nation worthy of recognition as a sovereign power if a Confederate Army captured Washington. And Richmond was politically important as capital of the Confederacy, and militarily important as a railroad center and location of the largest iron works south of the Mason Dixon Line.

In war potential the Union had tremendous advantages; yet some major advantages, besides its ports and long coast line, lay with the Confederacy. It could win its political independence if the Union did nothing. To maintain the Union, the armies of the United States would be forced to invade the Confederacy and defeat its armies.

That the Union possessed great advantages in manpower and industrial capacity no Confederate denied, but these advantages were believed offset by several factors. First, many able officers joined the Confederate Army. Second, a higher proportion of the men of the rural Confederacy were familiar with firearms and horses than were those of the Union. But it is easy to overstress this point. Most Union soldiers were either farmers or else trained in other outdoor occupations. It is doubtful that experienced soldiers such as Jefferson Davis, Robert E. Lee, or Joseph E. Johnston were ever so optimistic as to underestimate their opponents' fighting qualities.

A major miscalculation was the belief entertained by Jefferson Davis that Britain and France might aid the Confederacy by diplomatic recognition or armed intervention. When President Lincoln declared the blockade, Britain and France recognized the Confederacy as a belligerent, but not as a "de jure" or "de facto" government, by declaring neutrality. Throughout the war French and British governments respected the blockade, although some individual firms did business with the Confederacy. Napoleon III considered recognition, mediation, and intervention, but would not move without British support. But most leaders of Britain's political parties refused to consider premature recognition, only vaguely considered mediation, and never seriously considered forcible intervention.

When on a cold and blustery day in March a sober and earnest Abraham Lincoln took his oath to support, protect, and defend the Constitution and execute the laws, seven states had passed Ordinances of Secession. A provisional Confederate government, established under Jefferson Davis at Montgomery, Alabama, had seized all important federal property except Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor and Fort Pickens near Pensacola, Florida. Sumter's supplies were running low, and it was menaced by a growing Confederate force in Charleston. Further, Davis had called for 100,000 volunteers soldiers to serve for one year.

Lincoln was determined to protect Federal property; he also was determined to avoid war with the seceded states and to avoid antagonizing the eight slave states --Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and Arkansas--which were still in the Union. When President Lincoln sent an expedition to succor Fort Sumter, the Confederates began bombarding the fort on 12 April and forced its surrender. Meanwhile, Fort Pickens was successfully reinforced.

President Lincoln acted at once. On 15 April he called upon the governors of the loyal states to furnish 75,000 militiamen for three months, the length of time fixed by the Militia Act of 1795. The response was so enthusiastic that services of nearly 100,000 men were offered. On the other hand, Kentucky refused and the call for militia triggered Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas into joining the Confederacy.

With war practically inevitable, President Lincoln undertook several drastic steps to get ready. He called a special session of the Congress for 4 July, established 40 regiments of Volunteers, and increased the Regular Army and Navy.

To strangle the Confederacy, Lincoln on 19 April declared the entire coast from South Carolina to Texas under blockade. When Virginia and North Carolina seceded, he extended the blockade to their coasts as well.

By May, with both sides making ready to fight, no comprehensive strategic plans had yet been prepared. But General in Chief Scott had a clear concept for victory. He recommended that time be taken to train an army, and that the Southern Coastline be blockaded in order to strangle the South economically. The army should advance down the Mississippi to divide and conquer the Confederacy. The old general emphasized that this would in all probability take several years. This plan to squeeze and strangle the South was promptly dubbed the "Anaconda Plan" by the press.

FIRST LAND OPERATIONS: The well known, but exaggerated, Union reverse at Bull Run (Manassas) in July 1861 came about only partly in fulfillment of strategic plans. The strategic objective was destruction of the Confederate force at Manassas which protected the land approaches to Richmond. In addition, President Lincoln was eager to use the militiamen before their three-month terms expired, and both he and Scott were misled by faulty estimates which indicated that the Confederates were about to attack Washington. The Union soldiers advanced from Washington, but the Confederates skillfully transferred troops from the Shenandoah Valley by rail to Manassas in time to turn back the Union assaults. Bull Run, a drawn battle at Wilson's Creek, Missouri and some small but heartening victories in what became West Virginia were the only significant ground operations in 1861.

After Bull Run, command of the forces around Washington was entrusted to a dashing, dapper young general named George B. McClellan who had just won some cheering victories in West Virginia. Scott, too infirm to take active command, retired in the autumn. Lincoln replaced him as General in Chief with McClellan, who also retained his command of the Army of the Potomac.

BLOCKADE AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS: Strategically, the most important contributions to victory in 1861 were made by the naval blockading squadrons, and by joint Army-Navy expeditions which seized ports on the Atlantic coast as bases for the blockading squadrons. The U.S. Navy, although it fought some engagements, never had to batter a Confederate fleet into submission in order to command the sea. Its task was to exercise control of the sea it already possessed.

When the war began, the U.S. Navy possessed 90 warships, some ready, others in various stages of completion, in addition to eight Navy Yards. In April, withdrawing Union forces burned the Norfolk Navy Yard but the Confederates managed to put out the fires and salvage the remains of the MERRIMAC as well as more than a thousand cannon.

When Lincoln declared the blockade in April 1861 there were far from enough warships to blockade 3,550 miles of seacoast, but many more ships, including iron-clads, were to be provided by new construction in Navy Yards and river boat yards inland. By December 1861 the U.S. Navy numbered 264 vessels. More than 200 vessels were assigned to the blockade during the first year of war, but light, swift blockade runners kept slipping through. How many did, and how much they carried, is not known, but the Union Navy captured 150 in 1861, and its total bag for the four years of war reached nearly 1,500. But the only sure way to seal off the South was to combine blockade with capture of the ports themselves.

1862 --PROMISE AND FRUSTRATION: McClellan drilled and trained the Army of the Potomac in the vicinity of Washington but undertook no offensive action. The harassed Lincoln, growing impatient, issued his famous General War Order Number 1 on 27 JAN 1862. In it he directed the land and sea forces to conduct a general movement against the enemy on Washington's Birthday, 22 February 1862.

Whole bottles of ink have been used by Lincoln's critics in scoffing at this order. He is criticized for issuing orders at all, as though the Constitutional provision which specifies that the President shall be Commander in Chief of the armed forces does not really mean what it says. He is also criticized for issuing an order

for an offensive several weeks in advance without considering the state of the weather and the roads. Lincoln doubtless issued the order to get McClellan in action. This order, and part of a letter he had written to Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell a few days before, show that Lincoln had grasped the key to victory:

"...I state my general view of this war to be that we have the greater numbers, and the enemy has the greater facility of concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fail, unless we can find some way of making our advantage an over-match for his; and that this can be done by menacing him with superior forces at different points, at the same time; so that we safely attack one, or both, if he makes no change; and if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, but seize, and hold the weakened one, gaining so much."

In this way the Union could bring its superior strength to bear through coordinated attacks that would wear down the Confederate armies and thus win the war. But the precise operations by which this concept could be carried out had not yet been fully developed, nor was the supreme commander with sufficient ability yet available for high command.

RIVER CAMPAIGNS: The main Union armies west of the Appalachians were organized into two commands. The first was under General Buell and included Kentucky and the strongly pro-Unionist but Confederate-occupied eastern Tennessee. The second, under Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, embraced Missouri and Arkansas.

The great rivers--the Ohio, Tennessee, Cumberland, and Mississippi--provided the best and most permanent lines of communication. Thus the Navy Department, in 1861, had started buying and building gunboats and mortar boats to create river forces that would defeat Confederate forces, give fire support to Union troops ashore, and transport and supply them.

Facing Buell and Halleck on land were Confederate troops under General Albert Sidney Johnston whose mission was to hold the rivers, defend Tennessee, and if possible keep the Union troops out of Kentucky. Johnston's forces had built a line of forts and camps extending from Cumberland Gap in western Virginia through Bowling Green, Kentucky, to New Madrid Missouri, and Island Number 10 in the Mississippi River. Rivers and railways formed Johnston's main lines of communications in winter, as the roads were just muddy tracks. Two strong positions--Forts Henry and Donelson--protected a lateral railroad as it crossed the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers where they flow northward almost parallel to each other, and about 10 miles apart.

The sour-faced Halleck--known as "Old Brains," a master of the theory and literature of warfare--in early 1862 launched the great campaign that had as its strategic objective the reclaiming of Tennessee, reopening of the Mississippi, and splitting of the Confederacy, by attacking the center of Johnston's long vulnerable line. Capture of Forts Henry and Donelson in February by Ulysses S. Grant's army forces and Comdr. Andrew H. Foote's river craft, coupled with Buell's advance toward Bowling Green, cracked the Confederates' line and freed Kentucky and much of Tennessee. Johnston withdrew up the Tennessee River to Corinth, Mississippi.

President Lincoln, naturally elated at the recent successes in the west, on 11 March unified command of all army forces west of middle Tennessee and gave the command to Halleck, placing more than 100,000 men under his direction. These were organized into four armies: Brig Gen Samuel Curtis' Army of the Southwest in Missouri and Arkansas; Grant's Army of the Tennessee; Buell's Army of the Ohio; and Maj Gen John Pope's Army of the Mississippi.

Halleck sent Pope, supported by most of Foote's gunboats, against New Madrid and Island Number Ten to begin the opening of the Mississippi River while he concentrated Buell's and Grant's armies and advanced up the Tennessee against Johnston in Corinth. The Army of the Tennessee moved up the river to Pittsburg Landing near a little country chapel called Shiloh Church about 22 miles from Corinth. Buell mean-

while moved from Kentucky to Savannah, Tennessee, about 10 road miles from Pittsburg Landing. Johnston meanwhile slipped secretly through the forests from Corinth to Shiloh and launched a surprise attack on the morning of 6 April. (He was mortally wounded and replaced by General Peirre G.T. Beauregard.) As the day ended Buell's army began arriving from Savannah; next morning Grant counterattacked and Beauregard pulled back to Corinth.

Shiloh was the largest battle of the Civil War up to now; indeed, it was the biggest and bloodiest battle fought in North America up to 1862. The casualty rate was shocking. The 63,000 Union troops lost 13,000; the 40,000 Confederates, 11,000. As Grant retained the field and Beauregard withdrew, Shiloh was a strategic and tactical victory for the Union.

While Grant and Buell had been moving south, Pope and Foote were attacking Island Number 10 in the Mississippi near Tennessee's northwest corner, New Madrid having fallen to Pope on 14 March. Pope forced the surrender of Island Number 10 on 7 April, the same day that Grant regained his lost ground at Shiloh. Making Grant his second in command, Halleck now took over the armies of the Tennessee and the Ohio in person. He launched an offensive aimed at destruction of Beauregard's army, which was the main Confederate force between the Appalachians and the Mississippi. Remembering Shiloh, he carefully entrenched every night; his great host moved slowly; the Confederates delayed skillfully. It was 30 May before Halleck got to Corinth, and Beauregard had pulled out.

OPENING THE MISSISSIPPI: Meanwhile the high command in Washington had prepared to capture New Orleans, the Confederacy's greatest port, by sending an expedition up river from the Gulf. Starting 16 April, a fleet under Capt. David Glasgow Farragut bombarded Confederate forts, cracked a great boom that stretched across the river, defeated a Confederate flotilla of gunboats and rams in a wild melee, and silenced land batteries nearby. By 25 April he had worked his way upriver to New Orleans. Soldiers under Maj Gen Benjamin F. Butler took over the 26th of April.

Farragut moved up to Vicksburg in May but could do little against its 26 guns situated on a bluff 250 feet above the river. But on 28 June the dauntless sailor ran past the batteries to make contact with the Union gunboats which had come down river. The Union now controlled all the Mississippi except the 150 mile stretch between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, Louisiana, near the mouth of the Red River.

Fighting in 1862 was not over in the Western Theater. A Confederate counter-offensive in the fall, resulting in the battles of Perryville, Kentucky, in October, and Murfreesboro (Stone River) on the last day of the year, partly undid the earlier work of Halleck and Grant. Eastern Tennessee, though containing many pro-Unionist elements, was still in Confederate hands. But Missouri, Kentucky, western Tennessee, and New Orleans were in Union hands, and the Union controlled 600 miles of the Mississippi River. The Confederates still controlled rail and water communications to Texas, and thus could still get beef, mutton, cereals, and men over the river to their armies, as well as some foreign munitions through Mexico.

AMPHIBIOUS ACTION AND BLOCKADE: Just as the victories at Henry, Donelson, Island Number 10, and New Orleans had cheered the Union, so did a series of amphibious operations under Maj Gen Ambrose E. Burnside and Flag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough, who seized Roanoke Island and gained control of Albemarle Sound and tributary waters which penetrated deeply into North Carolina. Naval forces took Amelia Island and Jacksonville, Florida, and reoccupied Pensacola. These operations gave the Union virtual control of the Atlantic seaboard, and together with Farragut's seizure of New Orleans, helped partially seal the Gulf coast to blockade runners. By mid-year however, blockade-running was being conducted as quickly as fast, low ships could be built abroad. Nearly 200 were now in service. But they could not carry much cargo, and much of what they did carry included luxury items to be sold to civilians at enormous prices, rather than munitions.

VIRGINIA AND MARYLAND CAMPAIGNS: The heartening victories in the west and on

the Carolina and Florida coasts were not matched by decisive gains in the Eastern Theater, although 1862 saw bloody campaigns, all of which ended in frustration for the Union. The first of these campaigns were fought in Virginia.

McClellan, then General in Chief and also Commanding General of the Army of the Potomac, prepared plans in early 1862 in accordance with President Lincoln's General War Order Number One. These tended to be directed toward capture of Richmond rather than the destruction of Gen Joseph E. Johnston's Army of Northern Virginia. McClellan urged moving the army by water to Urbana on the Rappahannock from there to drive against Richmond before Johnston could move from Manassas to stop him. McClellan argued that the Washington fortifications would adequately protect the capital while the army was gone, while Lincoln favored an overland advance against Richmond which would always keep the Army of the Potomac between the Confederates and Washington. Johnston meanwhile abandoned Manassas and withdrew to Fredericksburg, about midway between the two capitals, and squarely athwart the route from Urbana to Richmond.

On 11 March, when McClellan marched his army out to the abandoned camp at Manassas to give it field experience, Lincoln relieved him of his duties as General in Chief, doubtless because he could not adequately command an army in the field and at the same time exercise strategic direction over all armies of the United States. Lincoln and Edwin McM. Stanton, who had become Sect of War in January, took over the functions of General in Chief themselves. To advise them they appointed an Army board, which included the heads of the War Department Bureaus under the chairmanship of the elderly Maj Gen Ethan A. Hitchcock.

McClellan now advocated another seaborne campaign, this time by water to Fort Monroe, which Union troops had continued to hold, at the tip of the peninsula between the York and James Rivers. This would be followed by an overland march to Richmond. The President, while not heartily in favor of the Peninsular plan, approved it with the understanding that McClellan leave enough men to protect Washington and continue to hold Manassas.

But before wooden ships could be risked on the Virginia waters and rivers, the MERRIMAC had to be disposed of. The Confederates had salvaged her at Norfolk, renamed her the Virginia, cut her down to the waterline, built a wood citadel covered by iron plates and slanted inwards like the river gunboats, and installed ten heavy guns. In New York John Ericsson was hurriedly building the MONITOR, a low, flat, almost wholly unseaworthy craft. She sailed with decks awash, and only her revolving turret, with its two 11 inch guns, and pilothouse were above water. Neither armor nor the revolving turret was new, but the impending clash would be the first between two armored warships. The wooden Federal warships that were blockading off Norfolk and Newport News proved exceptionally vulnerable when the VIRGINIA sortied on 8 March she sank two with gunfire and ram, and ran a third aground inshore. Union guns, though registering numerous hits, inflicted little damage.

In a climax which in fiction would be regarded as artificially contrived, the MONITOR arrived from New York the next day after a gruelling passage. For four hours on the morning of 9 March the two iron clads fought each other without giving or receiving significant damage. The VIRGINIA then returned to Norfolk for repairs. (She never came out again, and when the Confederates later abandoned Norfolk they destroyed her by fire*). With the threat to the local blockade thus neutralized, the Union could proceed with the Peninsular campaign, but was compelled to operate on the north side of the Peninsula with the York River as a line of communications as long as the VIRGINIA remained a threat.

By 4 April the leading elements of McClellan's army had landed and moved against the Confederate garrison at Yorktown. But on 3 April the Washington defense commander reported his strength insufficient to protect Washington. McClellan, in listing forces he had left behind, had counted some men twice, included some troops in Pennsylvania that were not his, and assumed, but only implicitly, that Federal troops in the Shenandoah Valley were also covering Washington. Further, Maj Gen Thomas Jonathan ("Stonewall") Jackson had begun offensive operations in the Valley. Lincoln

therefore directed Stanton to hold at Alexandria one of two corps then making ready for the Peninsula.

On 13 March Jackson had attacked Federal troops at Kernstown and was defeated. This move called attention to Jackson's threat to Harpers Ferry, and to a possible threat to Washington. Lincoln and Stanton thereupon devised plans to trap and destroy Jackson. They failed. Union forces were not under a unified command; some marched too slowly; orders were not strictly obeyed; and the President and Sect. Stanton did not always consider time and distance factors. Further, the elusive and capable Stonewall Jackson combined rapid movement, surprise, deception, and hard fighting to march the length of the valley $2\frac{1}{2}$ times from 23 March to 9 June, and to fight six battles, five of which he won.

Jackson's valley campaign also resulted in further detachments from the Peninsula. When Johnston hurried his army overland from Fredericksburg to the Peninsula to intercept McClellan, Lincoln sent Maj Gen Irwin A. McDowell with 40,000 men overland to Fredericksburg. He reached there on 14 May, whereupon McClellan asked Lincoln to send this force by water to join him on the Peninsula. Lincoln acceded in part; he told McDowell to move overland and cooperate with McClellan. As McDowell was about to move on 25 May, Lincoln ordered half his force to the Valley in the effort to destroy Jackson. McDowell's troops were late and ineffective.

McClellan's advance up the Peninsula, begun on 4 April, was slow and laborious. Altogether about 155,000 Union troops were committed against 95,481 Confederates, but McClellan consistently overestimated his opponents' strength and moved with extreme caution. The terrain was tangled and swampy; the roads were but muddy tracks. Heavy rains washed out most of the bridges McClellan built and weakened the others. Fighting was hard. In the major battles--Williamsburg, Fair Oaks, (Seven Pines), Mechanicsville, Gaines Mill, Savage Station, Frayser's Farm, and Malvern Hill, plus innumerable unrecorded patrol actions and skirmishes--the Union troops suffered 15,849 casualties; the Confederates, who did most of the attacking, lost 20,614. McClellan on 25 May was within sight of Richmond, but fell back. The Peninsula Campaign was notable for the armies' improvement in training and discipline as compared with Bull Run. Union artillery was grimly efficient, as was the muzzle-loading, single shot rifle, so that frontal assaults against prepared positions usually ended in bloody failure.

Johnston had suffered a severe wound on 31 May and was replaced by General Robert E. Lee, who ordered Jackson out of the valley to join him on the Peninsula with all possible speed. But even the great names of Lee and Jackson did not guarantee smooth operations. None of the commanders' staffs on either side was able to throw a whole army into a coordinated attack. Timing was off; units were slow; battles tended to be conducted by corps commanders. By 3 July McClellan with nearly 100,000 men was holding a strong defensive position at Harrison's Landing on the James River (the VIRGINIA had been destroyed by now), while Lee's exhausted army pulled back to defensive positions in front of Richmond. At the same time the Union 45,000-man Army of Virginia was occupying portions of western Virginia. Lincoln had consolidated all forces there under Pope, the victor of New Madrid and Island Number 10, and first directed him to threaten the Confederates in the Valley. When Jackson went to the Peninsula, Lincoln ordered Pope to advance up the Shenandoah Valley and turn east against Richmond. This was the general situation in July 1862 when President Lincoln, abandoning personal command, named Henry Halleck as General in Chief. In this capacity he did not exercise field command in person, but acted more as military adviser to President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton.

The first question facing Halleck was disposition of the forces on the Peninsula, an unhealthful area where the sick rate was high. McClellan, urging another crack at Richmond, meanwhile continued to over-estimate Confederate strength by about 100 per cent. Lincoln and Halleck decided their forces were too dispersed. On 3 August Halleck ordered McClellan to withdraw by water from Harrison's Landing to Acquia Creek on the Potomac, and to join Pope near Fredericksburg. Embarkation began on 14 August.

Lee and Jackson had not been exactly spectacular on the Peninsula, but now they showed their skill. Before Pope and McClellan could concentrate, they maneuvered brilliantly and, together with Maj Gen James Longstreet, severely defeated Pope's Army of Virginia in the Second Manassas Campaign in July and August. In consequence they forced Pope's Army back to Washington before the Army of the Potomac could bring its crushing weight to bear. Lincoln sent Pope off to Minnesota. Units of the Army of Virginia were assigned to McClellan, who took over all forces in the area of the Nation's capital.

Up to autumn of 1862, Confederate strategy had been mainly defensive, aimed at holding the entire area of the Confederacy. But now Davis and Lee resolved to invade the North. Several factors governed this decision. It was believed that a successful invasion would win advocates to the peace party in the Union, and would find adherents among Northern sympathizers. Maryland was expected to secede. Davis and Lee also hoped that invasion might induce Britain and France to recognize the Confederacy, and perhaps intervene forcibly to break the blockade.

Militarily, such a march northward through Maryland would threaten Washington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia, and would probably present an opportunity to defeat or destroy the Army of the Potomac. Thus Lee did not halt after Manassas, but with 55,000 effectives crossed the Potomac near Leesburg on 4 September. He divided his army, sending Jackson to seize Harper's Ferry while the main body crossed South Mountain en route to Hagerstown. McClellan followed, and by a stroke of luck obtained a lost order of Lee's which gave his dispositions, strength, and intentions. But McClellan moved too slowly to defeat Lee's units in detail. He attacked in a series of assaults on 17 September at Antietam Creek near Sharpsburg, but Lee had managed to concentrate in time and held his ground. In this bloody encounter the Army of the Potomac lost 13,000 killed, wounded, and missing out of 70,000 engaged; Lee lost 8,000 out of 40,000. Like its predecessors, Antietam also indicated tactically that the defense was much stronger than the offensive, although none of the tactical leaders seems to have taken that lesson immediately to heart.

Antietam affected many more people than the survivors of McClellan's assaults. The effect was Lincoln's announcement of impending emancipation of Negro slaves in the Confederate states. He had earlier stated that the war was being fought to save the Union and not to free the slaves, and had overruled several generals who were premature emancipators. But now, on 22 September, desiring to weaken the economies of the rebellious states and to appeal to antislavery sentiment abroad as well as at home, he issued the Emancipation Proclamation. This move anticipated the economic and psychological warfare of the 20th Century.

Lincoln now decided to dispense with McClellan's services and gave command of the Army of the Potomac to Burnside on 7 November. Burnside resolved to march rapidly to cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg on ponton bridges before Lee could get there, and then advance along the railway line toward Richmond. Such a move by the Army of the Potomac--120,000 strong--would cut Lee off from his main base. Burnside's advance elements reached the north bank of the Rappahannock on 17 November, well ahead of Lee. But a long series of minor failures delayed the pontons, and Lee moved his army to high ground on the south bank of the river behind Fredericksburg before Burnside could cross. Lee's positions were strong, but Burnside attacked anyway on 13 December and was beaten back with the loss of 12,600 to Lee's 5,300 casualties. His army withdrew to winter quarters on the north bank of the Rappahannock. Thus 1862, which saw impressive victories in the West and successes along the coast, ended in bitter frustration in the Eastern Theater. Ten full-scale and very costly battles had been fought, but no decisive result had yet been attained.

1863--TURNING THE TIDE: VICKSBURG AND PORT HUDSON: President Lincoln regarded opening the Mississippi as the most important of the Union operations. When he made Halleck General in Chief, he did not name a new commander for all the western armies. Grant remained directly under the General in Chief, in command of the District of West Tennessee. In the fall of 1862 he threw himself with his customary vigor into a joint Army-Navy offensive against Vicksburg in order to open the Mississippi. Rear

Adm. David D. Porter now commanded the naval forces supporting Grant. Halleck ordered Maj Gen Nathaniel P. Banks, who had replaced Butler in New Orleans, to open the Mississippi by advancing northward jointly with Farragut. The offensives against the Vicksburg-Port Hudson complex thus developed into a double envelopment by joint forces. Grant sent a land and water expedition under Maj Gen William T. Sherman against Vicksburg in December 1862, but by January the Confederates had cut the line of communications and repulsed Sherman. Grant there-upon determined to lead a campaign down the river in person. Reinforcements during the ensuing months brought his total strength to 75,000 and his command was redesignated the Army of the Tennessee. Opposed were some 30,000 Confederates under Lt. Gen John C. Pemberton in the Vicksburg area, while Johnston, supreme Confederate commander in the Western Theatre, was concentrating additional troops at Jackson about 40 miles east of Vicksburg.

Vicksburg on its bluff was almost perfectly situated for defense. Confederate guns dominated the Mississippi which bent in a great horseshoe. A gloomy stretch of swamps and streams rendered the town almost invulnerable from north and south. The only good approach route lay to east along the railroad and highway, and here an attacking force would be operating between two Confederate forces. The determined Grant tried to dig canals to by-pass the Confederate batteries at Vicksburg so the troops could safely sail to dry ground on the east bank of the river south of the swamp. All these attempts failed.

Grant and Porter now tried a new tack. With spring rains about to lessen, overland movement became easier. While Sherman demonstrated above Vicksburg, Grant moved his main body southward along the west bank of the Mississippi. On the nights of 16-17 and 22 April, Porter's river fleet of gunboats and transports slipped past the batteries. Porter and Grant crossed the Mississippi on 25 April without opposition.

Grant then abandoned his line of communications, struck out overland to cut Pemberton's line of communications. He drove the Confederates out of Jackson and then, leaving Sherman to deal with Johnston, swung his army westward against Vicksburg on 18 and 22 May but the Confederates repulsed every attack. Grant then set to work to besiege the town, which surrendered on Independence Day. Since 1 May Grant had lost 9,362 men--1,514 killed, 7,395 wounded, and 453 captured or missing--or less than McClellan had suffered at Antietam. Port Hudson surrendered the next day to Banks. In Lincoln's phrase, the Father of Waters could now flow unvexed to the sea. The results of these campaigns were impressive. Indeed, Grant's bold campaign against Vicksburg, a model of military efficiency, was probably the most decisive single land campaign of the entire war. The Confederacy was now sliced in two.

VIRGINIA AND PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGNS: As in 1862, Eastern campaigns were arduous and bloody but less conclusive than those of the west. With Burnside's Army of the Potomac on the north bank of the Rappahannock, Lee's main body held Fredericksburg. The unhappy Burnside was replaced as army commander on 25 January by Maj Gen Joseph Hooker, who had won an enviable reputation as a valourous and skillful tactical commander. He prepared a plan to advance up the Rappahannock, cross, and having maneuvered Lee out of his Fredericksburg defenses, destroy the Army of Northern Virginia.

Hooker began well but faltered in the presence of the brilliant, skillful Lee. That general, with 60,000 men, used deception, rapid maneuver, and surprise to defeat Hooker's 134,000 in the great battle of Chancellorsville, 27 April -6 May 1863. Hooker fell back across the Rappahannock. Now the future looked bright for the Confederacy. In early June the Army of Northern Virginia started north through the Shenandoah Valley into Pennsylvania. Hooker suggested that he seize this opportunity to take Richmond. But Lincoln told Hooker that destruction of Lee's Army and not capture of a city was his major objective; he ordered him to move north between Lee and Washington and Baltimore, and to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia.

Much advice had reached Lincoln after Chancellorsville, and all to one effect--get ride of Hooker. Lincoln had kept him, saying he would not throw away a gun because it had missed fire once. But when the fiery Hooker lost an argument with Halleck over control of Harpers Ferry, he requested relief and was replaced by Maj Gen

George G. Meade at 0300, 28 June. Meade went on to win his great defensive victory at Gettysburg, a victory which forced Lee to call off the invasion and return to Virginia.

Lincoln was jubilant over the inspiring series of victories--Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Port Hudson--and thought the war could be won right then if Meade pursued resolutely and destroyed the Army of Northern Virginia before it could get over the Potomac. But Meade let Lee pull away from the battlefield almost unmolested, and made only feeble efforts to destroy the battered Army of Northern Virginia as it crossed the flooded river. Nothing more was accomplished east of the mountains that year. After Gettysburg, with Lee and Meade maneuvering indecisively in Virginia the West remained the area of decisive accomplishment.

Campaigns in Tennessee: After Vicksburg Grant proposed that he move overland against Mobile. Mobile had earlier been listed as an objective for Banks, but Lincoln had to settle other matters first. He detached some of Grant's troops to Banks who led an expedition into Texas to insure it against possible aggression by Maximilian Napoleon III's puppet emperor in Mexico.

Meanwhile Maj Gen William S. Rosecrans, who now commanded the Army of the Cumberland, began a move in Tennessee. In July he started from Murfreesboro toward Chattanooga, whose strategic location made it one of the Confederacy's most important cities--a natural gateway or invasion route to either Ohio in the North or Atlanta, Savannah, and Richmond in the Confederacy. After Gettysburg, Davis acceded to a proposal by Longstreet that the West be strengthened. Thus, starting 9 September, Longstreet took 10,000 men and six field artillery batteries by rail from Virginia to Tennessee via Augusta and Atlanta. This round about route was necessary because Burnside now commander of the Department of the Ohio, had led a corps to penetrate the Cumberland Gap and drive the Confederates out of Knoxville. Longstreet reached Tennessee on 18 September.

By then Rosecrans had crossed the Tennessee River and started southward with his force widely dispersed so as to make use of all the mountain passes. His opponent, General Braxton Bragg, commanding the Army of Tennessee, in the battle of Chickamauga (18-20 September) hit Rosecrans so hard that the latter retired to Chattanooga. By establishing positions on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, Bragg bottled Rosecrans up in Chattanooga, where rations and forage quickly ran out. Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck now decided to reinforce Rosecrans. The detached two corps of 20,000 men from the Army of the Potomac, placed them under Hooker, and swiftly transferred them by rail to Tennessee. Lincoln had lost confidence in Rosecrans. He appointed Grant commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi, which stretched over the whole region from the Alleghenies to the Mississippi, but excluded Banks' Gulf Department. Hooker arrived, cleared the Confederates from the line of communications, and enabled Grant to resume regular supply shipments into Chattanooga. The opening of the Mississippi had freed the Army of the Tennessee for operations farther east. Sherman brought that force to Chattanooga to give Grant a total strength of 60,000 men against Bragg's 40,000.

Starting 24 November, Grant attacked and drove Bragg's forces from Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. Bragg retreated, Longstreet returned to Virginia, and Tennessee was reclaimed for the Union. With Chattanooga secured as a base, the way was open for an invasion of the lower South.

The year 1863 was, in retrospect, a year of decision. The opening of the Mississippi and the victories at Chattanooga were profoundly important, although no decision had yet been reached in the Eastern Theater. But only in hindsight was 1863 decisive. The Confederates were far from admitting defeat, and many battle were yet to be fought.

1864-1865 --THE TERMINATION: STRATEGIC PLANS: Congress revived the grade of lieutenant general in early 1864, and Lincoln decided to overhaul the system of command. He relieved Halleck as General in Chief, gave the post to Grant, and promoted

him to lieutenant general. Halleck loyally accepted his demotion and took over a new post, that of Chief of Staff. Grant decided, on Lincoln's insistence, to establish headquarters in the East, and to accompany Meade's Army of the Potomac in its campaigns against Lee. Halleck remained in Washington and served as liaison with Lincoln and Stanton. Halleck's post should not be confused with that of the modern Chief of Staff; he did not command the War Department bureaus. They were directly under the exacting, irascible, efficient Secretary Stanton, and their work was coordinated by Stanton and Halleck. Halleck also served as channel of communication between Grant and sixteen field commands other than the Army of the Potomac. He prepared digests of the army commanders' reports and letters so that Grant did not have to spend all his days reading.

Grant assumed his new post in March 1864, when he and President Lincoln worked out strategy for the remainder of the war. In Grant's view, strategic direction of the war up to then had not been sufficiently centralized and effective to coordinate the movements of all the armies and bring the great might of the Union to bear against the Confederacy, and in Grant he had a trusted commander with ability. Grant ordered the Army of the Potomac to advance southward and bring unremitting pressure against Lee, always seeking a chance to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia, but to wear it down by attrition if other methods did not succeed. At the same time Butler, commanding the Army of the James at Fort Monroe, was to advance up the Peninsula, capture Richmond if possible, and block the railroads south of the capital to cut Lee's supply line. Maj Gen Franz Sigel would lead a force up the Shenandoah Valley to divert the Confederates and possibly get at Lee's rear. In the West, where Sherman had succeeded to Grant's command, three armies were to advance southward from Chattanooga to destroy Johnston's Army of Tennessee (Grant intended that Banks move against Mobile at the same time that Sherman moved south. This part of the plan failed because Banks, acting on vague orders from Halleck, advanced up the Red River toward Shreveport and met defeat). The main outlines of the Lincoln-Grant final plan are clear and simple. As events unfolded, the Army of the Potomac delivered a holding attack which pinned Lee to Virginia while Sherman made a vast swinging movement which enveloped the entire southeastern Confederacy.

MAY-DECEMBER CAMPAIGNS: Sherman's and Meade's great armies advanced simultaneously southward on 4 May 1864. The Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan River and tried to envelop Lee's east flank while Butler went for his line of communications. But Lee attacked the Army of the Potomac with ferocity in the Battle of the Wilderness on 5-6 May. The imperturbable Grant, though getting somewhat the worse of it, pushed on, trying to outflank Lee and interpose the Army of the Potomac between Lee and the defenses of Richmond. The two armies clashed at Spotsylvania from 9 thru 20 May, whereupon Grant sideslipped south again. Lee retired to fortify positions on the North Anna River; Grant decided they were too strong and moved farther south. Butler meanwhile failed to accomplish his mission; in May Beauregard outgeneraled him and bottled him at Bermuda Hundred, whereupon Lee easily made his way into the Richmond defenses, established his right flank on the Chickahominy, his center at Cold Harbor, and efficiently repulsed a frontal assault at Cold Harbor on 3 June.

So far the constant fighting had cost 55,000 to 60,000 Union casualties, as against 25,000 to 30,000 for Lee. But Grant had pinned Lee to Virginia, and the Union could make up heavy losses while Confederate manpower was becoming scarce. With Lee strongly entrenched in front of Richmond, Grant now decided to cross the James River east of the capital and advance against Petersburg to cut the roads and railways leading into Richmond. Thus he could starve Lee, or force him out of his trenches. Grant's engineers threw a 2,100-foot long ponton bridge over the James--the longest up to that time in the modern world. Unknown to Lee, the whole army crossed the river. Its advance elements got to the outskirts of Petersburg on 15 June, but moved too slowly, giving Lee time to collect troops and defend the town. Grant assaulted on 18 June but failed. Union troops then tunneled a great mine under the Confederate's line and blew a huge breach in it at the end of July. But the infantry attacks which followed were poorly planned and badly led, and they failed.

Grant then started siege operations, and extended his lines to his left (west)

to get around Lee's right, or so force Lee to stretch his line thin or abandon Richmond. Lee countered by maneuvering his fortifications to the right. In this way, the two armies spent the winter of 1864-65. Lee's army, though greatly weakened, was still intact. Indeed, the Petersburg lines had been strong enough for the bold Lee to attempt a spectacular diversion in July. He sent a corps under Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early northward through the Shenandoah Valley. Maj Gen David Hunter who had replaced Sigel as Union commander, withdrew up the Valley and turned west. Seeing his chance, Early advanced east through Maryland and on 11 July skirmished briskly in front of Fort Stevens, which was part of the ring of forts around Washington. An interested spectator behind Stevens' parapet was Abraham Lincoln himself.

Grant had not been paying close attention to Early's advance and to Union preparations to meet it. But when Lincoln prodded him he acted. A Corps from the Army of the Potomac began arriving in Washington on 11 July and engaged Early who pulled back to the Valley. Grant now pulled back and placed Washington, western Maryland, and the Valley under Maj Gen Philip H. Sheridan, who spent the rest of the year in the Valley, defeated Early, and devastated the farms so they could no longer provide food for Lee's army. Sheridan's objectives were thus fully as economic as military.

ADVANCE TO ATLANTA: Starting 4 May, Sherman with about 105,000 men--three armies and a cavalry corps--advanced southward from Chattanooga, repairing the railroads behind them as they moved. Opposing Sherman was the Army of Tennessee under Johnston reinforced to a total of about 65,000 men. Sherman's mission was destruction of the opposing forces and capture of the rail and industrial center of Atlanta. Seriously outnumbered, Johnston skillfully took up defensive positions, forced Sherman to maneuver widely in preparation for attack, and then withdrew, leaving Sherman to start the entire process over again. Sherman, usually an apostle of maneuver and flank attack, launched one frontal assault against Johnston's prepared positions at Kenesaw Mountain on 27 June, but was beaten off. Sherman then maneuvered again, and forced Johnston back to positions in front of Atlanta.

Although Johnston had demonstrated great skill in his withdrawal, so that Sherman had gained but 100 miles in 74 days, Jefferson Davis grew impatient, and expressed doubt whether Johnston could repel or defeat the invaders. Actually, in terms of time and distance, Johnston had done as well against Sherman as Lee had done against Grant. Nevertheless Davis replaced Johnston with Maj Gen John B. Hood on 17 July. Hood promptly played into Sherman's hands. Three days later, while Sherman was maneuvering around the northeast side of Atlanta, Hood left strong positions and attacked in two great assaults which failed. Sherman began extending his fortifications; Hood's striking power greatly weakened, withdrew into northwest Alabama. Sherman's armies marched into Atlanta on 1-2 September.

PORT OPERATIONS: Besides blockading, and cruising against Confederate commerce-raiders, the Union had continued operations against major ports. Charleston held out, using forts, channel obstructions, and torpedoes. Mobile was no longer important as a port; the Union blockade was too tight. But the Confederate iron clad **TENNESSEE** was there. Farragut, invoking Divine aid rather than damning the torpedoes, used eighteen vessels to force his way into Mobile Bay on 5 August 1864. In January 1865 an attack against Fort Fisher--which controlled access to Wilmington, North Carolina, the Confederacy's last port--succeeded, and fitted in with Sherman's overland march.

MARCH TO THE SEA: With the fall of Atlanta, Sherman proposed a bold move. He suggested that he send two corps of 30,000 men back to Nashville under Thomas, who would raise and train more men and defend Tennessee if Hood moved north. Sherman did not intend to pursue Hood himself, but would abandon his own line of communications, and with 62,000 men advance through the Confederacy and reach a port. His objective was not to destroy and Confederate army but, by marching through Georgia, demonstrate that the South had lost the war. Again, this was economic and psychological warfare which anticipated that of the Twentieth Century. Lincoln and Grant had doubts about the plan, but they had confidence in Sherman and told him to go ahead.

Departing Atlanta on 12 November, Sherman's troops advanced on a 60 mile front. Carrying twenty days' rations against emergencies, they foraged liberally, and enthusiastically burned and destroyed railways, cotton gins, and everything of military value on Sherman's orders. In addition, and in violation of Sherman's orders, there was a good deal of looting and unauthorized destruction. Sherman's army appeared before Savannah on 10 December; when Confederate forces evacuated on the 21st, Sherman marched in and presented the city as a Christmas gift to the nation.

Meanwhile, Hood had invaded Tennessee, but suffered defeat in the battles of Franklin (30 November 1864) and Nashville (15 December 1864). Thomas pursued resolutely with his cavalry. Maj Gen James H. Wilson led a 17,000-man cavalry invasion into Alabama and Georgia in early 1865 to keep Hood down and as added proof that the Confederacy had lost the war. This was the longest independent cavalry movement of the whole struggle.

THE FINAL CAMPAIGNS: As the bloody year 1864 concluded, war's end was clearly in view. Just as the victories of 1863 had placed the Union armies in position to start decisive offensives, so 1864 saw those offensives carried through to partial completion. Upon resolute completion of those offensives victory now depended. In January 1865 Sherman struck north from Savannah to march through the Carolinas toward Lee and Grant. Again the troops advanced on a wide front, and again, they foraged and looted freely. This march through swamps and along muddy trails was a remarkable military achievement. Corduroying the roads as it moved along, and fighting innumerable patrol actions and cavalry skirmishes, the army marched an average of over ten miles a day. The Confederates withdrew skillfully but were unable to slow Sherman down very much. Save at Bentonville, North Carolina, on 21 March, there were no stand-up fights. The Confederates simply did not have enough men for all-out battle.

Once the Virginia mud had dried slightly, Grant on 29 March moved again at Petersburg, still attempting to get around Lee's right flank, which now extended to the west. Sheridan had returned from the Valley, and his cavalry pushed on in the lead. With his line stretched too thin, Lee abandoned Richmond and Petersburg, and lunged westward with the intention of breaking loose from Grant's grip and joining forces with the Confederate army in North Carolina. But Grant never let go. He pursued Lee with troops behind him and on his right flank while Sheridan raced ahead. A Confederate corps was cut off and captured; rations were exhausted; soldiers were straggling and deserting by the thousand. And when Sheridan got his cavalry to Appomattox Court House, he squarely blocked Lee's escape route.

Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia on 9 April 1865, and Grant paroled the entire force to go home. Davis and some other die-hards had wanted to continue the war at all costs, but the principal field commanders on both sides were eager to avoid irregular or guerrilla warfare which could only degenerate into banditry. All other Confederate commanders soon surrendered. The grim fighting was over.

In strategy, as in weapons and tactics, the Civil War differed markedly from its predecessors and anticipated the world wars of the 20th Century. It was fought according to a strategic concept which was developed early but took years to execute. Psychological and propaganda appeals were used by each side. Sherman's and Sheridan's depredations, like the strategic bombing of World War II, were economic rather than primarily military in their impact. And the close coordination of widely separated movements that characterized the latter phases was made possible by the telegraph and the skill of the high command, representing a new departure in warfare.

EDITOR'S NOTE: The following article was taken from THE ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST, August, 1961. It was written by Dr. John Miller Jr., at that time Deputy Chief Historian, Office of the Chief of Military History. It is presented in this newsletter because it is fine concise account of the Civil War. One which you can give to those who are unacquainted with the conflict as we are.

TRIBUTE TO CIVIL WAR NEWSMEN
Bruce Catton

In 1861 the U.S. A. knew very little either about war or about newspaper reporting--in the modern sense. Americans then were amateurs in both fields. Until a very short time before the Civil War began there were no reporters, in the modern sense of the word. The newspaper was an organ of opinion. Its editorial page slopped over into all the other pages; the editor was advancing a point of view, and what he printed depended pretty largely on what his point of view was. A newspaper was primarily an institution that argued a case or cause. If you believed in that cause, as a reader, you subscribed to that paper; if you believed in some other cause you subscribed to some other paper, which would show you the world as you wanted to see it.

Then the Civil War came along, and suddenly things were very different. The people...wanted desperately to know what was happening with sons and brothers and husbands they had said goodbye to. They wanted to read the unvarnished facts, and the American newspaper suddenly discovered that from now on the emphasis was going to be on NEWS. At that point the Reporter, in the modern sense, began to come into his own. He had a hard row to hoe, because the U.S. Army could not quite get the idea. The reporter had no tradition back of him. (In a good many cases he did not have much of an editor back of him either.) The Army had all it could do to get used to the fact that it was fighting a war that was bigger than anything it had ever dreamed of; the reporter was simply a nuisance, and if he could not be turned into a press-agent for some deserving general he was usually looked upon as a sort of fifth wheel that somehow could not quite be discarded.

Without premeditation on anybody's part, the modern reporter suddenly came into being. When I say "the modern reporter" I mean the man who was, for that day, a new breed of cat--the reporter who was not out to support a point of view or uphold a cause but who simply wanted to get the best and most detailed story possible about what was actually going on around him. That man--the spiritual ancestor of all of us here today--began to come into being during the Civil War.

The Civil War reporter had to fight for everything he got. There were no hand-outs; he had to get out and scratch, on his own hook. Nobody in the army was responsible for him. If there was a battle he had to prowl around the field as best he could--often enough, in imminent danger of life and limb--and pry out the facts for himself. Then he had to make his own arrangements for getting the story back to the office. This frequently meant spending 24 hours in the saddle. Along with everything else, the reporter had to have a horse, and know how to ride it, and make arrangements for having the beast fed and stabled. There were not many telegraph offices then, and the ones within easy range of army headquarters were usually tied up with army stuff. Reaching the wire so that he could file his story might involve a very long, wearing ride. If the battle had gone badly--which, on the Union side, in the Virginia theater, was not unusual--the army authorities were apt to do everything they could to keep him from filing his story at all. On top of everything else, if the reporter's story as finally printed offended the commanding general, which very often happened, the reporter might get bodily thrown out of the whole theater of operations, or even sent off to prison for a few weeks. The Civil War reporter surmounted very great handicaps and by the large did a job which was of immense service to the country; a job, furthermore, which permanently raised the reporter's own status, expanded his professional horizon, and did a great deal to improve the standards of news-gathering all across the country.

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HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
CIVIL WAR (cont)

histories that stretch over centuries--where we stand as infants in the panorama of time. Yet it is with pride that we celebrate the centenary of a great struggle.

The pages that follow present the vista of a great conflict on this continent. The articles that illuminate this vista bear the stamp of historical truth and have been chosen to whet the appetite of varied tastes. Through all of them you will find the underlying greatness of the American individual. Here is devotion to ideals strength of character and body; ingenuity; humor and pathos; good and bad--all those things which make up a people engaged in a war that remains living history.