

THE CIVIL WAR ROUND-TABLE

P. O. BOX 5028, CLEVELAND, OHIO 44101

December, 1973

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Mr. James Chapman
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
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THE CIVIL WAR ROUND-TABLE

P. O. BOX 5028, CLEVELAND, OHIO 44101

DECEMBER 1973

Vol. 17 No. 4

140th Meeting

DATE: TUESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1973

SPEAKER: REV. DONALD SMYTHE, S.J.

SUBJECT: GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING

PLACE: THE HERMIT CLUB, DODGE COURT

PRELIMINARIES: 6:30 PM DINNER: 7 PM

Rev. Donald Smythe, S.J.

Reverend Father Smythe is currently teaching American Military History at John Carroll University (Cleveland) and has been there since 1966. He is a member of the American Military Institute, the Ohio Academy of History, and the Organization of American Historians.

Born in Lorain, Ohio on December 22, 1927, his elementary and secondary education was in Amherst, Ohio and his college at John Carroll University, Cleveland (B.S.S., 1948). After one year at the University of Michigan Law School (1948-1949) he entered the Jesuit Order in 1949. His early Jesuit studies were at Xavier University (Cincinnati) and Loyola University (Chicago). In 1955 he received from the latter a M.A. in history and a licentiate in philosophy.

From 1955 to 1958 he taught American and world history at St. Ignatius High School (Chicago). The following three years he was at Georgetown University (Washington, D.C.), where he received his Ph.D. in 1961. His doctoral dissertation was entitled "The Early Career of General John J. Pershing, 1860-1903."

From 1961 to 1965 he studied theology at Woodstock College (Maryland) where he was ordained to the Catholic priesthood. Woodstock granted him a licentiate in theology in 1965. During the academic year 1965-66 he was in France, Belgium and Germany, interviewing Pershing acquaintances, consulting archives, and visiting World War I battlefields.

It was as a doctoral student at Georgetown that he began a multi-volume biography of General Pershing. The project was undertaken because no scholarly biographies of the man existed. It has been continued because none have been published and none are contemplated in the depth of this one. Volume I of the biography, Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing, is finished and was published by Scribners this year. Volume II (General of the Armies: John J. Pershing, 1917-1948) should be completed in about five years. Father Smythe also has many published articles on Pershing in leading historical magazines.

APPOMATTOX: A THREATENED STILLNESS

by Lance Gay

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS

August 26, 1973

APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE, Va. -- Sometimes in the stillness of the night after all the visitors have gone, Robert Madden walks through the uninhabited hamlet of Appomattox to "Surrender Triangle" to look down into the tranquil, tree-lined valley where the Confederate Army held its last bivouac.

If he closes his eyes, he says he can still hear the screams and gunfire volleys of the Army of Northern Virginia's last abortive charge when General Robert E. Lee tried to break through the Union lines that blocked the road to Danville.

And, Madden says, on quiet nights, he can still hear the gravel crinkle under soldiers' boots along the Richmond to Lynchburg Stage Road as the war-weary Confederate soldiers slowly walk up the hill to the grassy triangle where the Army of Northern Virginia laid down its arms, surrendered its battle flags, and disbanded.

But then, Madden says, he is usually shaken back to reality by a nightmare that has begun to haunt him, and he hears new and hostile footsteps in the valley and farmlands, marching on Appomattox Court House to the rumble of modern machinery bringing with it commercial development.

"It just gives me the shivers to think of it," said Madden, superintendent of Appomattox Court House National Historical Park, as he gazed across the virgin, verdant fields around the hamlet.

"I have nightmares, where I see high-density housing projects, motels, diners, and gas stations in that valley, right down there where the Confederate Army last slept and over there where Lee met Grant for the last time after the surrender had been negotiated."

This is no wild dream, Madden added, but a real threat to the valley, which is not included in the 1,050 acres around Appomattox owned by the National Park Service. In the past five years, Madden said, speculators repeatedly have approached farm owners in the valley and asked them to sell their property. He feels that it is only a matter of time before someone sells out.

"They're mostly older folks and they love their farms and they love the park and they've said they wouldn't do anything to hurt the park or desecrate it," Madden said in explaining why commercial development has been kept out of the area so far.

"But it's after their time that concerns me. When they die and the land is given to someone else, there is nothing to stop them from developing it."

And, with increasing demands for more recreation lands in the nation, "it has become almost inevitable where you have an area significant enough, in terms of historical, natural and cultural significance, that you have development around the area" Madden said. He referred to the sprawling development around Colonial Williamsburg and Gettysburg in the last decade.

It's only a matter of time before developers move into Appomattox to exploit the 260,000 tourists who annually trek to the park to see the hamlet where the war ended, Madden believes.

Rep. W.C. (Dan) Daniel, D-Va., who represents the Appomattox area, has introduced a bill in Congress that would allow expansion of the park by up to almost 500 acres.

This would allow the National Park Service to buy most of the valley and keep development out of the surrounding area. And Appomattox County officials are considering a zoning ordinance, which would allow restricted development around the park but which would also preserve the park's integrity and isolation.

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CONFEDERATE DIPLOMACY

by

Elden "Josh" Billings
CWRT of the District of
Columbia

In the following discussion Confederate Diplomacy shall be divided into two parts: (1) A brief summary of the effect of Confederate Diplomacy on England and France and (2) The work of Confederate Diplomats. Of the latter, little attention will be given to propaganda by such men as Hotze and De Leon, important as were their activities.

Confederate diplomacy is a story of ingenuity against almost insuperable odds. The effort to secure a place in the world, failed as the result of a series of unfortunate European economic circumstances, which were unknown to Confederate political leaders rather than to any failure of individuals.

Many incidents of Confederate diplomacy, are familiar to you: Therefore, more attention will be devoted to lesser-known aspects of the problems of Confederate diplomacy.

One of the first acts of the provisional Confederate Government was the selection of a three-man diplomatic mission to Washington to arrange a peaceful settlement with the United States Government. However, after some unofficial negotiations with Secretary of State William H. Seward, the Federal Government refused to acknowledge the commission and its members returned to the Confederacy. This act made it necessary for the Confederacy to prove its ability to win and to maintain its independence. Lincoln's proclamation announcing the blockade of the Southern Coast required that the Confederacy either induce foreign nations to repudiate the blockade or insist that other countries provide the ships and the aid necessary for the Confederacy itself to break the blockade.

With high hopes of foreign help and recognition, the infant Confederacy sent its first diplomatic agents to Europe. In March, 1861, before the outbreak of hostilities, William L. Yancey, Judge Pierre A. Rost and A. Dudley Mann were sent on an introductory mission. They were to approach England first. Once successful there, they were to tackle France, Russia and Belgium in order. Failing recognition they were to drum up support for the Confederacy to spread propaganda and to negotiate treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation.

Despite these professed orders, what has been called "King Cotton Diplomacy" was followed by the Confederate Government. Perhaps a brief explanation is necessary, for this concept is the central core of Confederate diplomacy. As Confederate leaders saw world economic condi-

tions cotton was king. British and French textile mills imported more than three-fourths of their cotton from the Confederacy. Although Britain has sought since 1840 to build up the Indian cotton supply as a buffer to that from the South her cotton demand had increased by one thousand per cent since 1800 while the Indian supply had risen by only twenty per cent.

In England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales a million out of a total of twenty-one million were dependent on the cotton industry for their livelihood. The north of the United States, next to England, depended on cotton, both as a medium of international trade and for her textile industry.

Although there were 4 million spindles in France and 2 million in Russia and Germany, respectively, cotton manufacturing was largely supplementary to farming and other rural pursuits. However, textiles were one of France's largest industries.

To Confederate leaders, it seemed reasonable that the European governments, particularly Britain and France, would be forced to recognize the Confederacy and to break the blockade in order to secure cotton for their textile industries.

Why the Davis Administration did not export enough cotton to establish a European credit of say \$500 million - remains unclear. Perhaps it was because of too rigid interpretation of the King Cotton theory. Certainly the main arguments against such a policy (1) the hazards of the blockade, and, (2) the alleged insufficiency of ships, were answerable in the first few months of the war. The blockade was ineffective: ships could have been purchased to move the cotton to Cuba, the West Indies, Mexico and other nearby places for storage and future shipment to Europe.

It is true that foreign loans were not obtained because the voluntary embargo placed on the shipment of cotton destroyed the only real basis for Confederate credit. John Slidell was primarily responsible for the one foreign loan actually consummated (The Erlanger Loan). Although opinions vary it has been estimated that the cash actually realized from the loan was only about \$3 million, or one fifth of its face value. Only one party profited from the loan (the Erlanger Company) which had gains of about \$2.7 million.

A movement to establish a Confederate bank in Europe with a branch in South Carolina was negotiated in early 1865, including a possible loan of up to \$75 million to the Confederate Government, but it failed because of military disasters.

However, there is some evidence of a secret loan of \$3 million from Britain and France in 1862. According to the story, as told in John Bakeless' "Spies of the Confederacy", a Confederate agent, Captain T.N. Conrad, was sent to Washington to meet two officials - one French, one British - who were posing as ordinary travelers. Conrad escorted the two to Richmond where, he claimed, an actual loan was negotiated and the money supplied a few weeks later. No record is extant regarding such a loan and Bakeless concludes that whether or not it was actually negotiated will probably never be known.

President Jefferson Davis and his cabinet (with the notable exception of Judah P. Benjamin who opposed the idea) soon established a policy of creating an artificial cotton famine in Europe by embargoing the shipment of cotton through the blockade.

So great was Southern confidence in this idea of a cotton embargo that public clamor demanded some method of preventing cotton exports.

Sentiment regarding a cotton embargo was just as strong in Congress yet no legislation was enacted. Undoubtedly, the prevention of actual legislation was the work of Jefferson Davis, who had a well-considered system of strategy, which was to encourage discussion of suggested legislation and the passage of resolutions regarding a cotton embargo as indicative of sentiment, so that the threat of an official embargo might be held over Europe. If such an embargo were sanctioned by the

administration, however, it might drive England and France into the arms of the enemy instead of to the aid of the beleaguered Confederacy. Thus, Davis saw that he could pose as the leader of an administration favoring unrestricted intercourse with all friendly powers, in the face of a Congress straining to pass an embargo.

Meanwhile, committees of public safety were established in the Southern seaports for the purpose of halting the export of cotton.

In addition, there was widespread effort to cut down supply by restricting the planting of cotton and by the deliberate burning of cotton as a public duty. The limitation of planting was the work of the states: That of requiring burning rather than falling into the hands of the enemy was the work of the Confederate legislature. It has been estimated that two and one half million bales in 1859 to three hundred thousand bales in 1864. What was, in effect, an embargo on cotton exports came as a result of public opinion and of state action, but it was effective.

The Davis Administration faced embarrassment abroad when its diplomatic representatives pressed for recognition by declaring that the blockade was ineffective but had no ready answer when European Governments sought to find why no cotton was appearing in their markets. The North, on the other hand, stressed that the unavailability of cotton proved that the blockade was effective.

The embargo discouraged blockade running because there was little, except cotton, for ships to carry on their return trips to Europe. So the cotton embargo helped persuade the European countries that the blockade was effective. Briefly, this was the situation that faced the Confederacy until Spring, 1862, after which the cotton embargo was reduced slowly until it ceased completely. By that time, however, the blockade had become much more effective.

Unfortunately bumper cotton crops in 1859 and 1860 had resulted in large shipments to Europe, particularly to England, until there was about a two and one half year supply of cotton on hand. Concomitant amounts were in other European countries.

However, the oversupply of cotton was not the only factor which Confederate diplomacy failed to consider. Despite the abundance of cotton in England and France many mills were closing down, producing economic distress. This depression was the result of overproduction and overstocking of the markets in 1859 and 1860. England, alone, had an excess of three hundred million pounds of cotton goods and seven hundred thousand bales more than the normal supply of raw cotton. The markets of India and China were saturated and the natives had stopped buying. Too, the American market was destroyed as a result of the War and not for the lack of cotton. France's exports to the United States declined by twenty million dollars and Britain's by twenty-five million dollars in 1861. Most of this loss was in cotton textiles.

Strangely, the Davis Administration seemed unaware of this situation. One experienced cotton merchant, attached to the Yancey-Rost-Mann mission, would soon have realized the falsity of the Confederate position and his advice might have changed the course of the war.

England's situation was: the raw cotton on hand had cost about fourteen cents a pound and the manufactured goods stored in warehouses could not be sold at the cost of the raw material. The British textile industry was faced with bankruptcy! Mills already were beginning to slow down before the war, and British financial and economic writers had been predicting a long period of unemployment for the industry. The Civil War came almost as the answer to a prayer and shut off the supply of cheap cotton. The Confederacy cooperated even further by its extra-legal embargo of cotton exports. The price of raw cotton rose from fourteen to sixty cents a pound, and as time passed the surplus manufactured goods followed suit, until at last prewar stocks were sold at a net profit of about two hundred million dollars.

Meanwhile, the larger and better financed companies continued to manufacture goods and to hold them against a rising market. These larger mills, comprising about two-thirds of the industry, thus made profits from their cheap pre-war goods and also received satisfactory returns from their output over the four years of the war. The small mill owners, on the other hand, lost all they had, because of insufficient capital to produce for a future rising market. The operatives, too, suffered severely. Unemployment and part-time employment in 1862 reached about two million in England, while in France nearly one million were without full-time employment.

The British textile industry was saved from one of the worst panic in history and impending ruin was turned into undreamed of profits. Small wonder that this industry desired neither the breaking of the blockade nor recognition of the Confederacy! As one writer, in speaking of the Lancashire Delegation, has phrased it, "instead of desiring intervention, these members of parliament and the industrialists they represented must have been praying that the Lord would see fit to let the Civil War continue forever." Even the operatives feared peace: They could not hope for full-time work during the war, but they were afraid when the war ended they would lose their jobs entirely. Another hope in England that Indian cotton could supplant American as a rival source was remarkably successful during the war years.

Two rival industries, linen and wool, which had lost business to cotton, recaptured much of the ground they had lost. In 1858 flax constituted about ninety-two thousand acres in Ireland -the chief source of supply of the linen industry- whereas in 1864 there were nearly three hundred two thousand acres, an increase of 229 per cent. The importation of yarn increased from about fifty-nine thousand pounds in 1861 to nearly four million pounds in 1863. Exports of yarns increased forty-four per cent between 1861 and 1864, while those of thread rose by 68%. The export of plain cloth climbed by 80 per cent. For the years 1861-1865 the excess profits above the normal were nearly one hundred million dollars.

Another industry which partially replaced cotton textiles, primarily in England and France was munitions. The North and the South together bought more than one hundred million dollars in munitions. These purchases do not include such adjunct items as clothing, tents, shoes and leather goods. One of the most lucrative sources of income was the sale of ships and steamers to the Confederacy or the building of steamers for English blockade-runners. Altogether 400 steamers and 800 sailing vessels were sold as blockade-runners. Six ironclads and two wooden cruisers were constructed for the Confederate Government.

Enormous profits -often as high as 500 per cent- were made by English blockade-running houses. The greatest profit of all to England could not be measured by dollars and cents figures. This was the destruction of the American Merchant Marine. Without any effort on England's part, her greatest rival in world maritime trade lost primacy: in fact, most of the American ships that were sold became part of the British Merchant Marine.

Wheat bore some relationship to the failure of King Cotton Diplomacy, but its influence has not been established precisely. It is true that British imports from the United States increased tremendously from 1859 through 1863. However, alternative sources of supply were available on the continent of Europe so that the fear of war, should the American wheat supply be shut off now, seems unwarranted. Then, however, many uninformed Englishmen thought that they were fatally dependent upon American foodstuffs.

Furthermore this theory was not discussed in Parliament or in cabinet meetings nor is there any mention of it found in the private correspondence of people vitally concerned. What attention was given to the theory in 1861-1863 pointed out that the wheat was merely a means of paying for tremendous shipments of munitions to the United

... (initially these would have been financed by cotton shipments). During 1864 and 1865, when the North was producing virtually all the munitions it required, England shifted to Russian and East European markets. Here the Confederacy seems to have suffered from shrewd propaganda by the Lincoln Administration.

These factors formed the main barrier to recognition or mediation by European countries. Other reasons of a political and diplomatic nature had some effect, but were largely secondary. Now attention must be given to the work of selected Confederate diplomatic agents.

Although the Yancey-Rost-Mann Mission was not officially received by the British Government, the Foreign Minister, Lord Russell, granted unofficial interviews on May third and ninth, 1861. The Mission scored a diplomatic triumph when, on May 13th 1861, Queen Victoria granted belligerent status to the Confederacy. France, Spain, The Netherlands and Brazil followed suit. This preliminary mission served from March 1861 to January 1862. It gained entree to British Society, received much public attention and secured belligerency status, but it failed in most of the Confederacy's major hopes, which were: (1) Full Recognition: A treaty of amity and commerce; (2) Denouncement of the Blockade: The use of foreign ports and active intervention by European countries. In January 1862, with the arrival of John M. Mason and John Slidell, Yancey returned home, Mann was shifted to Belgium, and Judge Rost to Spain.

On his return, Yancey, more realistic than the other members of the commission, made a speech in New Orleans in which he warned that Europe had neither sympathy nor appreciation for the Confederacy, and would do nothing to favor it until independence had been won on the battlefield. Mason and Slidell probably came nearer to achieving successful intervention by England as a result of their seizure from the British ship TRENT, on the high seas by Captain Charles Wilkes, than by anything they were able to do once they had been released and permitted to proceed to England and to France respectively.

Neither man was an ideal selection as a diplomat, although they probably were the best choices available. Mason epitomized the pro-slavery spirit of the South which was extremely unpopular in Europe. Slidell was described by W.H. Russell, famous British War Correspondent, as "The kind of man who if you put him in solitary confinement, would start intriguing with the mice against the cat."

Although both nations prepared for war, the Trent Affair was settled amicably. Britain sent troops to Canada during these tense days. An amusing anticlimax developed when a British troopship, unable to enter the ice-bound St. Lawrence, put into Portland, Maine. Seward graciously granted permission for the troops to cross Maine on their way to Canada.

Interpretation of the Trent Affair seems to be in need of revision. Today accumulated evidence indicates that the South may have staged the whole affair in a deliberate attempt to precipitate conflict between the North and Great Britain. Why else should the Davis Government have allowed a month and a half of time to elapse between the appointment of the commissioners and their departure? Certainly no one made any attempt to keep secret the mission nor their departure for Havana. Speculation regarding possible capture of the envoys was keen on both sides of the ocean. While in Havana awaiting arrival of the TRENT the two made no secret of their plans: actually they even had lunch with several of the officer of Wilkes' ship to whom they talked freely of their forthcoming departure. Evidently a trap was laid in the hope of disrupting British-American relations, but with the surrender of the two men, success eluded the Davis Administration.

Also, historians have ignored the French note regarding the Trent Affair. Although the French Government backed the British stand, its note gave Seward a diplomatic and legal instrument for convincing the President, the Cabinet and the Northern people of the wisdom of releasing the two Confederate envoys. Another example of Anglo-French co-operation.

Both Mason and Slidell secured an array of statistics to prove that the blockade was ineffective, declaring that 400 ships had passed through the blockade during the first 4 months of its existence. The British were not impressed for two reasons: Diplomatically, they had long cherished a paper blockade and, practically, they were afraid of war with the United States.

In the summer and early fall of 1862 serious consideration was given by the British Government to recognition. Confederate successes had led British authorities to consider a mediation plan involving joint action by England, France and Russia. This was not successful because of the hesitancy of the British, but of the failure of Russia to join.

At this time, William E. Gladstone, Chancellor of the Exchequer, dropped a bombshell by an unauthorized disclosure which seemed to forecast a policy which the Cabinet had not yet matured. He stated unequivocally that the Confederacy would succeed. All the world took Gladstone's statement to mean recognition. The market for cotton was thrown into doubt; uncertainty further disturbed a trade already in confusion. Orders were countermanded: the price of cotton was seriously depressed. Moreover, large interests did not want the war brought to a close and made known their objections to any change in policy.

On October 13, Lord Russell sent a memorandum to Cabinet members proposing an armistice so that the problem of peace in America could receive calm consideration.

Other factors acted as a brake on policy: Lee's failure at Antietam and retreat back to Virginia and Lincoln's preliminary Emancipation Proclamation resulted in postponement of this movement until the war might be more favorable to the Confederacy. A situation that never arose. E. D. Adams, an expert on British-American relations during the Civil War, believed that Russell's proposals were the most dangerous crisis in diplomacy for the United States Government during the conflict. Russell's suggestions came close to adoption and, in all likelihood, would have resulted in War between Britain and the United States, which, seemingly, would have assured Southern Independence. However, the British Cabinet rejected the proposal and, according to Adams, "Never again was there serious Governmental consideration of meddling in American affairs". Thus Antietam was, diplomatically speaking, one of the decisive battles of the world.

Failing in their attempts to secure recognition, Confederate agents sought to convince European nations that ships should be constructed for an that military supplies should be sent to the Confederacy.

The first two agents sent were Caleb Huse, a Massachusetts-born West Pointer, by the Ordnance Bureau, and James D. Bulloch, by the Navy. Huse was successful in buying small arms, heavy artillery and ammunition. For a short time he purchased supplies for other departments.

Practically all war supplies from Europe were obtained in England and France, although Huse did purchase 100,000 rifles and 60 cannon in Austria. He was forced to act almost alone in 1861 and the early months of 1862. Huse then became chief agent for the War Department, but many other men became active in purchasing for other departments, for the states and some companies.

Bulloch confined his chief interest to the building of fast cruisers, such as the ALABAMA and the FLORIDA. He succeeded in getting the ALABAMA (the most famous raider) out of England just ahead of the law officers of the crown, who had orders to detain the ship. A contract for two Laird Company ironclad rams to be delivered in 1863, failed because of previous announcements of British policy, buttressed by United States insistence that release of the rams meant war.

In 1863 another determined attempt was made by friends of the Confederacy in England to secure recognition, but it subsided because of the ineptitude of the proponents of the Confederacy coupled with Confederate defeats at Gettysburg and at Vicksburg.

European preoccupation with the Polish revolt against Russia definitely hampered Confederate diplomatic efforts in 1863. There was serious danger of a general war in Europe. France feared that the Prusso-Russian Pact would be leveled against her and dared not move without English cooperation, while the English dreaded a possible Russian-American agreement which might mean a new balance of power in the world. Other parts of Europe were in ferment which distracted attention from the American war.

After the summer of 1863 official sympathy for the Confederacy declined. This year marked a turning point in Confederate-English relations. A break came in the Autumn largely as a result of the failure of recognition and the detention of the Laird rams, but also as a consequence of the expulsion of British Consuls from the Confederacy. On August 4 Mason was notified by his government that his mission to Britain was ended and on September 30 he moved his activities to Paris.

France's attitude was friendly to the Confederacy, but she was guided in most of her actions by the British. With the consent of Napoleon III and with the specific authorization of the French Minister of Marine, contracts were made for the building of 4 cruisers. These were to be finished in 1864. Two ironclad rams were also contracted for, but vigorous protests by the American Government prevented delivery of any vessels. Though encouraging the Confederacy by glowing promises, France actually gave less aid in the building of a Confederate Navy than did England.

Of all the European Governments, France was most favorable to the Confederacy in sentiment. Napoleon granted two long interviews to John Slidell in 1862 in which he showed definite sympathy and an inclination to help the Confederacy secure either mediation or recognition. His Mexican adventure (which time precludes discussing in detail, but which must be summarized, was the main factor in his advocacy of the South.

France had, in 1861, in conjunction with Great Britain and Spain agreed to invade Mexico for the purpose of collecting debts, which had been cancelled for two years by the Juarez Government.

In May 1862, after having obtained satisfactory arrangements with the Mexican Government on the debt, England and Spain withdrew, but France remained (after submitting extravagant claims against Mexico) with plans to establish a puppet empire there.

The Davis Administration hoped to use Napoleon's ambitions in Mexico as a pawn in its attempts to gain recognition, using the argument that Napoleon's Mexican State could not succeed except with the help of the Confederacy. This, too, failed because of Napoleon's inability to act without Britain.

However, the Mexican Expedition by France had an influence on the French policy of neutrality which has not been noticed by historians. The foreign minister appreciated that the United States was in a position to be as unneutral or as neutral toward the Mexican Expedition as France might be toward the Civil War. This interrelationship the foreign minister did not fail to impress upon the French Emperor. Thus, for France's part she refrained from recognizing the Confederacy and from breaking the blockade, and she strictly enforced her neutrality regulations regarding Southern ships in her ports and under construction in her yards. In return Seward reassured France that the United States would not take action against France in Mexico nor allow recruitment in American cities of troops destined for the Mexican Republic. Napoleon's Mexican policy was not popular in France.

There was little chance of recognition of the Confederacy by any European Government after the summer of 1863. Consequently, most of the Confederate diplomatic activity was the shipment of arms, munitions, and the attempt to release ships for the Navy. Here one great deterrent was lack of financial resources.

A minor source of trade was Mexico. The amount and value of goods obtained cannot be determined, but large shipment including some small arms and ammunition came in from Europe through the Port of Matamoras. Most of these imports, however, did not get farther East than the Trans Mississippi Department.

The Confederacy maintained diplomatic relations with Canada, but Canadian activities were largely concerned with carrying the war into the North.

Summarizing Confederate diplomacy one can say:

None of these major objectives was obtained: the recognition of the independence of the Confederacy; the breaking of the blockade by foreign intervention; trade treaties; and important foreign loans.

These failures should not be attributed to the Davis Administration. Primarily they resulted from: defeats of the Confederate armies at critical times; from the unwillingness of European Governments to risk the threat of war with the United States; and from the surplus of cotton goods in European hands at the outbreak of the war.

As has been shown, England made enormous profits from the war. Her surplus of cotton was sold at a fabulous profit, her linen and woollen industries reaped enormous harvests, her munitions and steel industries enriched themselves, her shipbuilding was tremendously stimulated by the demands of the Confederate Government and those of merchant houses, which made millions from blockade running. Foreign trade increased by 34 per cent between 1860 and 1864, despite the decline of the American market.

Unemployment was little higher during the war years than before which indicated a shift from textiles to other industries plus some migration of workers.

Another reason for her failure to intervene was that the British Cabinet thought that the Confederacy would succeed without such action. Intervention, in British eyes, would have meant war with the United States, a struggle in which Britain would be vulnerable to all her other enemies. It was feared that such action would mean the loss of Canada. Britain did not want to help establish a precedent of interfering in a domestic struggle--while war was still raging--especially of a first-class power.

Finally, the British hoped to disarm American protests at a later date by allowing that country to establish a paper blockade. France failed to intervene because Napoleon III feared that his European rivals would take advantage of his preoccupation with American affairs to attack him and second, he was afraid of popular disapproval of an American War.

Slavery undoubtedly was one of the primary stumbling blocks in European recognition. Had the Confederacy at any time in the first part of the war indicated that it might free the slaves within its borders, there was a strong likelihood that England, France and other European countries might have granted recognition. At least there would have been much stronger consideration of such action. However, until the Kenner Mission of 1865, the Davis Administration refused to consider emancipation, declaring that such power resided in the state governments. Thus states rights helped defeat the diplomatic program of the Confederacy.

EDITOR'S NOTE: As Editor of this newsletter I am proud to present this original manuscript on Confederate Diplomacy by Elden "Josh" Billings.

Josh is an analyst in international finance with the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. He studied at the London School of Economics where he specialized in problems of British economics. Josh is a member of the CWRT of the District of Columbia as well as past president of that organization as well as the Washington Lincoln Group. He also has one of the finest libraries anywhere on the great conflict. Among his more than 1500 volumes are some war books not available in the Library of Congress.

But Madden and some Civil War buffs are becoming anxious with the government's slow and grinding processes and not that there is nothing now on the books to protect the valley from development, since Appomattox County -- like some other predominantly rural counties in Virginia -- doesn't have any zoning ordinances at all.

The hamlet was built in early 18th Century around Clover Hill Tavern, which served as a resting place for travelers on the Richmond to Lynchburg Stage Road. After the Civil War, the town was neglected and no efforts were made to preserve it until the 1930s, when the Resettlement Administration, one of the many government agencies formed during the Depression, bought 1,000 acres on the south side of the old stage road which was then renamed State Rte. 24.

The land was subsequently transferred to the National Park Service which launched an ambitious program to restore the hamlet to its condition on April 9, 1865, when Lee surrendered to Lt. Gen Ulysses S. Grant at the farmhouse of Wilmer McLean.

When the Park Service took over, souvenir hunters had completed the dismantling of the McLean House, which was begun by a group of promoters who went bankrupt while trying to move it to the 1893 Chicago World's Fair. The Appomattox Court House had been destroyed by fire that same year. But when they began reconstruction of the hamlet, the Park Service discovered that the Resettlement Administration's purchase did not include the site of the last artillery battle of the war north of the hamlet and included none of the other important historical sites north of Rte 24.

So in 1953, the Park Service asked Congress for authorization to exchange some of the parkland of no historical interest for some of the historical acreage within the hamlet.

Congress authorized the exchange, but in the process, stripped the Park Service of its authority to acquire any other land in the valley by means other than exchange of land. Thus, since that act, the Park Service has not been able to buy land in the valley.

"No one then envisioned the development I have nightmares about," Madden said, and park officials didn't worry about development of the valley until a few years ago when they became aware of growing interest by land speculators.

Among the areas the Park Service does not own is the site northwest of the village where the Army of Northern Virginia made its last abortive charge against Grant's troops, who were massed in a semicircle west of the hamlet.

Squatting in the middle of the attack route, about 150 yards from the front steps of the McLean House, is a four-year-old split-level brick rambler, which park officials said was the first indication that development was beginning to encroach on the hamlet.

The house is owned by David Nash, who also owns a total of 89 acres at the southwestern edge of the park. Some of the land has been cleared for development and a subdivision plan was filed with the country two years ago.

Madden and the Park Service have engaged in a running feud with Nash since he moved in and built a private landing strip in his front yard for his personal plane.

"I didn't realize how close it was until I was sitting in my office one day and this plane skimmed across the rooftops of the McLean House and the tavern," Madden recalled, "and I've had recurring dreams about that too -- about sitting up here one day when a propeller comes through the wall."

The Federal Aviation Administration investigated Park Service complaints against Nash and found he was operating within flight regulations and doing nothing wrong. However, Nash agreed to change his flight pattern to keep his plane away from the rooftops of the hamlet. Madden said Nash has been cooperating.

Another threat to the integrity of the park, officials fear, is the increasing industrialization of Appomattox County, a predominantly rural county until new industry began to locate there within the past 10 years.

The largest of the new industries is Thomasville Furniture Industries, one of the nation's largest producers of home furnishings, which is building a plant on a 100-acre site on the outskirts of the new town of Appomattox. The town is about two miles west of the historic hamlet.

With more industry moving into the area, Madden said, it is only a matter of time before the outskirts of the town begin to creep closer to the park. Demands will be made for new housing for employees the industry brings with it.

The Appomattox Town Council has been one of the most vigorous supporters of the bill to expand the limits of the park, and Mayor Henry Pack agreed with Madden that immediate steps have to be taken to protect the park and prevent it from "becoming another Gettysburg."

However, some Appomattox County officials have been less than warm about the prospect of another 500 acres being taken off the county's revenue rolls and given to the federal government. The Board of Supervisors has not endorsed the expansion measure.

Instead, some county officials have supported protecting the park through a new zoning ordinance. Under this measure, two zones would be created around the park.

The inner zone adjacent to the current parkland would prohibit commercial development but permit the construction of homes on two acres of land or more. The outer zone would permit the construction of single-family homes on one acre lots and some limited commercial development.

In both zones building heights would be limited to 35 feet on the theory that buildings of that size could be hidden behind tree cover and thus would not be visual obstructions to the view from the park.

The zoning ordinance, which is now being drawn up by the Appomattox County Planning Commission, already has encountered some opposition, especially from people in rural areas of the county who have maintained that the government has no right to dictate what they should do with their land.

Appomattox Supervisor Otto H. Tolley Sr. said he expects the board to consider a resolution to endorse the expansion of the park at its September 14 meeting, and predicted that the three-member board will pass it.

Madden believes that the best way of protecting the park is by expanding its boundaries to include all of the valley within sight of the hamlet and said he didn't think that the county's zoning ordinance would protect the valley as well as the federal purchase would.

"But without either the county's zoning ordinance or the acquisition of the land, I believe that exploitation is going to take place," he said.

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CAPTAIN MINIE

In 1847 Captain Minie in France developed an elongated or conical bullet, quickly named the Minie ball. It had a pointed nose to lessen air resistance. The base was round, to conform to the shape of the barrel, and thus avoid loss of power from the burning powder charge.

The base was hollow to equalize weight of nose and base and to prevent the bullet from tumbling end over end, as it might do if unbalanced in weight. The base had a thin skirt or wall, which under pressure of the powder charge expanded to fit the grooves or riflings in the barrel.